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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early 2010, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral arguments for 
McDonald v. City of Chicago to determine whether the Second Amendment is 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and applies directly to the states.1  
Coming less than two years after the Court’s landmark decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,2 the issues affecting the Fourteenth Amendment are two-fold.  
First, the Court will determine whether the Second Amendment is incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Second, the Court will 
determine if the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  While the “privileges and 
immunities” issue will receive the overwhelming attention of the legal community, 
what will seemingly be ignored is the history of the Anglo-American tradition of 
“having arms,” for its history may prove crucial as to whether the Second 
Amendment is incorporated through either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process or Privileges and Immunities Clauses.  
In the wake of Heller, the first and only court to issue an opinion incorporating 
the Second Amendment was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ vacated decision in 
Nordyke v. King.3  In incorporating the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court determined that “the right to keep and 
bear arms is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” and “is necessary 
to the Anglo-American conception of ordered liberty that we have inherited.”4  There 
is no denying that the limited “individual right” to defend against standing armies—
foreign or domestic—predated the Constitution.  However, there is no substantiating 
historical evidence that a right to own and use guns in the home was ever meant to be 
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”5  Given the Supreme Court’s 
holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Nordyke court’s conclusion was not at 
all surprising.  The Court majority had already determined that the “District’s ban on 
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its 
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the 
purpose of immediate self-defense.”6   
The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”7  Most legal scholars and historians argue that this right mirrors a 
provision in the 1689 English Declaration of Rights, which ensures that “subjects 
which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions 
                                                          
1
 NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5150 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1521).  
2
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
3
 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16908 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2009) (No. 07-15763). 
4
 Id. at 457.  
5
 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
6
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22. 
7
 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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and as allowed by law.”8  It is more than reasonable to assert that this provision 
heavily influenced the Second Amendment, because the Founding Fathers viewed 
the American Revolution as a reaffirmation of the Glorious Revolution.9  Therefore, 
it is fair to say that the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” guarantee was the 
precursor to, if not the inspiration for, the Second Amendment. 
This fact is not only historically significant, it is also legally significant.  It was 
the means by which the Supreme Court majority came to its determination in Heller. 
The Court stated that the English “right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ 
abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right 
protecting against both public and private violence.”10  In other words, the Supreme 
Court majority interpreted the English “have arms” provision as a right to personal 
armed self-defense—an interpretation it thought the Founders understood to be the 
Second Amendment’s “central component.”11 
This historical interpretation of the “have arms” provision laid the foundation for 
the decision in Nordyke.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not touch upon the 
history of the English right to “have arms.”  Instead, it merely took the Heller 
majority’s analysis as sufficient to prove that an alleged right to own a gun for 
defense of the home was firmly rooted in the Anglo-American tradition.  Both the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court majority have been misled.  
They have relied upon incomplete and misguided research of both the English “have 
arms” provision and the Founders’ understanding of that limited right.12  Both courts 
have been led to believe that lower-status Englishmen’s discontent with the gaming 
laws, coupled with their required duties in the militia, created a constitutional right to 
own arms to defend the home—a right that has never historically or legally existed.   
The problem is that Individual Right Scholars have seemingly ignored the 
abundant sources that explain exactly what the English allowance to “have arms” 
was meant to protect.  First, the provision is an allowance—not a right—because it 
states that Protestants “may have arms.”  Furthermore, it was conditioned on the 
arms being “suitable to their condition and as allowed by law.”  Both phrases greatly 
limit an individual’s ability to possess arms.  This was done intentionally, for the 
“have arms” provision was an affirmation of preexisting law and custom.  This 
                                                          
8
 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.) (emphasis added).  This is commonly known as the 1689 
Declaration of Rights.  
9
 There are countless reaffirmations of this in the Founders’ writings.  See PATRICK J. 
CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 55-64 (2008) [hereinafter CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES]. 
10
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798-99 (2008). 
11
 Id. at 2801 (emphasis omitted). 
12
 See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).  The Court also cites WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS 
ON POLICE 59-60 (London, Baker & Galabin 1785) and GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS, 
CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE 
MILITIA 17-18, 27 (3d ed. London, n. pub. 1782) both of which were written well after the 
adoption of the English Declaration of Rights.  Neither is historically significant in examining 
the original intent of the English “have arms” provision.  Nevertheless, both will be addressed 
later in this Article to refute the Court majority and Malcolm’s contentions. 
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included allowing qualified Protestants to “have arms” in defense of the realm and 
check tyrannical standing armies.   
To some, these historical facts may seem like a moot point considering the 
Supreme Court has already given its opinion.  This is not necessarily the case.  As 
seen in the stayed Nordkye, the legal debate of the history of the Second Amendment 
is still alive.  There is no question that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on 
Heller’s history of the Second Amendment, but the court did open the door for 
refutation when it stated, “[Santa Clara] County does little to refute [the] powerful 
evidence that the right to bear arms is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the 
Republic, a right Americans considered fundamental at the Founding and 
thereafter.”13    
Furthermore, litigation of the history of the “right to keep and bear arms” is 
prevalent because the Supreme Court never affirmatively answered whether the 
Second Amendment is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.14  The Nordyke court mistakenly assumed that the holding 
in Heller was meant to overturn the late nineteenth-century cases that addressed this 
issue.15  However, before that decision was stayed, it was the only circuit to do so.  
Both the Second16 and Seventh17 Circuits have held that the Second Amendment does 
not apply to the states.  They rely on the fact that Heller stated that the Supreme 
Court’s nineteenth-century case precedent “reaffirmed that the Second Amendment 
applies only to the Federal Government.”18  
Therefore, given these interpretational differences and the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari on this issue, a detailed look into the history and original intent of 
the English Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision is significant.  Both cases 
before the Court are arguing that the Heller majority’s understanding of this history 
is adequate to incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  This is not necessarily true.  The first test in 
determining if a right is incorporated under the Due Process Clause is whether it is 
                                                          
13
 Nordyke v. King, 536 F.3d 439, 456 (9th Cir. 2009). 
14
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18; see also PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009) 
[hereinafter CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT].  There has been much speculation by lawyers 
and legal scholars as to whether the Second Amendment is a right that would be incorporated 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Unfortunately, all those who 
have addressed this legal issue have done so prior to the Heller decision.  See Michael 
Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1 (2007); David A. 
Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring Rationale for Excluding the 
Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1079 (2005); Koren Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The Second Amendment and the 
Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 177 
(1998).  
15
 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
16
 Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009). 
17
 NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2009). 
18
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.22 (2008).  
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“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”19 In conducting this test, the Court 
has traditionally examined the Anglo-American tradition of the right being asserted.   
For example, in determining whether the right to a jury trial met this test, the 
Supreme Court traced its roots back to Greek and Roman history, the Magna Carta, 
through the English Declaration of Rights, and to the colonies from the 
Commentaries of William Blackstone.20  Although it is true that the Heller majority 
did briefly examine these historical issues, no historian, besides Joyce Lee Malcolm, 
who specializes in seventeenth-century English history, has supported the Court’s 
contentions.  In fact, the most prominent historian that specializes in this era and the 
Glorious Revolution—Lois G. Schwoerer—has persistently refuted the Heller 
majority’s interpretation.21  Therefore, it is most likely that the Court will need to 
address these historical issues again and with more specificity.   
Not to mention, the four dissenting Justices in Heller will have no qualms about 
revisiting this issue.  There can be little doubt that not only will the English history 
of “having arms” be reexamined, but perhaps the entire history of the Second 
Amendment as well.  The historical and constitutional inconsistencies within the 
Heller majority’s opinion are all too clear. While these inaccuracies are significant, 
what is more relevant is the Court’s misinterpretation of its constitutional 
predecessor—the English allowance to “have arms,” for by starting off its historical 
analysis on the wrong foot, so to speak, the Court ultimately reached a textually 
perplexing conclusion.  It was this initial step toward an inaccurate historical 
interpretation of the Declaration of Rights that allowed the Court to incorporate the 
faulty holding in Heller.  Thus, it is essential that the original intent of that right be 
examined in exacting detail and the Court follow its well-established precedent of 
reesamining the history of constitutional provisions in light of recent scholarship. 22 
                                                          
19
 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
20
 Id. at 151-52. 
21
 See Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON 
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207, 207-21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000).  Carl Bogus also addresses 
this.  Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
309 (1998). 
22
  See Smith v. Alright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575 (1985); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 604, 611 
(1971); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1985).  Some of the 
historical and constitutional inconsistencies within Heller are: 
It does not examine any relevant legislative history immediately following the 
adoption of the Constitution, but rather uses commentary and cases drafted at least 
forty years later.  It relies on state Constitutions’ “right to bear arms” provisions after 
the adoption of the Second Amendment, without textually analyzing them or giving 
them a plurality meaning.  Furthermore, the holding ignores the states’ ratification of 
convention amendments that contradicted the individual right theory, but still 
erroneously inferred that these conventions all point to the individual right model.  It 
added the word “because” to the beginning of the prefatory clause (“A well regulated 
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”), changed the word “State” to 
“country,” argued the word “against” would had to have been incorporated for the 
amendment to have some form of a collective right interpretation, and added a self-
defense exception that never historically existed.  In short, the opinion was a selective 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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II.  THE 1689 ENGLISH DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
On February 13, 1689, the Declaration of Rights was presented to the soon-to-be 
sovereigns of the three kingdoms—William and Mary.23  The Declaration is 
undoubtedly a statement of rights that the members of the Convention deemed 
necessary for the future governance of England.  Whether the rights listed therein are 
an affirmation of preexisting fundamental rights or newly avowed rights has been the 
issue of debate.24  For example, the protection “[t]hat the raising or keeping a 
standing Army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of 
Parliament” was a newly avowed right and a response to the discontent felt over 
James II’s standing army.25  There was certainly nothing contrary in the statutes 
about the manner in which James II maintained his standing army.26 It had 
traditionally and legally been a power that the sovereign maintained.27  Parliament 
                                                                                                                                         
incorporation of the evidence to ensure the Second Amendment protected an 
“individual right” for self-defense in the home. 
CHARLES, supra note 14, at 9-10.  .  
23
 LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 11 (1981) [hereinafter 
SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS]. 
24
 Thomas Macaulay wrote, “Not a single new right was given to the people.  The whole 
English law, substantive and adjective, was, in the judgment of all the greatest lawyers, of 
Holt and Treby, of Maynard and Somers, exactly the same after the Revolution as before it.”   
THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 2 MACAULAY’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 377-78 (1906).  G.M. 
Trevelyan wrote:  
The Declaration of Right was, in form at least, purely conservative.  It introduced 
no new principle of law . . . [f]or the Convention had wisely decided that alterations in 
the existing laws would require time for debate, and not another day could be spared 
before the throne was filled, without great risk to the public safety.  Therefore the 
Declaration of Right had been framed as a mere recital of those existing rights of 
Parliament and of the subject, which James [II] had outraged, and which William must 
promise to observe.  All further changes, however pressing their need, must wait till 
Parliament should have time to discuss and pass them, and till there was a King to give 
them statutory force by royal assent to new laws. 
GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1688-1689, at 150-51 (1938).  
Lois G. Schwoerer has taken a more objective and accurate approach.  She has affirmatively 
shown that eight of the thirteen rights listed in the Declaration of Rights were not ancient or 
preexisting.  SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 100-01. 
25
 LOIS G. SCHWOERER, NO STANDING ARMIES!: THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 147-54 (1974) [hereinafter SCHWOERER, NO STANDING 
ARMIES]. 
26
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-74.  Schwoerer states: 
The Militia Act of 1661 unequivocally confirmed the monarch’s right to sole 
command of the military forces of the nation: “the sole supreme government, 
command and disposition of the militia” as well as, so the act ran, “of all forces by sea 
and land . . . is, and by the laws of England ever was, the undoubted right” of the 
crown. 
Id. at 72; see also CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 64-69; TIM 
HARRIS, POLITICS UNDER THE LATER STUARTS: PARTY CONFLICT IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 1660-
1715, at 134 (1993). 
27
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.) (“[T]hat both or either of the Houses of 
Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same; nor can nor lawfully may raise or levy any 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/3
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was merely distrustful of the sovereign given the oppressive use of standing armies 
during the Cromwellian Protectorate.  Therefore, when the danger of Monmouth’s 
Rebellion subsided,28 and James II refused to disband his standing army, a tension 
developed between Parliament and the King.  This issue would be settled upon 
William and Mary’s accession to the throne on April 11, 1689, for the Declaration of 
Rights created a newly avowed parliamentary power, thus settling the dispute of 
standing armies during times of peace. 
Meanwhile, unlike the protection against standing armies, the allowance to “have 
arms” was a preexisting fundamental right.  It had been reaffirmed many times since 
the Middle Ages by England’s continuous reliance on the hue and cry, assize of 
arms, and the militia.29  For centuries, laws permitted qualified Englishmen to 
maintain arms30 for the defense of the realm31—an allowance that had always been 
                                                                                                                                         
War offensive or defensive against His Majesty.”); see also SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 72. 
28
 BARRY COWARD, THE STUART AGE: ENGLAND, 1603-1714, at 338 (2d ed. 1994). 
29
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 74. 
30
 According to Giles Jacob’s 1729 A New Law Dictionary, the definition of arms 
“extended to any Thing that a Man wears for his Defence, or takes into his Hands, or useth in 
Anger to strike or cast at another.”  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “Arms” (n.p., 
E. & R Nutt 1729).  The definition makes no mention of the 1689 Declaration of Rights or a 
right to self-defense.  Moreover, there is no mention of the Declaration of Rights or the “have 
arms” provision at any of the following 1729 dictionary entries: “self-preservation,” “se 
defendendo” (self-defense), “defence,” and “game.” 
However, the dictionary does make mention of the Declaration of Rights at the entries of 
“convention parliament” and “dispensation by non obstante,” thus giving weight to the 
argument that armed individual self-defense was not linked to the “have arms” provision.  In 
fact, in all the subsequent editions up to his death in 1744, Jacob’s legal dictionary never 
modified the “arms” entry to include the “have arms” provision or change the other entries—
“self-preservation,” “se defendendo” (self-defense), “defence,” and “game.”  See GILES JACOB, 
A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,”  “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” 
“defence,” “game” (n.p., Henry Lintot 5th ed. 1744);  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, 
at “armour and arms,”  “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., Henry 
Lintot 1743);  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,”  “self-
preservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 4th ed. 
1739); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se 
defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 3d ed. 1736);  GILES JACOB, 
A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” 
“defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 2d ed. 1733);  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW 
DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game” 
(n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 2d ed. 1732).  Following Jacob’s death, subsequent editions 
of A New Law Dictionary continued to be published.  It was not until 1773—after William 
Blackstone had published his Commentaries—that the “arms” entry included: “As to arms for 
necessary defence, vide Black. Com. 1V. 143.”  A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and 
arms” (Owen Ruffhead & J. Morgan eds., Dublin, n. pub. 1773).  The cite to Blackstone’s 
Commentaries is significant because it shows that the editors interpreted the “have arms” 
provision as Blackstone understood it—as the “fifth auxiliary right” to resist and overthrow 
tyrannical government, not as armed individual self-defense.  See infra Part VII.  With J. 
Morgan remaining as the editor, the 1782 edition of A New Law Dictionary also included 
the Blackstone reference.  A NEW LAW DICTONARY, at “armour and arms” (J. Morgan ed., 
London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1782).  However, in 1797, T.E. Tomlins expanded A New 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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conditioned upon hierarchal and socio-economic status.32  This right, however, came 
with great social responsibility.  An individual could not have just any arms per se.  
Arms were regulated by law and deemed an allowance that could be taken away.33 
Furthermore, with this allowance came certain duties and restrictions, which will be 
discussed in great detail, but for our purposes now, it is significant only in 
understanding why the “have arms” provision was drafted.     
A.  The Road to an Affirmed Allowance to “Have Arms” 
What has been forgotten in the debate over the meaning of the English “have 
arms” provision is that the Declaration of Rights was the documentary means that 
justified the removal of James II as King.34 It was drafted as a conditional charter of 
liberty by which William and Mary had to abide in order to maintain parliamentary 
support.  By contemporary standards, the Declaration’s grievances may seem to be 
broadly worded, but the grievances had a uniform meaning in the Seventeenth 
Century.35  This broadness has confused Individual Right Scholars and has begotten 
debate on the practice of disarming that happened under the Stuarts.  The threshold 
question is whether the disarming happened on the scale that Individual Right 
Scholars have implied. 
As previously addressed, James II’s maintenance of a standing army was more of 
a fabricated grievance than an actual one.  There is no denying that a standing army 
was maintained.36  However, it is just historically and legally inaccurate to state that 
James II violated the fundamental laws of the land by doing so.  The Declaration’s 
“have arms” grievance is similar if we examine it as a contemporary phrase. This is 
because the historical record provides us with no ironclad proof of James II actually 
“disarming” large numbers of Protestants in England.  Thus, one may argue that the 
disarming of Protestants was more of a fabricated grievance than a real one.  
                                                                                                                                         
Law Dictionary into two volumes.  Tomlins removed the Blackstone reference and replaced it 
with the actual statute.  It read: 
By the Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2, It is declared that “the subjects which are 
Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition as allowed by 
law.”  See stat. 33 H. 8. c. 6. and tit. Game and Constable III. 2. 
T.E. TOMLINS, 1 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (London, Andrew Strahan 
1797).  Similar to Jacob’s previous editions, neither the Bill of Rights nor the “have arms” 
provision was listed in the 1797 dictionary entries “homicide,” “self-defense,” “defence,” 
“self-preservation,” or “game.” 
31
 See 1 Jac. 2, c. 8 (1685) (Eng.); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.); 4 & 5 Phil. & M., c. 
2 (1557-1558) (Eng.); 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-1397) (Eng.); 
12 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1388) (Eng.); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1351) (Eng.); 2 
Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 2 (1285) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.); 7 Edw. 
(1279) (Eng.). 
32
 Id.; see also SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 77. 
33
 See supra note 31. 
34
 See Lois G. Schwoerer, The Bill of Rights: Epitome of the Revolution of 1688-89, in 
THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 225 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980) (agreeing 
that the Declaration of Rights lists grievances that were “both alleged and real”).   
35
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 100. 
36
 SCHWOERER, NO STANDING ARMIES, supra note 25, at 139-44. 
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In fact, there is substantially more evidence that the disarming provision was 
based upon the fear that it could occur on a massive scale rather than on an actual 
occurrence of the event.  First, this is supported by the fact that we have only scant 
evidence of this disarming.37  In every instance where “disarming” is mentioned, it is 
done briefly either in unreliable political pamphlets of the period or within the 
records of Convention on the Declaration itself—neither of which provide concrete 
examples.  In fact, one pamphleteer even described the disarming grievance as being 
a grievance of which he “[did] not know the time it was done in England.”38  He 
knew “it was twice done in Ireland . . . after the suppression of Monmouth’s 
Rebellion” but could not recollect such an instance occurring by James II in 
England.39  Second, no list or any detailed accounts of arms being confiscated by 
James II exist.40 
                                                          
37
 5 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 54-55 (London, T.C. Hansard 1806); 9 ANCHITELL GREY, 
DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 31, 32 (London, D. Henry & R. Cave 1769); 2 JOHN 
SOMERS, NOTES OF THE DEBATES, MISCELLANESOUS STATE PAPERS, FROM 1501 TO 1726, at 
416, 417 (London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell 1778).  The best evidence of disarming occurs in 
J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 30-40, 48 (1965).  While 
Western’s research in this area gives us the greatest amount of evidence regarding this, he 
points out disarming only during Charles II’s reign.  This still leaves us with no substantiated 
evidence of actual disarming by James II.  Not to mention, there is nothing in the records of 
Parliament that there was dissatisfaction with the disarming of insurgents or individuals that 
were disaffected to the crown.  If anything, the evidence shows that Parliament supported it. 
38
 CHARLES CAESAR, NUMERUS INFAUSTUS: A SHORT VIEW OF THE UNFORTUNATE REIGNS 
OF WILLIAM THE SECOND, HENRY THE SECOND, EDWARD THE SECOND, RICHARD THE SECOND, 
CHARLES THE SECOND, JAMES THE SECOND 46 (London, n. pub. 2d ed. 1689). 
39
 Id.  Regarding the disarming of Protestants in Ireland, this was a reference to Richard 
Talbot, the Earl of Tyrconnel.  Talbot disarmed the Protestant soldiers and officers and 
replaced them with Catholics.  Out of the eight thousand troops raised, less than one hundred 
were English Protestants.  Protestant soldiers were continuously replaced by papist substitutes.  
See AN ACCOUNT OF A LATE, HORRID AND BLOODY MASSACRE IN IRELAND OF SEVERAL 
THOUSANDS OF PROTESTANTS, PROCUR’D AND CARRY’D ON BY THE BY THE L[ORD DEPUTY] 
TYRCONNEL AND HIS ADHERENTS 2 (n.p., n. pub. n.d.).  Another account by Anon describes the 
disarming as follows:  
And so it proved, for Talbot, by this time made Earl of Tyrconnel, causing them to be 
drawn up in Companies, commanded them to lay down and quit their Arms; which 
done, they were expresly told, that it was the King’s Pleasure to have none but Roman 
Catholicks in his standing Forces of that Kingdom, and as many as would comply with 
it, might return to their Arms, and those that would not might depart. 
THE POPISH CHAMPION, OR, A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND MILITARY ACTIONS OF 
RICHARD EARL OF TYRCONNEL 13 (London, John Duton 1689).  Another disarming occurred 
when Talbot learned of Protestant noblemen scheming against him.  He disarmed “the 
Protestants that lay within the Circle of his Command”—the Protestants in the army that had 
not laid down their weapons in the first instance.  Id. at 18.  Talbot then used these arms to 
equip “his Souldiers that came in unarmed.”  Id. at 19.  Both disarmaments equate to the 
disarming described in the 1689 Declaration of Rights and the 1689 Scottish Claim of Right—
that arms were taken from Protestants who were serving in a military capacity and given to 
Catholics.   
40
 This means that there is nothing of substance on the historical record that James II 
actually disarmed English Protestants in large amounts.  Lois Schwoerer lists the “Popish Plot 
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Despite this historical uncertainty, it is clear why the Declaration’s “have arms” 
provision was drafted.  Although there are no concrete examples of Protestants being 
disarmed, the record shows that the “have arms” provision was directly linked to the 
dispensing of the Test Act to employ Catholic military officers.41  To be more 
precise, it was the power military Lieutenants possessed in arming the militia and 
disarming disaffected persons that perpetuated a fear among the Protestant elite that 
disarming could occur on a massive scale.  It was this fear that would lead to the 
drafting of the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision.   
As early as 1680, Francis Winnington conveyed his concern for disarmament by 
a Catholic army.42  He knew the “Militia of London” could “disarm men at 
discretion” if they pleased.43  The concern was that if the militia was composed of 
Catholics, then papists could disarm all the Protestants at any time.44  The fear of 
disarming by papists reached new heights upon James II’s accession to the throne in 
1685, for the King had employed Catholic military officers to suppress Monmouth’s 
Rebellion, and he planned on keeping them.45 
                                                                                                                                         
and Exclusion Crisis in 1678-81, the Rye House Plot scare in 1683, and Monmouth’s 
Rebellion in 1685” as instances where “Charles, and, later, James II” used the militia to disarm 
Protestants.  SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 76.  She, however, 
provides no sources to this fact.  She relies on its mention by the Convention’s members in the 
rights committee when they debated the Declaration of Rights.  9 GREY, supra note 37, at 31, 
32; 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416, 417. 
41
 25 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (1672) (Eng.).  Entitled An Act for preventing Dangers which may 
happen from Popish Recutsants, it required “all and every persons or persons that shall be 
admitted entered placed or taken into any Office or Offices Civill or Military . . . shall take the 
said Oaths aforesaid in the said respective Court or Courts.”  Id.  The Militia Act of 1662, 
entitled An Act for ordering the Forces in several Counties of this Kingdom, which preceded 
the Test Act, dually required it.  13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 18 (1662) (Eng.).  The employing of 
Catholic military officers was also highlighted due to the events of the Seven Bishops case.  In 
that case, James II prosecuted seven bishops for their petitioning that the dispensing of the 
Test Act was against law.  The court rejected that the bishops had a right to petition, and 
James II continued to dispense with the Test Act.  See THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688: 
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 406-11 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 1966); see also SCHWOERER, 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 69-70. 
42
 8 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES ON THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE 
YEAR 1694, at 165 (London, n. pub. 1769). 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id.  
45
 This was a direct violation of the Test Act of which the King was all too aware.  James 
II wrote to Parliament: 
Let no man take exception, that there are some Officers in the Army not qualified 
according to the late Tests for their Employments: the Gentlemen, I must tell you, are 
most of them well-known to me; and, having formerly served me on several occasions, 
and always approved the loyalty of their principles by their Practices I think them now 
fit to be employed under me; and will deal plainly with you, that after having had the 
benefit of their service in such a time of need and danger, I will neither expose them to 
disgrace, nor myself to the want of them, if there should be another Rebellion to make 
them necessary to me. 
4 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1370-71 (London, R. Bagshaw 1808). 
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James II knew “some men may be so wicked to hope and expect that a difference 
may happen” over the Catholic officers’ employment.46  He just hoped Parliament 
would view this as a non-issue.  He believed “when you consider what advantages 
have a risen to us in a few months, by the good understanding we have hitherto had; 
what wonderful effects it hath already produced in the change of the whole scene of 
affairs” that the Catholic officers did not affect the security of the nation.47  What 
may have been the most shocking statement of the speech was James II’s dismissal 
of the militia system.  He hoped that Parliament would “be convinced, that the 
Militia, which [had] been so much depended on, [was] not sufficient” for occasions 
such as Monmouth’s Rebellion.48  Only a “good force of well-disciplined troops in 
constant pay” could defend England from these continuous threats to the “peace and 
quiet of [his] subjects, as well as for the safety of the government.”49 
It must be noted that James II neither disbanded the militia nor said he would not 
employ their services.  He was merely stating that the threats that the nation was 
facing required a professional fighting force, as well as the militia.  The House of 
Commons did not take the King’s speech as an attempt to disband the militia either.  
It was primarily concerned with the employment of Catholic officers and the 
maintenance of a standing army.  One member reminded the House “that no Papist 
[could] possibly creep into any employment” because of the Test Act.50  He felt a 
“great difference” toward such an action and was personally “afflicted greatly at this 
breach on [their] Liberties.”51 
Another member of the House could not agree more.  He viewed the employment 
of Catholic officers as “dispensing with all the Laws at once.”52  It was “treason for 
any man to be reconciled to the Church of Rome; for the Pope, by law is [a] declared 
enemy to this kingdom.”53  The most interesting statement came from John Maynard. 
He predicted these employments would lead to the disarming of alleged disaffected 
Protestants.  Citing the 1662 Militia Act, Maynard reminded the House that not only 
was it illegal to take up arms against the King,54 but that “lords-lieutenants, and 
                                                          
46
 Id. at 1371.  
47
 Id.  
48
 Id. at 1369. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 1373. 
51
 Id. (“I was here, and showed myself against it; the arguments for it were, ‘That we 
should in case of a Popish Successor, have a Popish Army.’  You see the Act of the Test 
already broken, but pray remember what the late lord chancellor told you, when the late King 
(of blessed memory) pased that Act; the words were to this effect: ‘By this Act you are 
provided against Popery, that no Papist can possible creep into any Employment.’ I am 
afflicted greatly at this Breach of our Liberties, and seeing so great difference betwixt this 
Speech, and those heretofore made, cannot but believe this was by some other advice.  This, 
struck at here, is our all, and I wonder there have been any men so desperate, as to take any 
employment not qualified for it; and I would therefore have the question, ‘That a Standing 
Army is destructive to the country.”). 
52
 Id. at 1374. 
53
 Id.  
54
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). 
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deputy-lieutenants, have power to disarm the disaffected.”55  He felt that if 
Parliament supplied an army employed with Catholic officers, it would just be 
providing James II with the means to produce a destructive end.  The Test Act was 
not a “punishment for the Papists, but a protection for ourselves.”56  In other words, 
Maynard feared that by allowing the King to maintain Catholic officers, Parliament 
was putting the country in a perilous situation. 
Based on the potential impositions on liberty the maintenance of a standing army 
would produce, coupled with the illegality of employing Catholics as military 
officers, the House prepared an address to the King asking him to remove the 
Catholic officers.57  James II responded by stating that he did not “expect such an 
Address from the house of commons.”58  He hoped he “would have created and 
confirmed a greater confidence” of the House by then, and he refused to remove the 
officers or even negotiate concessions to do so.59  Instead, James II reminded its 
members that he had “warn[ed] of Fears and Jealousies amongst [themselves].”60  In 
the King’s eyes, the security of the realm was more important than Parliament’s fears 
and laws restricting papists.  He was the sovereign.  It was up to him to ensure the 
peace of England by whatever means necessary.   
The House of Commons’ address to the King shows just how interconnected all 
the grievances that would make up the Declaration of Rights were, for it was through 
James II’s dispensing of the Test Act that allowed him to employ Catholics, maintain 
his standing army, and place Catholics in a position to disarm Protestants.  More 
                                                          
55
 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1374-75.  The power to search and seize arms of 
disaffected persons can be found in 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.).  See also 8 GREY, 
supra note 42, at 359. 
56
 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1375. 
57
 Id. at 1378-79.  The address went as follows: 
And as to the part of [the King’s speech], relating to the Officers in the Army not 
qualified for their Employments, according to an Act of parliament made in the 25th 
year of the reign of your majesty’s royal brother, Entituled, ‘An Act for preventing 
Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants.’  [W]e do, out of our bounden 
duty, humbly represent unto your majesty, That those Officers cannot by law be 
capable of their Employments; and that the Incapacities they bring upon themselves 
thereby can no way be taken off but by an act of parliament.—Therefore, out of that 
great deference and duty we owe unto your majesty, who have been graciously 
pleased to take notice of their services to you we are preparing a Bill to pass both 
houses, for your royal assent, to indemnify them from the Penalties they have now 
incurred; and, because the continuing of them in their Employments may be taken to 
be a dispensing with the law without an act of parliament, (the consequence of which 
is of the greatest concern to the rights of all your majesty’s subjects, and to all the laws 
made for the security of their religion we therefore do most humbly beseech your 
majesty, that you would be graciously pleased to give such directions therein, that no 
apprehensions or jealousies may remain in the hearts of your Majesty’s most good and 
faithful subjects. 
Id.  The House of Lords never approved this address.  The House vote to concurrence with the 
House of Lords was not necessary.  Id.  
58
 Id. at 1385.  
59
 Id.  
60
 Id.   
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importantly, the address shows that Parliament presupposed that James II would 
disarm Protestants in large numbers even though it had no evidence to support this 
fear.  At no point during the debates did members of the House give examples of 
either Charles II or James II disarming disaffected persons—let alone outstanding 
Protestants. 
B.  The Creation of the Allowance to “Have Arms” 
Parliament’s next mention of disarming Protestants would not come as a 
hypothetical, but as a grievance.  On February 2, 1689, a committee of thirty-nine 
headed by George Treby, drafted twenty-three Heads of Grievances.61  In regards to 
the disarming of Protestants, one grievance read, “[I]t [is] necessary to the public 
safety that the Protestant subjects ‘should provide and keep arms for the common 
defense, and that arms, which have been seized and taken from them . . . restored.’”62   
The grievance claimed that Protestants had, in fact, been disarmed by James II.63  
It made no mention of when or in what context this disarming occurred.64  Thus, it is 
uncertain when, and if it ever, happened on the massive scale that the grievance 
implies by contemporary standards.  This may explain why the last portion of the 
grievance—“and arms that have been seized from them restored”—was removed 
five days later,65 for dissemination of James II’s disarming may have been based 
primarily on political propaganda rather than fact.  Also, if Parliament did not have 
any documentation of Protestants being disarmed, what arms were taken by whom 
and so forth, it could not keep the last section.  It would be a grievance that only 
asserted to return arms that were never taken on the large scale that the Declaration 
of Rights would have implied.    
Certainly, James II’s Catholic officers must have disarmed some disaffected 
persons.  Parliament had explicitly authorized this disarming with the adoption of the 
1662 Militia Act.66  The Act set up the laws by which individuals were to provide 
“Horse and Armes and Furniture.”67  First, the King appointed military Lieutenants 
that had the power to call and assemble the militia, to “arm and array them” 
according to hierarchal and socio-economic status, and “form them into Companies, 
                                                          
61
 HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, 1603-1689, at 151 (Robert H. Fritze & 
William B. Robison eds., 1996). 
62
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 75; H. RICHARD UVILLER & 
WILLIAM MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
FELL SILENT 53 (2002). 
63
 HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, supra note 61, at 151. 
64
 On August 24, 2004, the Department of Justice, under the advisement of President 
George W. Bush, constructed an opinion in favor of the “individual right” model.  It claims 
that Charles II’s 1662 Militia Act and 1671 Game Act were used to search and seize the arms 
of individuals on a large scale.  Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 41-42 (Aug. 24, 2004).  It provides no substantiating evidence for its 
claim other than citing Malcolm.  See id.   
65
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 75. 
66
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.). 
67
 Id. § 2. 
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Troops and Regiments . . . in case of Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion.”68  The 
appointment of these Lieutenants was of particular importance,69 because Lieutenants 
had the explicit power, or could appoint such deputies with such power, to “train 
exercise and put in readines and . . . lead and conduct the persons so to be armed 
arrayed and weaponed.”70  The only arming restrictions within the Militia Act were 
that Lieutenants were required to ensure that only individuals of certain qualities or 
conditions would be provided arms, weapons, horses, and furniture.71  Thus, through 
the Militia Act, an individual did not have a right to arms.  It was an allowance by 
                                                          
68
 Id. § 1. 
69
 The appointment of lieutenants was an issue of contention between the king and 
Parliament on multiple occasions.  In 1641, Oliver Cromwell made mention of how the 
“factious Parliament” wanted to know who the lieutenants were because this was the “Power 
of the Militia.”  Thomas Carlyle, Preliminary to Letter by Oliver Cromwell (May 3, 1641), in 
1 THE LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER CROMWELL 103, 105 (S.C. Lomas ed., 1904).  In a 
petition to Charles I entitled Propositions Concerning the Security and Peace of the Kingdom 
Parliament requested the following:  
1. That men of honour and trust be placed lord lieutenants in every county; and that 
direction be given to these lieutenants, to be careful in the choice of their deputies.  2.  
That the Trained Bands be furnished with arms, powder, and bullet; and that they be 
exercised and made ready for service.  Also that an oath be prepared to pass both 
houses of parliament, to be taken by the lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants, and other 
officers of Trained Bands, to secure their fidelity in these dangerous times. 
2 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 849 (London, R. Bagshaw 1807).  This request shows just how 
important the lieutenants were in arming and training the people as a militia. 
70
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). 
71
 Id. §§ 2-3.  
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the Lieutenants, and it was a tax,72 a duty,73 and a privilege74 that was dependent on 
hierarchal and socio-economic standing.75   
Second, the Militia Act authorized Lieutenants to “employ such Person or 
Persons as they shall thinke fit” to “search for and seize all Armes in the custody or 
possession of any person or persons whom the said Lieutenants . . . shall judge 
dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome.”76  This search and seizure provision was 
                                                          
72
 Id. § 8.  Those that failed to “provide and furnish such sufficient Horse and Horseman 
Horses and Horsemen Armes and other Furniture or to pay such sum or sums of Money 
towards the providing and furnishing as aforesaid” could be held liable to pay a penalty “not 
exceeding twenty pounds.”  Id.  Lieutenants could place liens and take property of those who 
did not comply to obtain this money, if needed.  Id.  The Act even stipulated the requirement 
of providing arms as a tax.  Section 25 stipulated that “nothing in this Act contained shall 
extend to put any new charge of Armes upon the Tinners in the Counties of Devon and 
Cornwall other then [sic] the Tax mentioned in the former Provisio.”  Id. § 25. 
73
 Id. § 9.  “That if any person or persons so to be armed arrayed and weaponed shall 
detaine or imbezil his Horse Armes or Furniture,” Lieutenants may “imprison such persons 
and persons.”  Id.  “[T]hat if any person so to be armed horsed or weaponed as aforesaid shall 
not appear and serve compleatly furnished with Horse and Armes and other Furniture 
wherewith he is intrusted,” Lieutenants may “imprison such person or persons for the space of 
five dayes.”  Id.  “And if any person or persons so assessed or charged as aforesaid shall refuse 
or neglect to send in or deliver his Horse Armes or other Furniture upon such summons or 
other notice,” Lieutenants may “inflict a penalty not exceeding five pounds.”  Id.  
74
 The Act stipulated what type of arms each person was to have, depending on that 
person’s status.  For example, a Foot Soldier was required to have “a Musquett the Barrell 
whereof is not to be under three Foot in length and the Gage of the Bore to be for twelve 
Bullets to the pound A Coller of Bandeleers with a Sword.”  Id. § 20. 
75
 Lieutenants had: 
[F]ull Power and Authority to charge any person with Horse Horsman and Armes or 
with Foot Souldier and Armes . . . having respect unto and not exceeding the 
limitations and proportions hereafter mentioned (that is to say) No Person shall be 
charged with finding a Horse Horseman and Armes unless such person or persons 
have a Revenue of Five hundred pounds by the yeare in possession or have an Estate 
of Six thousand pounds in goods or money besides the furniture of his or theire houses 
and so proportionably for a greater Estate in lands in possession or goods as the 
respective Lieutenants and theire Deputies as aforesaid in theire discretions shall see 
cause and thinke reasonable And they are not to charge any person with finding a Foot 
Souldier and Armes that hath not a yearly Revenue of Fifty pounds in possession or a 
personal Estate of Six hundred pounds in goods or moneys (other than the stocke upon 
the ground) and after the aforesaid rate proportionably for a greater or lesser Revenue 
or Estate . . . Nor shall they charge any person with the finding of both of Horse and 
Foot in the same County.  
Id.  § 2.  Lieutenants could also join “two or three or more persons together” to “impose 
the finding and providing of Horse Horseman and Armes.”  Id. § 3.   Tenants could also be 
required to provide arms.  Id. § 15.  It was lawful for them to even default on rent money by 
using that money to buy the required armaments.  Id. § 16.  Nothing in the Act was meant to 
“avoid any Covenant or Agreement which hath beene or shall be made betweene any Landlord 
and Tenant concerning the finding Horses or Armes or the bearing or paying of any [Taxes 
Rates or other charges by any Tenant either by generall or speciall Covenants].”  Id. § 28 
(alteration in original). 
76
 Id. § 13. 
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“for the better securing the Peace of the Kingdome” and seems to have never been 
questioned until the employment of Catholic military officers. 77  This is most likely 
because the houses that were searched and seized—prior to James II’s accession—
were primarily those of Catholics.  But historians have overstated this.  As will be 
shown, many Protestants were also disarmed in large amounts.  
The 1662 Militia Act provision for the search and seizure of arms was a statutory 
confirmation of what was already being done by the Restoration government.  In 
numerous instances, orders were issued to seize arms of disaffected and dangerous 
persons, often without warrant.78  In fact, it became so common that it was petitioned 
to Charles II that a proclamation be issued “forbidding the seizing of persons or 
searching of houses without warrant, except in time of actual insurrection.”79  The 
petitioner was concerned that continued searches without warrant could “renew the 
war” and that future searches should not be conducted “without lawful authority.”80  
It is uncertain what effect, if any, the petition had on Charles II.  What is known is 
that within a year after its submission, the 1662 Militia Act was adopted, and it 
outlined the manner in which future searches and seizures of arms were to be 
conducted.81 
For the next six years, the historical record provides numerous instances of 
disarming dangerous, disaffected, and unqualified persons—most of whom were not 
identified as papists.82  On November 1, 1662, Charles II ordered Sir Thomas Peyton 
                                                          
77
 Id.  
78
 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1660-1661, 
at 150 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 1860) 
(stating that, in 1660, instructions were issued to the Lord Lieutenants that “the full numbers 
to be kept up, well-affected officers chosen, the volunteers who offer assistance formed in 
troops apart and trained, the officers to be numerous, disaffected persons watched and not 
allowed to assemble, and their arms seized.”).  In November 1660, Henry Croswick and others 
of Bristol had petitioned for “leave to retain in the city armory 315 muskets, 126 pikes, 245 
pairs of bandoleers, . . . belonging to the five companies of Sir Edw. Massey’s regiment, 
disbanded; their arms were taken away during the troubles, and they are in want of them for 
preservation of the peace.”  Id. at 393.  For other examples see id. at 472, 475, 481, 567 and 2 
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1661-1662, at 125, 
212, 248, 321 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 
1861). 
79
 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 475. 
80
 Id. 
81
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.). 
82
 See, e.g., 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 
1666-1667, at 238 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman, 
Roberts & Green 1864).  On November 5, 1666, James Hicks reported that: 
The house of Mr. John Digby, son of Sir Kenelm Digby, and a strong papist, living 
near Stony Stratford, has been searched, and 300 arms found.  They were not taken 
away, but he took it so ill that he went away in his coach and six horses, with only his 
coachman and postilion, and is supposed to be gone for Ireland.   
Id.  On December 11, 1666, Deputy Lieutenants were order to: 
[S]earch for arms in the houses of Popish recusants, but there are only two or three in 
the county.  Searched that of his neighbour, Mr. Pulton, but found only two birding 
guns and an old sword, besides his militia arms.  Asks leave to restore him the two 
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“to seize all arms found in the custody of disaffected persons in the lathe of 
Shepway, and disarm all factious and seditious spirits, and such as travel with 
unusual arms at unseasonable hours.”83  On April 27, 1667, a warrant was issued to 
apprehend “Mason and others suspected of corresponding with him” and to seize all 
“arms, papers, writings, [etcetera], belonging to him.”84   
Three years later, on May 25, 1670, the Lord Mayor of London wrote to Lord 
Arlington requesting a “special warrant” to “seize and secure all dangerous and 
suspicious persons, with their arms, weapons, [etcetera], and to detain them so long 
as his Majesty or the said Commissioners shall think fit; and to give to all 
commanding officers and soldiers of the Militia orders requisite for the 
accomplishment of the same.”85  No mention was made of papists. The Lord Mayor 
was only concerned with apprehending his “Majesty’s enemies, rebels, traitors, and 
offenders.”86  The next day, the King ordered the Lord Mayor and Commissioners 
for the Lieutenancy of London to “make [a] strict search in the city and precincts for 
dangerous and disaffected persons, seize and secure them and their arms, and detain 
them in custody till our further pleasure.”87  
The disarming of disaffected and dangerous persons was especially prevalent in 
1683.88  The fears perpetuated from the Rye House Plot89 caused the disarming of 
many persons suspected to be dangerous and disaffected.90  Also, these seizures were 
not explicitly contingent upon the dangerous and disaffected persons being papists. 
For example, Militia Colonel Robert West had two chests of arms seized and placed 
in the Tower of London.91  Then, on July 12, Secretary Jenkins thanked the Earl of 
                                                                                                                                         
guns, as he loves shooting, and also two birding guns taken from two day labourers’ 
houses.  Enquires whether to search the house of Lord Cardigan, he being a peer. 
Id. at 337. 
83
 2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 538. 
84
 7 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1667, at 57 
(Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1865).  For other examples of arms 
being seized see 2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 434, 438, 525; 3 CALENDAR 
OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1663-1664, at 44, 83, 346, 361, 
525 (Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 1862); 
and 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 82, at 91. 
85
 10 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1670, at 236 (Mary Anne Everett 
Green ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswoode 1895) (emphasis omitted). 
86
 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
87
 Id. at 237.  
88
 See generally 24 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1683 (F.H. Blackburne 
Daniell ed., 1933); 25 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1683 (F.H. Blackburne 
Daniell ed., 1933) (mentioning numerous instances of disarming due to fear of popish plots 
and preventing disaffected and dangerous persons from supporting the Duke of Monmouth). 
89
 The Rye House Plot was a conspiracy to murder Charles II and James II.  It is unknown 
whether the plot was real or a political fabrication.  See Doreen J. Milne, The Results of the 
Rye House Plot and Their Influence upon the Revolution of 1688 (1950), in 1 TRANSACTIONS 
OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 91, 91-108 (1951). 
90
 Id. 
91
 25 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 88, at 343. 
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Shrewsbury for seizing the arms of suspected persons in Staffordshire.92  Meanwhile, 
Captain Thomas Whitley had fifty muskets seized because he was suspected of 
supporting the Duke of Monmouth.93 
Seizures of arms continued up to James II’s accession to the throne.  For 
instance, on May 20, 1684, Charles II issued detailed orders to Lieutenants 
throughout the kingdom to seize the arms from “dangerous and disaffected 
persons.”94  Such arms that were deemed “useful for arming the militia” were to “be 
deposited for that purpose in such a place as [they] think most convenient.”95  The 
rest of the arms were to be “delivered to the keeper of the magazine[s]” at designated 
locations.96   
It is this massive disarming in 1684 that is of particular interest in understanding 
the disarming grievance against James II, for this disarming, like its predecessors, 
was never questioned by Parliament or even mentioned upon James II’s accession to 
the throne.  This is because Parliament did not have a problem with Protestant 
Lieutenants seizing the arms of dangerous, disaffected, or unqualified persons.  It 
had been common practice throughout Charles II’s reign and had even been 
supported by statute.97   James II’s employment of Catholics to military appointments 
changed all of this.  With Catholic officers now in charge of searches, the Militia Act 
was no longer a protection against popery or the safety of the kingdom.  It was now 
seen as a means for Catholics to disarm qualified Protestants, thus, establishing a 
Catholic England.98  This is exactly what men like John Maynard feared.  He thought 
Catholics would no longer be targeted—only Protestants.99  Conversely, there were 
restrictions to the searching and seizing of arms.  For instance, all searches required a 
warrant from the King.100  The King, however, was also Catholic.  Thus, one can 
only imagine how members of Parliament who were easily paranoid could be 
convinced of a potential plot to disarm all Protestants.   
The fear of a Catholic plot to overthrow English Protestants provided the context 
out of which the language of the “have arms” provision developed.  The Declaration 
of Rights states it was by “causing several good subjects being Protestants to be 
disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to 
law” that “subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to 
their conditions and as allowed by law.”101  When James II appointed Catholics as 
                                                          
92
 Id. at 310. 
93
 Id. at 293, 323, 389. 
94
 27 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series of the reign of Charles II, 1684-1685, 
at 26-27, 83-85, 102 (F.H. Blackburne Daniell ed., 1933).  These orders were given to over 
thirty-four counties and eighteen Lieutenants, all of which gave locations for the depositing of 
the arms seized. 
95
 Id.  
96
 Id.  
97
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.). 
98
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-75. 
99
 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1375, 1378-79, 1385. 
100
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.). 
101
 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.). 
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Lieutenants, he subverted the Test and Militia Acts.  It was these appointments that 
“armed and employed” papists “contrary to law.”102  The mention of arming papists 
was not referencing all Catholics in general but, rather, was specifically mentioning 
Catholic military officers alone, for it was the newly appointed Catholic Lieutenants 
that not only had the power to search and seize arms from disaffected and dangerous 
persons, but also had the power to disarm Protestants through the militia laws.103   
The Militia Act expressly stipulated that it was through the Lieutenants’ direction 
that individuals were armed and arrayed.104  Furthermore, it was the Lieutenants who 
trained and mustered the militia.105  These facts help place the Declaration of Rights’ 
“have arms” provision in its true context.  The Declaration even mentions the 
disarming of Protestants “at the same time” when Catholics were armed.  The 
grievance was not stating that Protestants were physically disarmed by Catholics per 
se.  Rather, the grievance was addressing the issue that Catholics were employed as 
Lieutenants—a military position that only Protestants were legally allowed to 
perform106 and a position that determined how individuals were to provide, use, train, 
and muster arms in the militia.  Therefore, the real disarmament was that Catholic 
Lieutenants now had charge of the militia arms stores and magazines. 
The Scottish Claim of Right supports this understanding of the Declaration of 
Rights’ “have arms” provision.107  Like the Declaration, the Claim of Right states the 
                                                          
102
 Id.  
103
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, §14 (1662) (Eng.). 
104
 Id. §§ 3, 7-9. 
105
 Id. § 21. 
106
 See Gilbert Burnet, An Answer to the Disertion Discuss’d, (1688), in ELEVENTH 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO THE PRESENT JUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS IN ENGLAND AND 
SCOTLAND 1, 9 (London, Richard January 1689).  This political tract read: 
Upon the Disbanding of the Papists, the Discusser makes a special Observation, That 
no Test-Acts nor any Others could barr the King from Listing them as Common 
Souldiers.  This perhaps may be true; that is to say, that a Protestant Prince may list 
Papists, and a Popish Prince Protestants, to follow him in a lawful War.  But when a 
Popish Prince in a Protestant Nation had made his chiefs Levies of Popish Common 
Souldiers to over-aw his Protestant Subjects, and put his sole Confidence in them for 
his known and open Designs and manifest Endeavors to introduce Popery into a 
Protestant Kingdom, contrary to the Law, ‘twas time then to think of disbanding such 
Vermin, and ridding them out of the Land.  And the reason why the Protestants could 
not be trusted was as certain.  For if the King would not trust his Protestants, nay 
disarm’d them, when Papists were both arm’d and Employ’d, what reason had the 
Protestants to trust the King. 
Id. 
107
 The Claim of Right is an essential historical document that all previous 
historians and legal commentators have utterly ignored regarding the “have arms” 
debate, for what is lost in their analyses is that often the same policies that the Stuart 
monarchy applied in England were also implemented in Scotland.  As historian Tim 
Harris informs us, “[B]y looking north of the border the English could see what was 
in store for them under their popish king.”  See Tim Harris, Reluctant Revolutionaries? 
The Scots and the Revolution of 1688-89, in POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN 
LATER STUART BRITAIN 97, 97 (Howard Nenner ed., 1997).  In other words, Scotland was the 
testing ground for most of James II’s policies—including the disarming of Protestants.  Id.   
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reason why the right exists.108  While the Declaration stipulates that it was by 
“causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time 
when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law” that Protestants “may 
have arms,” the Claim of Right grievance provides a bit more detail.  It claims that it 
was by: 
Disarmeing protestants while at the same tyme he Imployed papists in 
the places of greatest trust, civil and military; such as Chancellor 
Secretaries, Privie Counsellors, and Lords of Sessione, thrusting out 
protestants to make roome for papists, and Intrusting the forts and 
magazins of the Kingdome in ther hands [that the] Disarmeing of 
Protestants and Imploying papists [was] Contrary to Law.109 
The language of the Claim of Right makes abundantly clear that the main 
grievance between the Parliament and James II was not the disarmament of 
individuals, but the principle that Catholics were in positions whereby they, in 
theory, could disarm Protestants.  To be more specific, the grievance claimed that the 
King was employing papists “in places of great trust, civil and military”110 and that 
these employments were disarming Protestants.  As the grievance states, the King 
was entrusting the “forts and magazins” to Catholics.111  The seventeenth-century 
line of thought was that if the Catholics had control of the arms it was a de facto 
disarming of Protestants.112 
What is unique about the Claim of Right is that it does not protect the allowance 
to “have arms.”  It was only “contrary to law” to disarm Protestants and employ 
papists “in the places of greatest trust” and to entrust these papists “with the forts and 
magazines of the Kingdome.”113  Arguably, due to textual construction, the Claim of 
Right does not even offer the limited allowance to “have arms” that is protected by 
the Declaration of Rights.  Despite this fact, there is no doubt that the intents of both 
documents’ provisions are synonymous.  Both were concerned with the employing 
of Catholics as military officers—a position that was responsible for the arming of 
the militia and the keeping of its stores and magazines. 
                                                          
108
 For the entire Claim of Right, see 9 Scot. Parl. Acts 28 (1822). 
109
 Id.  Ultimately, the grievance remained the same as its first draft from the Committee 
for Settling Government.  It stated: 
B[y] Disarmeing protestants while at the same tyme he Imployed papists in the places 
of the greatest trust, civil and military; such as Chancellor Secretaries, Privie 
Counsellors, Lords of Sessione thrusting out protestants to make roome for papist, and 
Intrsuting the forts and magazins of the Kingdome in ther hands.   
Id.  For the adopted wording and language see id.  
110
 Id.  
111
 It was stated in Parliament as a grievance that “the militia armes by proclamation 
[were] being taken out of protestants hands, and committed to his Majesties stores, and since 
given out to papists.”  Id. 
112
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-77. 
113
 9 Scot. Parl. Acts 28 (1822) (“T[hat] the Disarming of protestants and Imploying 
papists in the places of greatest trust, both Civil and military, the thrusting out protestants, to 
make roome for papists, and the intrusting papists with the forts and magazines of the 
Kingdome are Contrary to Law.”).  
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Joyce Lee Malcolm is the only author to state that the Declaration of Rights’ 
grievance of disarming and the Protestant right to “have arms” did not have a limited 
application.  She believes that the redrafting process of the “have arms” provision 
moved away from “private ownership of arms as a political duty and toward a right 
to have arms for individual defence.”114  She comes to this conclusion because the 
“sparse records of the Convention yield only an outline of the discussions which took 
place and no account of what occurred either within the committees that drafted the 
Declaration of Rights or at conferences between the committees for the two 
Houses.”115  Despite the “sparse records,” Malcolm claims the “patchy evidence” that 
is available “reveals the anxieties of Convention members and the compromises they 
made to protect and strengthen the ability of Englishmen to have weapons.”116 
This is quite a bold statement.  Malcolm makes a large historical assumption 
without sufficient documentation.117  “Patchy evidence” is never sufficient to support 
an opinion as an historical fact.  Despite the lack of direct and substantiated evidence 
that supports this conclusion, Malcolm’s research infers that there is a solid 
foundation of evidence that the drafters of the Declaration of Rights were looking to 
incorporate the protection of armed individual self-defense.118  Nothing, however, 
could be farther from the intent, meaning, and protection for which the “have arms” 
provision was drafted.  The evidence does not suggest that the drafters were 
concerned with individual armed self-defense or the authority of military Lieutenants 
to disarm.  What the evidence does suggest is that the drafters merely had qualms 
with Catholics performing it against Protestants without justification.   
There is nothing in the Convention debates that proves otherwise.  There are 
three accounts of the debates, each of which connect the employing of Catholic 
Lieutenants and the Militia Act with the disarmament of Protestants.119  For example, 
Sir Richard Temple stated that the “Militia Act was made use of to disarm all 
England.”120  What Temple meant by “all England” was what has already been 
                                                          
114
 MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119. 
115
 Id. at 115. 
116
 Id.  
117
 Lois G. Schwoerer correctly states the true purpose behind the “have arms” provision.  
She writes that it “was, in a way, to reaffirm the value of the militia and to imply that 
legitimate military power resided, not in a standing army, the creature of the executive, but in 
the independent citizenry, embodied in the militia, the force of the parliamentary gentry.”  
SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 76.  If anything, the sources for this 
period raise more questions than they provide definitive conclusions. 
118
 See generally MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 115, 119. 
119
 For Richard Temple’s account see 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 53; 9 GREY 
supra note 37, at 31; 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416.  For John Maynard’s account 
see 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 407, 417.  For Boscawen’s account see 4 COBBETT, 
supra note 45, at 220; 9 GREY supra note 37, at 32; and 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 
416.  
120
 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 54.  Anchitell Grey’s account reads, “An Army was no 
part of the Government till the late King’s tie.  The Militia-Act was made use of to disarm all 
England.”  9 GREY, supra note 37, at 31.  Somers’ account reads, “Standing army settled 
without consent of Parliament, though not part of constitution.—May be allowed in case of 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
372 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:351 
conclusively shown.  By commissioning Catholics as Lieutenants, James II placed 
the power of arming the militia in papist hands.  John Maynard confirmed this when 
he stated that James II’s use of the Militia Act was “an abominable thing” that the 
King used “to disarm the nation, to set up a standing army.”121   
Moreover, the Militia Act permitted these Catholic Lieutenants to search and 
seize the arms of disaffected persons.  Mr. Boscawen complained about such an 
event when he stated, “The Militia, under pretence of persons disturbing the 
government, disarmed and imprisoned men without any cause,” an action with which 
Boscawen had a personal grievance since he too “was so dealt with.”122  Parliament 
never had any quarrels with the Militia Act’s provision that disarmed dangerous 
persons.  What Boscawen was upset about was that he was disarmed and imprisoned 
without any cause.  He did not think the Lieutenants had any reason to believe that 
he was “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome.”123   
John Maynard also expressed this concern.  He thought the Militia Act “was 
made to disarm all Englishmen, whom the Lieutenants should suspect, by day or by 
night[,] by force or otherwise.”124  It upset him that this was being done in Ireland 
“for the sake of putting arms into Irish Hands,” and because it was being done by 
Catholics without cause.125  Therefore, to the Convention, disarming dangerous 
persons was supported, as long as did not occur to prominent members of Parliament 
or the upstanding Protestant gentry. 
At no time during the Convention’s debates did any of the members seek, state, 
or claim that the disarming of “dangerous persons” provision in the Militia Act was 
illegal, arbitrary, or against their alleged fundamental right to “have arms” for 
                                                                                                                                         
war, invasion, or rebellion.—Militia bill.—Power to disarm all England.—Now done in 
Ireland.”  2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416. 
121
 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 417. 
122
 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 54.  Grey’s, account reads, “The Militia, under pretence 
of persons disturbing the Government, disarmed and imprisoned men without any cause: I 
myself was so dealt with.” 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 32.  Somers’ account reads, “Militia.—
Imprisoning without reason: disarming.—Himself disarmed.”  2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 
416.  
123
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662) (Eng.).  This would become an issue of discontent 
with the maintaining of a popish standing army.  At the time the 1662 Militia Act was passed, 
Parliament stated the following:  
In the next place, we held it our duty to undeceive the people, who have been poisoned 
with an opinion, that the Militia of this nation was in themselves, or in their 
representatives in parliament; and, according to the ancient known laws, we have 
declared the sole right of the Militia to be in your majesty.  And forasmuch as our time 
hath not permitted us to finish a Bill intended for the future ordering of the same; we 
shall present you with a temporary Bill, for the present managing and disposing of the 
Land Forces; and likewise another Bill for establishing certain Articles and Orders for 
the Regulation and Government of your majesty’s Navies and Forces by sea.   
4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 220. 
124
 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 407.   
125
 Id.  The fear of Catholics taking control of government may have been more prominent 
than the disarming grievance itself.  For this anti-Catholic sentiment see HARRIS, supra note 
26, at 80-86.   
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personal defense.  They had always found the Militia Act “grievous” but not in the 
manner that Individual Right Scholars claim.  In the Heads of Grievances, the fifth 
grievance stated that “[t]he Acts concerning the Militia are grievous to the 
Subject.”126  What was “grievous” were the powers given to the King in the 1661 and 
1662 Militia Acts.  In the 1661 Act, Parliament had qualms with the provision that 
gave the King sole command of the military forces, including the militia and “all 
forces by sea and land.”127  The 1662 Act reiterated this legal right of the King and 
stated that the King possessed “the sole and supreame Power Government Command 
and Disposition of the Militia . . . and that both or either of the Houses of Parliament 
cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.”128  What was also “grievous” was that the 
1662 Act made it illegal for Parliament to “raise or levy any War offensive or 
defensive against his Majesty.”129  Both Acts were “grievous” because Parliament 
not only had no legal recourse to check the King’s power to raise military forces, but 
it was also expressly illegal for Parliament to exert its right of self-preservation in the 
scenario that the army subverted their liberties.   
Furthermore, at no time after the inception of the 1662 Militia Act or during any 
of the debates to revise it did either house of Parliament seek to alter the searching 
and seizure of arms provision.  In 1668, Parliament sought to reform only the tax 
provisions of the Militia Act.130  Mr. Weller was of the opinion that the Act made the 
militia “as burthensome to 50l. [per] man in the country.”131  The amount required to 
be paid was “almost [as much] as all other taxes” combined.132  What he found 
equally frustrating was that it was a tax that “the lords have gotten this advantage on 
us” because “they touch not the burthen of it with their finger.”133  The taxes in the 
Militia Act and the embezzling of other money to support Charles II’s army were the 
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 MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 117. 
127
 13 Car. 2, c. 6 (1661) (Eng.). 
128
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.); see also ANTHONY FLETCHER, REFORM IN THE 
PROVINCES: THE GOVERNMENT OF STUART ENGLAND 321 (1986).   
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 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). 
130
 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 245-46.  When the Act was adopted, Parliament 
supported its provisions: 
We have already, according to our duties and the laws, declared the sole right of 
the Militia to be in your majesty: and now, with your permission, we humbly tender 
your majesty a Bill for the better Regulation and Ordering the Standing Forces of this 
nation; wherein we have taken care to make all things so certain, that your majesty’s 
lieutenants and their deputies may know what to command, and all the people to learn 
how to obey.—And because our late wounds are yet but green, and possibly, before 
the body politic be well purged, may incline to break out again, whereby your majesty 
may be forced to draw your sword before your treasury be supplied with Money; we 
have consented that your majesty may raise, for the 3 next ensuing years, one month’s 
tax in each year, after the rate of 70,000l. per mensem, if necessity shall so require.  
Id. 
131
 Id. at 301.  For further information on the militia taxes see FLETCHER, supra note 128, 
at 326-27. 
132
 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 301.  
133
 Id. at 391.   
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primary reforms that were attempted until the ascension of William and Mary.134  
The only other requests rested on why the Militia Acts were considered “grievous”—
this principle being that the King should rely on the militia rather than on a standing 
army.135   
In sum, the search and seizure provision never received a proposal for its 
alteration.  In fact, the disarming of disaffected people began two years prior to the 
inception of the 1662 Militia Act136 and was undeniably supported by the 
government.  By 1666, it was even generally accepted that it was within the King’s 
authority to place a “special watch on those of the disaffected who had horses or 
arms above their station, which were to be taken from them.”137  This was affirmed 
again in 1678 with the Popish Plot.  The House of Commons authorized Lieutenants 
to search and seize the persons of Sir Francis Ratcliffe and Lord Carrington, and to 
“secure all their horses.”138  Sir Eliab Harvey reminded his fellow members that 
Ratcliffe and Carrington were Catholic when he clarified that the “Papists generally 
have now extraordinary horses; four or five more than ordinary.”139  Colonel Titus 
did not want to punish the accused conspirators.  He said he would rather “have their 
horses secured, and a farther search for arms” conducted.140  Meanwhile, Sir Robert 
Sawyer advocated calling up one third of the militia, the sheriff, and the posse 
comitatus of the county to search and seize the arms of papists and other disaffected 
persons potentially participating in the Popish Plot.141  Thus, Parliament 
wholeheartedly agreed with the Militia Act’s search and seizure provision.  Sawyer 
eloquently summed up Parliament’s consensus on this matter, stating, “By Law, 
when the Kingdom is in danger, those persons who are the authors of that danger 
should be secured.”142 
Even when William and Mary assumed the throne and Parliament debated and 
proposed a new militia bill,143 the search and seizure provision was never the subject 
of debate or even mentioned.  William of Orange wanted to put the militia “into 
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 WESTERN, supra note 37, at 46-48. 
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 See 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 606, 666, 952, 1052, 1167, 1292, 1372-74; 2 
ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 
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 6 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO 
THE YEAR 1694, at 211 (London, n. pub. 1769) 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 212. 
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 Id. at 215.  Parliament resolved, “That an humble Address be made to his Majesty, that 
the Militia of the several counties may be in readiness, and that a third part of them may be 
raised for a fortnight, and that there be a farther search for Papist arms.”  Id. at 216. 
142
 Id.  
143
 For the bill’s career, see 10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 102-03, 112, 137, 163, 169, 186, 192, 
197, 199, 207, 212, 214, 223, 235 and 14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 284, 287, 302-03. 
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some better Posture”144 and the House of Commons worked to accomplish this 
objective.  The bill was referred to a committee of thirty-eight members, including 
Richard Temple, Mr. Sacheverell, Sir William Williams, and Mr. Boscawen,145 each 
of whom had showed dissatisfaction with the disarming of Protestants at the 
Declaration of Rights’ Convention.146  When the bill was sent to the House of Lords, 
it had a provision that would have repealed all the previous militia acts.147  In other 
words, the search and seizure of arms provision in the 1662 Militia Act would have 
been negated absent a similar provision in the new bill.148  The bill, however, did not 
pass.  Thus, historians are unsure whether the final version of the new bill would 
have included a search and seizure of arms provision.   
Based on the information available, however, it is highly likely that a similar 
provision would have eventually been incorporated.  The legislative record shows no 
dissatisfaction with the search and seizure of arms.  If anything, the records of the 
new militia bill show implicit support for it.  On July 9, 1689, the House of 
Commons put forth a provision in the bill for the purpose of “indemnifying and 
saving harmless all Persons that have taken Arms on the Behalf of the King’s 
Majesty” William of Orange.149  This shows that the Parliament supported the seizure 
of arms; it just preferred to have the power to determine who could seize the arms 
and to limit that it not be done by Catholics.150    
                                                          
144
 14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 258-59. 
145
 10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 102-03. 
146
 For Malcolm’s account see MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 113-16. 
147
 10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 212. 
148
 WESTERN, supra note 37, at 86.  For the Act’s contents see HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS 
COMM’N, 12 HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1689-1690, at 206-17 (London, Byre & 
Spottiswoode 1889).  Its contents do not include a provision similar to the search and seizure 
provision in the 1662 Militia Act.  Nevertheless, the bill did not pass.  Furthermore, if the 
House of Lords chose to approve the bill, there was nothing to prevent it from amending it to 
include one.   
149
 10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 212.  Language similar to this clause is contained in the bill that 
was presented to the House of Lords.  See HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMM’N, supra note 
148, at 241 (“That all and every person and persons who have or hath taken arms on the behalf 
of the King’s Majesty that now is, whilst he was Prince of Orange.”).   
150
 The search and seizure provision remained in force until the inception of the 1757 
Militia Act.  Lord Hardwicke initially gained some support for the defeat of the bill in 1756 
because the Act did not have a provision for the search and seizure of arms.  His fifth 
grievance with the Act read:  
In the Militia Act of king Charles 2, sect. 14, a power is given to the lord 
lieutenant and deputy lieutenants to “search for and seize the arms of persons, whom 
they shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom.” This power is totally 
repealed by this Bill, and no such new power is given.   
15 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 738 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813).  The grievance helped 
prevent the bill from passing in 1756, but due to pressure from the King and the people, the 
bill passed in 1757.  The search and seizure provision was removed.  Nevertheless, the bill 
gave arms to the militia only during times of drill.  The people were required to return them 
after muster.  See 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 32-34, 36 (1757) (Eng.).  
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The frequent search and seizures of arms during William and Mary’s reign gives 
credit to this interpretation.  These prove that the 1662 Militia Act’s seizure of arms 
provision was not only frequently used, but it was also supported by both Houses of 
Parliament.  It was a useful tool to remove arms from individuals that were 
dangerous to government, especially Catholics.151  In 1689, Mr. Smith wanted to 
“know why persons have stopped the lieutenancy of Middlesex from seizing Papists, 
and taking away their horses.”152  Papists were not the only conspirators who could 
be subjected to search and seizure, for Smith and his fellow members knew that “ill 
protestants join with” the papists.153  Thus, Protestants could also be subject to arms 
being confiscated.  This was reiterated when Parliament proposed “[t]hat all Papists, 
and all such persons as are not qualified by law, be disarmed, disbanded, and 
removed from all employments, civil and military.”154  Although the proposal’s main 
purpose was to target papists, the phrase “such persons as are not qualified by law” 
extended disarmament to Protestants and whoever else was deemed dangerous.155 
Because of this threat, William Williams knew there was “no time to form a 
[new] law for the militia.”156  He was for executing “the laws as they are, and . . . [for 
                                                          
151
 On March 5, 1689, the House of Lords ordered the following:  
This House being informed that there are divers Arms in the House of one Filkins, in 
the Parish of St. Giles: It is thereupon ORDERED, by the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Doors of the Rooms where those Arms 
are, be broken open by the Officers of the Ordnance, in the Presence of a Constable; 
and that the Arms there found be taken, and sent to The Tower of London.  This House 
being informed that there are Arms in the Custody of Moleneux, a Pawnbroker: It is 
thereupon ORDERED, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, 
That what Arms or Belts shall be found in his Custody, with the King’s Mark on them, 
be taken, and sent to The Tower of London; and that such other Arms as shall be found 
in his Custody shall be inventoried, and secured until further Order.   
14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 138-39.  
152
 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 342. 
153
 Id. at 343.  Smith also stated: 
I would have the Papists seized, and I would address the king for a proclamation 
limiting a time for those with king James: recall them by a day limited; if they 
surrender not themselves, seize their estates.  Let us know why orders to seize the 
horses and arms of Papists have had counterorders.  If that was done, I doubt not but 
the king may appear at the head of the militia as well as at the head of a standing 
Army.   
Id. at 343-44. 
154
 Id. at 19.  
155
 Id. at 14 (“[A]ll Papists who shall be found in open arms, or with arms in their houses, 
or about their persons, or in any office civil or military, upon any pretence whatsoever, 
contrary to the known laws of the land, shall be treated by us and our forces, not as soldiers 
and gentlemen, but as robbers, free-booters and banditti; they shall be incapable of quarter, 
and entirely delivered up to the discretion of our soldiers.  We do farther declare, that all 
persons who shall be found any ways aiding or assisting to them, or shall much under their 
command, or shall join with, or submit to them in the discharge or execution of their illegal 
commissions or authority, shall be looked upon as partakers of their crimes, enemies to the 
laws, and to their country.”). 
156
 Id. at 344. 
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forming] the Militia as well as [the Lieutenants] can.”157  Mr. Hampden then 
resolved: 
1. That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, that the 
considerable Papists, or reputed Papists, of this kingdom, may be 
forthwith taken into custody; and the arms and horses of all Papists, and 
reputed Papists, be searched for, and seized.  2.  That whatever 
Protestants, who shall own, protect, or conceal, any arms or horses, 
belonging to Papists, or reputed Papists, shall be looked upon as enemies 
to their majesties and this kingdom; and be proceeded against 
accordingly.158 
This address to William of Orange confirms that Protestants were not exempt 
from the 1662 Militia Act’s search and seizure of arms provision.  While it had 
primarily been used to disarm papists since William and Mary’s accession, 
Protestants were never exempt from being classified as disaffected or dangerous.159  
In fact, there are numerous instances where individuals’ arms were seized without 
regard to religion.  For instance, when warrants were issued to search for arms at 
“Queens Head Tavern” and the house next to “‘Anchor and Crown’ in Brewer 
Street,” no mention was made of papists.160  The same was true when a warrant was 
                                                          
157
 Id.  
158
 Id. at 344-45 (citation omitted).  This address would lead to the adoption of An Act for 
the better secureing the Government by disarming Papists and reputed Papists.  1 W. & M., c. 
15 (1688) (Eng.); see also 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 168-71 (discussing debates relating to the 
Act). 
159
 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 153-54.  William of Orange was cognizant of the 
Declaration of Rights and the sanctions it imposed on government.  For instance, the king 
confided in Parliament about the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  He wrote to 
Parliament:  
That his majesty had credible information, that there are several persons in and about 
this town, that keep private Meetings and Cabals, to conspire against the Government, 
and for the assistance of the late king James: That his majesty has caused some of 
those persons to be already apprehended and secured, upon the suspicion of High 
Treason; and that, he thinks, he may see cause to do so by others, within a little time: 
but that his majesty is between two great difficulties in this case; for that, if he should 
set those persons at liberty, that are apprehended, he would be wanting his own safety, 
and the safety of his government and people: on he other hand, if he should detain 
them, he is unwilling to do any thing, but what shall be fully warranted by law, which 
he has so often declared he will preserve: and that therefore, if those persons should 
deliver themselves by the act of Habeas Corpus, there would be another difficulty.  
That his majesty is likewise unwilling, that excessive Bail should be taken in this case; 
his majesty remembering that to be one Article of the Grievances presented to him: 
that ordinary Bail will not be sufficient; for men who carry on such designs, in hopes 
of succeeding will not stick at forfeiting a small sum: and that, this falling out when 
the parliament is sitting, his majesty therefore thought fit to ask the Advice of this 
house therein; and intends to advise with the lords also.   
Id.  No such advice was sought when he requested that the arms of disaffected Protestants be 
seized.   
160
 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of William and Mary, 
1689-1690, at 30, 292 (William John Hardy ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1895). 
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issued for a man named “Smith.”  His home was located at “‘the Crown and Thistle,’ 
Princes Street, in St. Ann’s Parish, and another home for concealed arms and 
ammunition.”161  In both instances, no mention was made of religion.162   
In comparison, when warrants were issued to search for the arms of papists, it 
was expressly stipulated as such.  On April 10, 1690, a warrant was issued “to search 
for concealed arms belonging to papists, and to apprehend all Irish papists together 
with other traitors and conspirators of whom . . . [the Colonel] shall have 
information.”163  The Earl of Shrewsbury also made this distinction in an order to 
Lord Lumley.  It read “that something should be done to discountenance those 
meetings of disaffected persons and papists . . . whether it may not be fit for the 
justices of the peace and the deputy lieutenants to go through the county again and 
give orders for disarming papists and their adherents.”164 
The fact that arms were searched for and seized from both Protestants and 
Catholics alike more adequately explains why the Declaration of Rights’ arms 
provision stated that Protestants “may have arms.”  The possession of arms was 
surely a duty and a tax through the respective militia laws, but it was primarily a 
privilege “suitable to their condition” and “as allowed by law.”  It was a privilege 
because the government could seize arms from disaffected or dangerous persons—
Catholic or Protestant.  All that was required was a warrant and good cause.165 
The restrictions the House of Lords placed on the “may have arms” provision 
also helps explain its language.  The arms had to be “suitable to their condition” and 
“as allowed by law.”166  The phrase “suitable to their condition” unequivocally shows 
that the House of Lords wanted to maintain the hierarchal “chain of being” and the 
cultural status quo.  Laws concerning the militia, defense of the realm, game, and 
weapons all incorporated provisions stipulating “condition” or “quality” as a factor 
in applying and structuring them.  For instance, the militia laws stipulated who was 
to be provided what arms based on one’s revenue and landed estates.167  In game, 
                                                          
161
 Id. at 195. 
162
 There are other examples of arms being seized of “dangerous” or “disaffected” persons.  
See id. at 165, 206, 329. 
163
 Id. at 548.  There are other examples of papists’ arms being seized.  See 2 CALENDAR 
OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of William III, 1696 (William John Hardy ed., 
Kraus Reprint 1969) (1895).  
164
 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 160, at 554. 
165
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.). 
166
 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.). 
167
 Lieutenants had: 
[F]ull Power and Authority to charge any person with Horse Horsman and Armes or 
with Foot Souldier and Armes . . . having respect unto and not exceeding the 
limitations and proportions hereafter mentioned (that is to say) No person shall be 
charged with finding a Horse Horseman and Armes unless such person or persons 
have a Revenue of Five hundred pounds by the yeare in possession or have an Estate 
of Six thousand pounds in goods or money besides the furniture of his or theire houses 
and so proportionably for a greater Estate in lands in possession or goods as the 
respective Lieutenants and theire Deputies as aforesaid in theire discretions shall see 
cause and thinke reasonable And they are not to charge any person with finding a Foot 
Souldier and Armes that hath not a yearly Revenue of Fifty pounds in possession, or a 
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deer, and hunting laws, individuals were allowed to maintain weapons, arms, and 
tools only for hunting depending on similar factors.168  Finally, laws governing the 
use, ownership, and privileges of weapons were almost always subject to the 
individual’s degree, station, or condition.169 
                                                                                                                                         
personal Estate of Six hundred pounds in goods or moneys, (other than the stock upon 
the ground) and after the aforesaid rate proportionably for a greater or lesser Revenue 
or Estate Nor shall they charge any person with the finding both of Horse and Foot in 
the same County.  
13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.).   
The Militia Act set up the following socio-economic structure: 
Every Man between fifteen years of age, and sixty years, shall be assessed and 
sworn to Armor according to the quantity of their Lands and Goods; that is to wit, 
[from] Fifteen Pounds Lands, and Goods Forty Marks, an Hauberke, [a Breast-plate] 
of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse; and [from] Ten Pounds of Lands, and Twenty 
Marks Goods, an Hauberke, [a Breast-plate of Iron,] a Sword, and a Knife; and [from] 
from Five Pound Lands, [a Doublet,] [a Breast-plate] of Iron, a Sword, and a Knife; 
and from Forty Shillings Land and more, unto One hundred Shillings of Land, a 
Sword, a Bow and Arrows, and a Knife; and he that hath less than Forty Shillings 
yearly, shall be sworn to [keep Gis-armes,] Knives, and other [less Weapons]; and he 
that hath less than Twenty Marks in Goods, shall have Swords, Knives, and other [less 
Weapons]; and all other that may, shall have Bows and Arrows out of the Forest, and 
in the Forest Bows and [Boults.]  
13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.) (alterations in original).   
168
 See 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25, § 2 (1670-1671) (Eng.) (“That all and every person and 
persons, not haveing Lands and Tenements or some other Estate of Inheritance in his owne or 
his Wifes right of the cleare yearely value of one hundred pounds per annu or for terme of life, 
or haveing Lease or Leases of ninety nine yeares or for any longer terme, of the cleare yearely 
value of one hundred and fifty pounds, other than the Sonne and Heire apparent of an Esquire, 
or other person of higher degree. and the Owners and Keepers of Forrests, Parks, Chases or 
Warrens, being stocked with Deere or Conies for their necessary use in respect of the said 
Forrests, Parks, Chases or Warrens, are hereby declared to be persons by the Lawes of this 
Realme, not allowed to have or keepe for themselves or any other person or persons any Guns, 
Bowes, Grey hounds, Setting-dogs, Ferretts, Cony-doggs, Lurchers, Hayes, Netts, Lowbells, 
Hare-pipes, Ginns, Snares or other Engines aforesaid, But shall be, and are hereby prohibited 
to have, keepe or use the same.”); 3 Ja., c. 13, § 4 (1605-1606) (Eng.) (“That if any pson or 
psons not having any Mannors Landes Tenements or Hereditaments of the cleere yeerly value 
of Forty Pounds, or not worth in Goodes or Chattels the some of Two hundred Poundes, shall 
use any Gunne Bowe or Crosbowe to kill any Deere or Connyes, or shall keepe any Buckstall 
or Engine Hayes Gatenets Pursnets Ferrets or Conny Dogges, except such pson or psons as 
shall have any Ground imparked with Pale or inclosed with Wall or Hedge as aforesaide used 
for the keeping breeding or cherishing of any Deere or Connyes, the increase of which said 
Connyes shall amount to the cleer yeerly value of Forty Shillings to bee letten at the leaste.”); 
4 & 5 W. & M., c. 23, § 4 (1592) (Eng.) (providing that the 1692 Game Act permitted the 
destruction of guns, weapons, nets, and dogs that were “prohibited to be kept by persons of 
their degree”). 
169
 See 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.) (“[T]hat no psone or psonnes dwellinge or 
resiaunte within Wales or the Lordshipps marches of the same, of what estate degree or 
condition so ev[er] he or they be of, comynge resortinge or repayringe unto any Sessions or 
Courte to be holden within Wales or any Lordshippes marches of the same, shall bringe to 
beare or cause to be brought or borne, to the same Sessions or Courte or to any place within 
the distaunce of two myles from the same Sessions or Courte, nor to any towne, churche, 
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Malcolm’s account of these affairs is much different.  The arms provision in the 
Heads of Grievances used the phrase “should provide and keep arms,” but by the 
time the provision made it through the House of Commons, it was changed to “may 
have arms.”  Malcolm contends that “should” was replaced by “may” because the 
former “smacked too much of preparation for popular rebellion to be swallowed by 
the more cautious Lords or, for that matter, by William.”170  There are no sources, 
letters, or debates to back up this assertion.  Such an historical interpretation 
seemingly ignores all the laws that restricted arms by hierarchy and socio-economic 
status—laws that William and Mary of Orange maintained and Parliament never 
overturned.  Malcolm attempts to counter this fact by arguing that the compromise to 
create the “have arms” provision in the Declaration of Rights was the first step in 
Parliament to modify and reform the Militia and Game laws.171  She believes that 
although “the arms article declared a right that current law negated, [this was done] 
with the understanding that future legislation would eliminate the discrepancy.”172  
No historical evidence exists to support this assertion either. 
                                                                                                                                         
fayre, markett, or other congregacion, except yt be upon a hute or outcrie made of any felonye 
robberie done or perpetrated, nor yn the highe wayes yn affraye of the Kyng[’s] peace or the 
Kyng[’s] liege . . . or any other maner of weapon, privye cote or armour defence.”); 25 Hen. 8, 
c. 17, § 1 (1533-1534) (Eng.) (“[N]o pson or persons of what Estate or degree he or they be, 
except he or they in theire owne right or in the right of hys or theire wyfes to hys or theire 
owne uses, or any other to the use of any suche person or perons, have lands tenements fees 
annuityes or offices to the yerely value of an hundred poundes, frome  the furst day of June 
next comyng shall shote in any [hangonne] or crosse bow, or use or kepe in hys or theire 
houses or els where any crose bow or handgonne; upon payne to forfayte for every tyme that 
he or they soo offende contrary to this acte . . . And that it shalbe lefull to every person that 
may use or kepe any crose bowe or handgonne or that may shote in the same notwithstondyng 
this Acte, to sease and take every suche crosse bowe and handgonne or any of theyme frome 
the kepyng or possession of every suche offender, and the same to kepe or retayne to hys or 
theire owne use.”) (second alteration in original); 12 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1388) (Eng.) (“That no 
Servant of Husbandry, or Labourer, nor Servant [or] Artificer, nor of Victualler, shall from 
henceforth bear any [Buckler,] Sword, nor Dagger, upon Forfeiture of the same, but in the 
Time of War for Defence of the Realm of England.”) (alterations in original); 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 
(1328) (Eng.) (“That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the 
King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s Precepts, or of 
their Office, and such as be in their Company assisting them, and also [upon a Cry made for 
Arms to keep the Peace, and he same in such places where such Acts happen,] be so hardy to 
come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing their office, with force 
and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by 
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the 
King’s Pleasure.”) (alteration in original); 13 Edw. (1285) (Eng.) (“It is enjoined that none be 
so hardy to be found going or wandering about the Streets of the City, after Curfew tolled at 
St. Martins le Grand, with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing Mischief, or whereof 
evil suspicion might arise; nor any in any other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other 
lawful Person of good repute, or their certain Messenger, having their Warrants to go from one 
to another, with Lanthern in hand.”) 
170
 MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119.  
171
 Id. at 120. 
172
 Id.  
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If anything, given the legal and statutory record, “should” was replaced by “may” 
because of the legal implications that the former would supply.  If the Declaration of 
Rights stated that Protestants “should have arms” it would have implied that every 
Protestant had an affirmative right to arms for defense of the realm.  Not to mention, 
when “should” remained in the provision, it did not possess the language “suitable to 
their condition as allowed by law.”  Thus, the initial proposal in the Heads of 
Grievances would have extended a right to “have arms” for defense of the realm to 
all Protestants.173  The House of Lords’ alterations fixed this.  It wanted to ensure that 
not only did the current arms restrictions remain, but that future Parliaments could 
curtail this allowance as they deemed necessary.174 
For seventeenth-century historians, understanding the “have arms” provision in 
such a light is not difficult.  The provision was intended grant a limited right in 
connection with the English militia system that would prevent the illegal 
maintenance of standing armies and echoed the legal justification for armed rebellion 
when government usurped the rights of the people.175  Although one may argue that 
there is no mention of the militia in the “have arms” provision or the Declaration of 
Rights, the three subjects are undoubtedly linked.  One needs to look only at the 
Heads of Grievances, which provides the following grievances in this numerical 
order: 
5.  The Acts of the Militia are grievous to the Subject. 
6.  The raising or keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdom in 
time of Peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against Law. 
7.  It is necessary for the publick Safety, that the Subjects, which are 
Protestants, should provide and keep Arms for their common Defence: 
And that the Arms which have been seized, and taken from them, be re-
stored.176 
As previously addressed, what was “grievous” about the Militia Act was not the 
disarming of disaffected and dangerous persons, it was that the King had sole 
authority over the armed forces177 and that the Act made it illegal to take up arms 
against him.178  These facts were intertwined with the phrase “keeping a Standing 
Army.”  Parliament feared that if the King had sole authority of the militia—the 
means by which Parliament was to check a tyrannical government—and there was 
                                                          
173
 The right to have arms supported the “anti-army prejudice and pro-militia sentiment.”  
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 21, at 207, 211.  It was in no way 
meant to extend to the “individual right” to have arms.  Id. at 210. 
174
 Schwoerer contends “that the change was made to satisfy the Prince of Orange, who 
objected to the idea that Protestants ‘should provide and keep Arms.’”  Id. at 214. 
175
 See supra pp. 356-67. 
176
 MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 131. 
177
 At the Convention, Sir William Williams even stated, “The Act of the Militia is worthy 
your consideration, and he in whose hands you put it should be our Head.  I take it to be your 
security to settle your safety for the future, and then to consider the person.”  9 GREY, supra 
note 37, at 30.  
178
 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.). 
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no statutory check on the maintenance of a standing army, the potential usurpations 
on liberty were philosophically endless.179  This is why the Heads of Grievances 
conditioned a standing army on parliamentary approval, which ultimately leads us to 
the “have arms” grievance.  Parliament felt that by allowing the people to “have 
arms” for “the common Defence”—i.e., militia—there would always remain a means 
to check a standing army that refused to disband.180 
Lastly, Malcolm’s interpretation does not support the fact that William used the 
1662 Militia Act to disarm papists and dangerous persons on a massive scale nearly a 
decade after the Declaration of Rights remained in force.  For instance, in 1699, 
William used the search and seizure provision to disarm “great numbers of papists 
and other disaffected persons, who disown his Majesty’s government.”181  He 
expressly authorized: 
[The] mayor of London, and all justices . . . [to] put in execution the 
statute[s] intituled, An Act for the amoving papists and reputed papists 
from the cities of London and Westminster, and ten miles distance from 
the same, . . . An act for the better securing the government by disarming 
papists and reputed papists[, and] . . . An Act for the better security of his 
Majesty’s royal person and government.182   
The statutes that William authorized gave the government power to disarm not only 
papists, but dangerous and disaffected persons as well. 
In fact, in 1701, William even granted monetary rewards for arms seized from 
dangerous or disaffected persons.   On February 26th, he proclaimed: “And we 
charge all lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants, within the several counties of 
[England] and Wales, that they cause search to be made for arms in the possession of 
any persons whom they judge dangerous, and seize such arms according to law.”183  
                                                          
179
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 73-74. 
180
 One may argue that if the three grievances were meant to be intertwined, they would 
have combined as such in the Declaration of Rights.  A valid point, but, nevertheless, the 
Convention’s record also intertwined them.  In most instances where disarming was 
mentioned, the Militia Act and standing armies were mentioned right beside it.  This was not 
by chance.  It was intentional.  Sir Richard Temple stated that “to provide against a Standing 
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As a result, warrants were issued for papists and persons suspected to be dangerous 
or disaffected.184  Parliament did not object to these searches as a violation of the 
“have arms” provision.  In fact, the searches were applauded.  The House of Lords 
“humbly thanked his majesty for . . . order[ing] the seizing of all horses and arms of 
Papists, and other disaffected persons, and hav[ing] those ill men removed from 
London, according to the law.”185  Furthermore, the Lords hoped the King would 
“give directions” for a further search of arms.186  This evidence is a far cry from the 
“individual right” interpretation that Malcolm puts forward. 
Therefore, the historical and legislative record of the “have arms” provision does 
not support the “individual right” model of armed self-defense.  Rather, the “have 
arms” provision was a means to check arbitrary government—nothing more, nothing 
less.  Its “may have arms” language in no way implies that every Protestant 
Englishman had a right to guns, weapons, or other instruments.  It was a 
governmental allowance that depended on hierarchal structure and socio-economic 
status.187  Most importantly, it was an allowance that could be altered and regulated 
“as allowed by law.”  What could never be taken away, however, was the 
philosophical right the “have arms” provision echoed—the right of the people to take 
up “arms for their Defence” when all other means of redress to a tyrannical 
government are exhausted.  This is why William Blackstone labeled it the “fifth and 
last auxiliary right,”188 for it should only be looked upon as the last option to secure 
the liberties of the people.  
III.  CORRECTING THE “INDIVIDUAL RIGHT” INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONVENTION 
The two best arguments that Individual Right Scholars make concerning the 
legislative history of the “have arms” provision are taken out of context.  The first is 
their interpretation of Mr. Finch’s testimony at the Convention.  Malcolm contends 
that “[t]he need for the private possession of weapons to restrain the Crown was 
pressed by Mr. Finch.”189  In John Somers’ account, he abbreviated Finch’s statement 
as follows: 
Question, If the King has lost his title to the crown?—I think no man 
safe under his administration.—No safety but in the consent of the 
nation.—The constitution being limited, there is a good foundation for 
defensive arms.—It has given us right to demand full and ample 
security.—If there be an expedient wherein all may be secure, and all 
agree, that is the best.—1.  We are to examine and inquire of the 
succession.—2.  Every man must swear to it as lawful and rightful.190 
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Based on this account, Malcolm believes Finch was making the point that “there 
was both a personal and a national interest in the ability of citizens to have 
‘defensive arms.’”191  In making this contention, however, Malcolm omits all the 
preceding and subsequent language of the quote.192  What Finch was actually 
referring to was the “title to the throne.”193  His reference to “defensive arms” had 
nothing to do with private possession of weapons but instead had to do with the 
philosophical principle that Parliament may overthrow a tyrannical government. At 
no time was Finch referencing anything except the succession conundrum that the 
Convention faced: How would it legally proclaim William and Mary of Orange the 
true sovereigns of England? Finch argued that if the English Constitution was 
limited, then when James II dispensed and suspended those limitations, the 
Constitution gave Parliament and the people the right to take up arms in its 
defense.194  
Individual Right Scholars’ misuse of historical context at the Convention does 
not end here.  They also believe that Thomas Erle’s draft of a speech which was 
“probably presented . . . in one of the [Convention’s] early debates” gives weight to 
the argument that the “have arms” provision protected individual firearm 
possession.195  The portion of the speech to which they refer reads: 
It will be convenient to make no man a militia officer but such as have 
a good estate to bear the expense of such an office, as hath been in ancient 
times; and it will prevent the misemploying the money gathered for the 
service of the county if there be two treasurers appointed that are persons 
of ability and known integrity to receive it, their clerks or servants to be 
allowed some small rewards for disbursing and receiving the money; 
commissioners to be appointed that are no militia officers for taking an 
account and for the disposal of the militia money.  Besides the militia 
arms it will be convenient that every man that hath ₤10 and every 
substantial householder in any town or city should be provided of a good 
musket in case of an invasion: if it be said they will destroy the game, 
there is a law made against it so that ’tis not the gun or musket that 
offends but the man that makes an ill use of his arms and he may be 
punished for it by the law.196 
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Although Erle never delivered these sentiments in a speech to Parliament, there is 
no denying that he would have expressed his opinion on these matters to his fellow 
members.197  As historian Mark Goldie shows us, Erle’s speech was constructed in 
the midst of the Glorious Revolution, meaning it was drafted around December 
1688.198  But even if Goldie has miscalculated the date, the draft supports the limited 
purpose of the “have arms” provision—defense of the realm against foreign 
invasion.  What makes this abundantly clear is the militia context that Erle mentions: 
“[E]very substantial householder . . . should be provided of a good musket.”199  The 
purpose of providing these muskets was “in case of an invasion.”200  It was not for 
individual protection of the home whatsoever, a point Erle clarifies when he 
mentions the game laws, for he knew the governments arming of the people—even if 
it were to apply only to “substantial householders”—would be seen as a dangerous 
proposition.  He hoped to ease those fears by reminding Parliament that there were 
already laws on the books regarding the unlawful use of arms.  
Furthermore, the fact that Erle sought to arm only “substantial householders” 
speaks to the “have arms” provision’s exception that it be “suitable to their 
condition.”  Erle was not asking Parliament to arm every man in England, nor was he 
asking that they be allowed to arm themselves as the “individual right” view would 
have it.  Rather, he sought to arm only those who met certain hierarchal and socio-
economic qualifications.  Just what would qualify as a “substantial householder” is 
uncertain, but this does not mean that Erle’s use of language should be taken lightly.  
It is significant that Erle’s arming proposal was placed immediately after his mention 
of the Stuart Kings’ standing armies and his grievances with the Militia Act, 
including the grievances that militia arms had been put into the hands of “lewd 
dissolute persons’ custody.”201  Rather, Erle thought it was in the nation’s best 
interest to “put the militia arms into such hands that have estates of their own.”202  He 
reasoned that “lewd dissolute persons” were not to be trusted because they “have 
nothing [and] do not care to preserve that for others that they have no share in 
themselves.”203  Meanwhile, people of landed estates “have something to lose [and] 
will be careful to preserve it.”204 
In the end, Erle’s proposal that every “substantial shareholder” be provided a 
good musket did not pass.  His recommendations may have led to the Heads of 
Grievances’ language that Protestants “should provide and keep Arms for their 
common Defence.”  These words articulate what Erle sought to propose: it was every 
Protestant’s duty to protect against invasion.  The language was substantially 
changed to “may have arms,” though, articulating that having arms was an allowance 
by law—not a right per se. 
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IV.  THE GAME ACTS AND UNDERSTANDING ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE 
Individual Right Scholars contend that the passing of the “have arms” provision 
should have negated the 1671 Game Act’s restrictions on weapons.  Otherwise, with 
the Game Act still in force, the “have arms” provision would be a right that “merely . 
. . [protected] the wealthy.”205  First and foremost, there is nothing in the drafting 
history of the Declaration of Rights that extended the right to “have arms” to hunting 
or game.  None of the grievances or debates even mentioned it in passing.  The right 
to “have arms” was expressly linked to the employing of Catholic Lieutenants, and 
no substantiating historical evidence exists to prove otherwise. 
In fact, the Heads of Grievances stipulated the possession of arms for “their 
common Defence,” a phrase that even Joyce Lee Malcolm believes speaks of arms 
ownership as a “public duty.”206  The only public duties that involved the possession 
of arms were connected to the defense of the realm through the assize and militia 
laws.207  The phrase “for their common Defence,” however, was altered by the House 
of Lords.  Its final language dropped the word “common” so it read “for their 
defence.”208  Malcolm and other Individual Right Theorists believe that this change 
“marked a final shift away from the private ownership of arms as a political duty and 
toward a right to have arms for individual defense.”209 
This interpretation, however, does not adequately explain the House of Lords’ 
decision to add the phrase “suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.”   As 
has already been shown, the term “condition” was frequently used in weapon,210 
militia,211 and game laws.212  In every instance, the term referenced hierarchal and 
socio-economic status—the chain of being.213  The clause was not “vague,” as 
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Malcolm contends, nor was it included to allow for “legislative clarification and for 
perpetuation of restrictions such as that on ownership of handguns.”214  It was 
intended to clarify just how limited one “may have arms for their Defence.” 
The next contention made by Individual Right Scholars is the argument that the 
lingual understanding of “arms for their Defence” clearly speaks to individual self-
defense, whether it is of the home, person, or property.  Historian J. R. Western 
believes that the removal of the word “common,” “suggested only that it was lawful 
to keep a blunderbuss to repel burglars: ‘Subjects which are protestants may have 
arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.’”215  
Malcolm takes Western’s analysis a step further by claiming that the shift protected 
an individual’s “right to have arms for individual defense.”216  Neither interpretation, 
however, is correct.  While Western accurately includes the hue and cry217 as one of 
the allowances by law that Protestants “may have arms . . . suitable to their 
conditions,” he did not adequately articulate the protective scope of the right to 
“have arms.”  Not to mention, even the hue and cry limited what types of arms one 
may possess.218  Meanwhile, Malcolm assumes that “for their defence” spoke to 
individual firearm ownership without providing any use of this language—in 
contemporary seventeenth-century law or literature—that proves her assertion.  
A look at the books, pamphlets, and literature prior to, contemporaneous with, 
and after the Glorious Revolution actually shows that the phrases “arms for their 
common defence” and “arms for their defence” were synonymous in meaning.  Both 
referenced the use of arms for military purposes, defense of the realm, or that the 
people have a right to overthrow tyrannical government, in the philosophical context.  
For instance, in his treatise on the art of war, Roger Boyle, the Earl of Orrey, wrote 
that it was the duty of the “[s]oldiers [to] carry Arms for their Defence.”219  In 1623, 
Richard Jobson wrote of “Ferambra” the “Lord of his Country” putting “himselfe 
[and] Country in armes for their defence.”220  In 1674, Blaise Monluc wrote of his 
personal experience of going to the Court of French Parliament to convince it to 
                                                                                                                                         
hath all his parts both within and without . . . members of his body, in a profitable, 
necessary, and pleasant order.  Every degree of people, in their vocation, calling, and 
office, hath appointed to them their duty and order.  Some are in high degree, some in 
low; . . . and every one have need of other.   
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“take up arms.”221  Monluc argued that it was the Parliament’s duty to “encourage the 
people” to defend France.222  In order for Parliament to convince the people, though, 
he believed it must “see those who have power over their lives and estates take arms 
for their defence.”223  The use of the phrase in these examples was purely military in 
context.  However, this use of “arms for their defence” was not common.  
In most instances, “arms for their defence” referenced the people—either in a 
militia or military context—standing up against tyrannical oppression.  For example, 
in 1585, when Thomas Bilson addressed whether it was lawful to resist tyrannical 
princes and magistrates, he stated that the Protestant “subjectes taking armes for their 
defence in such a case” was “in no way to be accounted treason.”224  This philosophy 
of lawful rebellion with the phrase “arms for their defence” was reiterated in multiple 
tracts.  In 1608, Jean Francois Le Petit wrote that rebellion against tyrannical 
government was “permitted both by godly, naturall, and humaine laws.”225  This 
made it lawful “by authority of the councell of [the] state then ruling to take armes 
for their defence and securities.”226  In 1643, William Prynne wrote of the duty of 
Parliament to engage with “open Force of Armes” when the King “betray[ed] [its] 
trust, yea the whole kingdome too.”227  Prynne explained that Parliament must 
“defend their owne and the Subjects Liberties, persons, privileges, . . . against his 
Majesties offensive Armies which invade them.”228 The power to engage in such 
rebellion was “agreeable to the very Law of nature and reason,” and, therefore, 
Prynne explained it was “lawfull to take up Armes for their Defence when it was 
needful.”229 
Many other examples of the phrase “arms for their defence” exist in this 
context,230 but there are two that are particularly important.  The first is a 
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contemporaneous 1688 pamphlet by Peter Pett entitled The Happy Future State of 
England.231  Pett discussed how the papists brought almost as much alarm and fear 
throughout the kingdom as a foreign invasion would.232  In fact, the fear was so 
extreme that it caused the government to “occasionally lay[] a Tax on men to buy 
what Arms for their defence the Law allowes.”233  The pamphlet’s use of the phrase 
“arms for their defence” perfectly captures what the Declaration of Rights’ “have 
arms” provision protected.  This is because the allowance that Protestants “may have 
arms” was more of a tax than anything else.  Through the militia acts, the hue and 
cry, and the assize of arms, individuals were required to possess arms depending on 
their quality or condition.234  Moreover, Pett makes reference to “as the law allowes,” 
further showing the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.”235  The 
government could always change what types of arms persons were allowed to 
provide depending on their quality or condition.236 
The second example is a 1649 work by James Howell describing the events of 
the English Civil War and Charles I’s fleeing to the Isle of Wight.237  Howell wrote 
that Charles I was “contented to declare, That the two Houses [of Parliament] were 
necessitated to take Armes for their defence”—a connation that clearly speaks of 
military defense.238  What is particularly interesting is that Howell would further 
write about “self-defence.”  To Howell, “self-defence” is “the universall Law of 
Nature, and it extends to all other creatures, as well as the rationall.”239  It is not a 
written principle: 
[B]ut a Law born with us; A Law which we have not learnt, receiv’d 
or read, but that which we have suck’d, drawn forth, and wrung out of 
Nature her self; A Law to which we are not taught, but made unto, 
wherewith we are not instructed, but indued withall, that if our lifes be in 
jeopardy, [etcetera] we may repell force by force.240 
                                                                                                                                         
enemies to the common cause, or shall refuse to take armes for their defence”); PHILIPE DE 
COMMINES, THE HISTORIE OF PHILIP DE COMMINES KNIGHT, LORD OF ARGENTON 69 (London, 
Ar. Hatfield & I. Norton 1596) (stating “the Bishoprick . . . commanded them to take armes 
for their defence”); MARTIN FUMÉE, THE HISTORIE OF THE TROUBLES OF HUNGARIE 162 
(London, Felix Kynston 1600) (stating “[a]nd because in this towne where many persons, who 
willingly, or by compulsion of the Turkes, had taken armes for their defence”).  
231
 PETER PETT, THE HAPPY FUTURE STATE OF ENGLAND (London, n. pub. 1688). 
232
 Id. at 60. 
233
 Id.  
234
 See supra notes 31-32. 
235
 PETT, supra note 231, at 60. 
236Id.  
237
 JAMES HOWELL, AN INQUISITION AFTER BLOOD (n.p., n. pub. 1649). 
238
 Id. at 4. 
239
 Id.  
240
 Id. at 4-5.  
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
390 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:351 
Howell rightfully believed that Parliament exercised the principle of the natural 
right of “self-defence” when it took “arms for their defence,” and Charles I “was 
content[] to acknowledge.”241  Individual Right Theorists will argue that Howell’s 
analysis proves that “self-defence” and “arms for their defence” were synonymous 
phrases—that the latter spoke to armed individual self-defense.  This, however, takes 
Howell out of context.  Howell makes it clear that “self-defence” is an individual 
natural right to defend one’s person when assaulted.242  The term can also be a 
broader principle for revolution.  It is this revolutionary context in which the people 
may “have arms” to protect their liberties.243  It was this natural law principle that 
prompted Parliament to take up “arms for their defence.”  If the two phrases were 
synonymous, Howell would have stated that “arms for their defence” “is the 
universall Law of Nature.”  He did not.  Instead, he was clear to differentiate 
between the two principles.  “Arms for their defence” is in reference to organized 
and justified rebellion or military action based on the principle of “self-defence.”  
Meanwhile, “self-defence” often was in reference to an individual’s right to protect 
his or her person when endangered, but this right was not absolute.244  
If anything, Howell’s tract shows that “self-defence” was a common term used 
prior to the drafting of the Declaration of Rights.245  And because it was common, it 
begets the question, “Why was ‘self-defence’ not used in lieu of ‘arms for their 
defence’?”  The use of the former would have more adequately articulated an 
“individual right” to “have arms” to protect their person, house, and property.  The 
truth of the matter is that “arms for their defence” was used because it properly 
articulated the principle of defending the realm against outside forces and against 
tyrannical governments.  It had nothing to do with an individual’s protection of his 
person, house, or property.  
Parliament’s use of the phrase “arms for their defence” twice in 1642 supports 
this understanding.  The first usage occurred on January 12th in the House of Lords.  
John Pym, responding to the charge that Parliament endeavored to raise a force of 
men to remove Charles I, stated that it was “the king’s going into the North and 
raising armies there” that preceded Parliament taking “any course, or [making] any 
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preparation to take up arms for their defence.”246  The second instance occurred in 
the House of Commons.  On November 18th, Parliament ordered that the inhabitants 
of the Hamlets Popular and Blackwall: 
[S]hall have Power to make Assesses, as well upon the Lands as the 
Inhabitants, to the Value of One hundred and Fifty Pounds, for Providing 
of Arms for their Defence, and Satisfying of the great Charge they have 
been at for the Courts of Guard, and Posts, and other Necessaries for their 
Security.247   
Both examples limit “arms for their defence” to a defense of the realm context. 
Individual Right Scholars have never explored the seventeenth-century 
understanding of the phrase “arms for their defence.”  They merely assume it equates 
with armed individual “self-defence”248—a contemporary misunderstanding of 
seventeenth-century terminology.  Not even Cato’s Letters linked the two together.  
In writing on self-defense in 1720, Thomas Gordon wrote that the “Law of Nature 
does not only allow us, but oblige[s] us, to defend ourselves.  It is our Duty, not only 
to ourselves, but to Society.”249  Cato’s Letters and quotations like this have been 
used by Individual Right Scholars to support their stance.  What these scholars fail to 
mention, however, is that Gordon was discussing a natural right, and he made no 
mention of a right to weaponry or arms.  There is not one instance in Cato’s Letters 
that states that society cannot determine what means individuals may use to defend 
themselves and society upon entering civilization.  In fact, the first law of nature is 
that “all Men are bound alike not to hurt one another.”250   
There is not even a mention of the Declaration of Rights or a right to “have arms” 
in any of the Cato tracts mentioning or examining self-defense.  One may argue that 
Gordon and Trenchard forgot to include it, or that it was just naturally understood to 
exist.  However, this does not explain why the authors went to great lengths to 
include the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution when discussing other matters 
of a constitutional nature.  These other matters include the right to petition, 
separation of powers in a limited monarchy, and standing armies—all of which are 
expressly contained within the Declaration of Rights.   The right to petition and 
redress was a “legal Remedy at Hand: It is their undoubted Right, and acknowledged 
to be so in the Bill of Rights passed in the Reign of King Charles the First; and since 
by the Act of Settlement of the Crown at the Revolution.”251  In writing about the 
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limited powers of the crown, Gordon wrote, “We have a Constitution that abhors 
Absolute Power; we have a King that does not desire it; and we are a People that will 
never suffer it.”252  For the unconstitutionality of standing armies, one need look no 
further than the title of Trenchard’s 1697 tract, An Argument Shewing that a 
Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive to 
the Constitution of the English Monarchy.253 
To be clear, neither Trenchard nor Gordon viewed armed individual self-defense 
as a right—natural or civil.  In a state of nature, it is undeniable that every person has 
“a Right to repel Injuries, and to revenge them.”254  That is, people have “a Right to 
punish the Authors of those Injuries, and to prevent their being again committed.”255  
An individual, however, gives up this unfettered natural right to the government 
upon entering society.  As Gordon wrote, “[I]t is absurd to suppose that National 
Legislatures, to whom every . . . [person’s] private Power is committed, have not the 
same Right, and ought not to exercise it on proper Occasions.”256  In society, the 
people also turn over justice to the government.  Gordon felt that the natural right of 
“repelling and revenging Injuries, in such [a] Manner as every [person] thought best, 
is transferred to the Magistrate, when Political Societies are formed.”257 It only 
returns to “private [individuals] again, when the Society is dissolved.”258   
This dissolution of society and government can occur with a lack of proper 
succession or when society restrains “the great End of their Trust, in protecting the 
Innocent; an End for which alone Men part with their natural Rights, and become the 
Members and Subjects of Society.”259  When this trust is broken and government is 
oppressive, the people “have a Right to defend and preserve themselves” because 
“there is no other Power in Being to protect and defend them.”260  In other words, the 
people have a right to revolt against unjust rule.  Even Trenchard knew it was 
difficult to imagine that “any Number of Men [would be] formidable enough to 
disturb a settled State” given the “Artillery, and all the Magazines of War” at the 
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government’s disposal.261  But when the “publick Grievances are so enormous, the 
Oppression so great, and the Disaffection so universal” the people must rebel.262  It is 
this “Principle of People’s judging for themselves, and resisting lawless Force,” 
wrote Trenchard, that “stands our late happy [Glorious] Revolution.”263  People did 
not have an unfettered right to “have arms” to accomplish this either.  What they did 
have was the right to take up arms and restore their rights. 
Individual Right Scholars ignore these historical and philosophical facts.  They 
are so bold to believe that even if the Declaration of Rights allowed Protestants to 
“have arms,” it must have overridden any laws restricting firearm ownership, 
including the game laws.264  The Declaration of Rights never overrode these laws, 
nor was it ever intended to do so.  In fact, upon the accession of William and Mary, 
the 1692 Game Act affirmed that “all and every Law and Statute now in force for the 
better preservation of the Game” shall remain in force.265  The only laws that were 
voided were those that were “altered or repealed” by the 1692 Game Act’s 
provisions.266   
Both the 1671 and 1692 Game Acts put in place a provision by which “one or 
more Justice of the Peace” had the authority to search the “Houses[,] Out-houses[,] 
or other places belonging” to “suspected persons not qualified” by law to possess 
certain hunting instruments.267  Clearly, the 1692 Game Act’s search and seizure 
provision overrode its 1671 predecessor.  What Individual Right Theorists stress is 
that the word “guns” was omitted in the 1692 Game Act—an astute and correct 
observation.268  The 1671 Act allowed the Justices of the Peace to take the following 
hunting instruments from persons who were suspected of violating property 
requirements: “Gunns, Bows, Grayhounds, Setting-dogs, Lurchers or other Dogs to 
kill Hares or Conies, Ferrets, Tramels, Lowbells, Hayes or other Netts, Harepipes, 
Snares or other Engines for the takeing and killing of Conyes, Hares, Pheasants 
Partridges or other Game.”269  Meanwhile, the 1692 Act overrode this by listing only 
the following hunting instruments: “Bows Greyhounds Setting Dogs Ferrits Coney 
Dogs Hayes Lurchers Netts Tunnels Lowbels Hare-Pipes Snares or any other 
Instruments for the destruction of Fish Fowle or other Game.”270 
A comparison of the two provisions shows that the word “guns” was omitted 
from the 1692 Act.  One may argue that “guns” could be grouped in with the 1692 
Act’s mention of “other Instruments.”  This may be true, but any guns found would 
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have had to been shown to be an instrument for hunting game.  In other words, upon 
the justice’s search, there could be no question that (1) the firearm was for hunting 
game; and (2) that the individual whose premises were searched did not meet the 
property qualifications to possess it, for the search and seizure provision was one of 
presumed guilt.271  Persons suspected of violating the Game Act were presumed to be 
unable to meet the property qualifications.272  To be qualified, one had to: (1) have 
freeholds worth at least 100l. a year; (2) have leaseholds (for ninety-nine years or 
longer) or copyholds worth at least 150l. a year; (3) be a son and heir apparent of 
esquires or other persons of higher degree; or (4) hold franchises of park, chase or 
free warren.273 
These qualifications help explain why the word “guns” was removed from the 
search and seizure provision.  It expressly conflicted with the Militia Act’s 
requirement that all persons with a yearly revenue of 50l. were required to provide a 
“Foot Souldier and Armes” for the defense of the realm.274  This is likely what Lord 
Macclesfield was objecting to in the 1706 Game Act’s debates when he stated that it 
was a “great inconvenience” to maintain “guns” in the Game Act.275  Joyce Lee 
Malcolm implies that the “great inconvenience” was in reference to the Game Act’s 
interference with the alleged right for every individual to own arms for self-defense 
that the Declaration of Rights echoed.276  This is not the case nor does the record 
support it, for the 1692 Game Act did not repeal Henry VIII’s statute on firearms. 
Henry VIII’s statute regulating arms had been enacted to prevent “shamefull 
murthers roberies felonyes ryots and routs” and limited what arms one could own.277  
The act required individuals have “lands, teñts rents fees annuyties or Office, to the 
yeerly value of one hundred Pounds.”278  Otherwise, it was unlawful for them to own, 
possess, or use guns.  Those who did qualify had to ensure that the gun was “not of 
the lengthe of one whole Yarde or hagbut or demyhake beinge not of the lenghe of 
thre quarters of a Yarde, Tenne pounds sterlinge.”279  Meanwhile, “Crosbowes little 
shorte handguns and little hagbutts” were illegal for anyone to own, regardless of his 
condition or quality.280 
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The statute also regulated the manner in which one could use firearms.  Those 
who were qualified could shoot lawful firearms only “within any Cittie Boroughe or 
Market Towne or within one quarter of a myle of any Cittie, Boroughe or Market 
Towne” at “Butt of Banck of earth in place convenient, or for the defence of his pson 
or house.”281  It is here where a statute made it lawful for an individual to use 
firearms for self-defense.  It was not an affirmed right, but an allowance that could 
be regulated by law.  More importantly, it was an allowance that extended only to 
individuals that earned a yearly value of 100₤.282  All other individuals were 
disqualified unless they resided “in anye house standinge and being sett distance 
twoo furlongs from any Cittie Borough or Towne.”283  Only then may the individual 
have lawful firearms to “ayde and assist to the defence of this Realme.”284 
As late as 1755, Richard Burn285 cites Henry VIII’s statute as still being in force 
and as the reason “guns” was removed from the 1692 Game Act.  He wrote that “it 
was not at all necessary to insert a gun in this act, since the carrying of a gun is 
prohibited under double the penalty by the statute of [Henry VIII].”286  Meaning the 
1671 Game Act’s inclusion of “guns” was repetitive.  Henry VIII’s statute already 
regulated the illegal carrying, ownership, and use of firearms.287  This conflict of 
laws helps put into context Lord Macclesfield’s objection that the maintaining of 
“guns” in the Game Act “might be attended with great inconvenience,” but this is not 
the only reason.288 
As has already been addressed, the 1671 Game Act’s qualifications for hunting 
instruments conflicted with the Militia Act.  While persons with a yearly revenue of 
50l. were required to provide certain arms, it was illegal for these same persons to 
possess guns or bows for hunting if they did not make a yearly revenue of 100l.289  
The 1692 Game Act did not fix this.  It merely altered the search and seizure 
provision, and it did not address whether it was legal to own guns for hunting.290 
What Individual Right Scholars ignore is that while Section Two’s search and 
seizure of illegal hunting instruments may have been revised by omitting “guns,” 
Section Three remained in force.  It still stipulated that any person not meeting the 
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hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications were “not allowed to have or keepe for 
themselves or any other person or persons any Guns, Bowes, Grey hounds, [or] 
Setting-dogs” to hunt protected game.291  Thus, while it may have been an 
individual’s duty to provide arms for the militia, at the same time it could also be 
illegal for the same individual—who did not meet the 1671 Game Act’s 
qualifications—to own firearms for hunting game.   
The 1706 Game Act altered this conflict of law.  It revised Section Three of the 
1671 Game Act.292  No longer were “guns” or “bows” listed as illegal hunting 
instruments for unqualified persons.293  Now, it was unlawful only to “keep or use 
any Greyhouds Setting Dogs Hayes Lurchers Tunnells or any other Engine to kill 
and destroy Game.”294  This fixed the “great inconvenience” maintaining “guns” in 
the Section Three of the 1671 Game Act attended.  Furthermore, it is in this legal 
context that Rex v. Gardiner295 and Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman296 were decided. 
Individual Right Scholars incorporate the decisions of these cases in a light that 
supports their pre-determined conclusion.297  Unfortunately, in doing this, they do not 
understand the legality of “guns” in early eighteenth-century England.  The scholars 
claim that the court’s failure to mention the militia implies that there was a right to 
have guns for reasons besides defense of the realm and against tyrannical 
government.  Nothing is farther from the truth.  As will be shown, the court 
accurately applied the statutes of the realm in both cases.  The decisions had nothing 
to do with a right to own arms for self-defense.  They had to do with the proper 
adjudication of the game laws.   
In Rex v. Gardiner, the defense “moved to quash a conviction, for unlawfully 
having and keeping a gun” in violation of the game laws.298  It was rightfully argued, 
in accordance with the 1706 Game Act, the defendant’s possession of a gun did not 
prove that it was being used for the illegal destruction of game,299 for “guns” were no 
longer expressly mentioned in the game laws.300   Therefore, the prosecution had to 
prove that the gun was used for the illegal destruction of game.  Mere possession was 
no longer a strict liability offense that could be prosecuted.301  This legal principle 
was articulated by defense counsel when it was argued: 
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For . . . if the statute is to be construed so largely, as to extend to the 
bare having of any instrument, that may possibly be used in destroying 
game, it will be attended with very great inconvenience; there being 
scarce any, tho’ ever so useful, but what may be applied to that purpose.  
And tho’ a gun may be used in destroying game, and when it is so, doth 
then fall within the words of the act.302 
Individual Right Scholars rely too much on the defense’s argument that a “gun” 
did not qualify as an “engine.”  The defense stated that a “gun is an engine, not for 
the killing of game, but for the defence of a man’s house.”303  The defense was not 
stating that having a gun for the defense of the home was a right.  Rather, it was 
making the point that “guns” were “frequently necessary to be kept and used for 
other purposes,”304 including the “killing of noxious vermin” and self-defense of the 
home by persons “qualified to have such arms.”305   
Having arms as an allowance was even articulated in the Individual Right 
Scholars’ second example—Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman.  In that case, the court 
stated that “a Gun may be kept for the Defence of a Man’s House, and for divers 
other lawful Purposes.”306  At no time did it stipulate that having arms was a right.  
The court was merely making the same point that was made in Rex v. Gardiner when 
it stated: 
As Greyhounds, Setting dogs, Hayes, Lurchers and Tunnels are 
expressly mentioned in that Statute, it is never necessary to alledge, that 
any of these have been used for killing or destroying the Game; and the 
rather, as they can scarcely be kept for any other Purpose than to kill or 
destroy the Game.307   
In other words, “guns” served purposes other than hunting.  This was not the case 
with the instruments listed in the 1706 Game Act.308 It was rare for anyone to keep 
“greyhounds, setting dogs, hayes, lurchers and tunnels” but to kill game.   
In sum, the “individual right” contention about the phrase “arms for their 
Defence” and the game laws are unfounded.  First, Individual Right Scholars assume 
that the Convention’s adoption of “arms for their Defence” affirmed an individual 
right for armed self-defense.  As the historical record shows, the phrase “arms for 
their Defence” has always been associated with using arms in the limited 
circumstances of the defense of the realm or to take up arms to overthrow tyrannical 
government309—neither of which comport with the “individual right” theory. 
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Second, no evidence exists that shows that the Convention intended on 
modifying the game laws to comply with an alleged right to “have arms” for 
personal self-defense.  The removal of “guns” and “bows” from subsequent game 
laws was done to remove any confusion with the 1662 Militia Act’s requirement to 
provide arms and because the penalties for the illegal possession of arms were 
already covered under Henry VIII’s statute.310  Not to mention, the “individual right” 
theory that “future legislation would eliminate the discrepancy” between current gun 
laws and the “have arms” provision311 does not explain why “arms” qualifications 
remained.  Both the hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications to possess arms 
and the confiscation of the arms of unqualified persons not only remained in force, 
they were affirmed by William and Mary of Orange.312  Needless to say, the 
“individual right” theory of a right to armed self-defense lacks sufficient legal and 
historical support. 
V.  THE DISARMING OF PAPISTS AND THE ALLOWANCE OF ARMS FOR SELF-
DEFENSE 
Starting in the late thirteenth century, the hue and cry required individuals to 
maintain arms, weapons, and armor for the defense of their community and the 
realm.  When violent crimes were committed—i.e., robbery, burglary, and murder—
people were called from their houses to find and arrest perpetrators according to the 
law.313  Michael Dalton’s 1697 edition of Country Justice provides the following 
helpful example: 
If Thieves shall come to a Man’s House, to rob or murther him, he 
may lawfully assemble company to defend his House by force; and if he 
or any of his company shall kill any of them in defence of Himself, his 
Family, his Goods or House, This is no felony, neither shall forfeit any 
thing therefore.314 
Dalton accurately shows us that self-defense was lawful through the hue and cry.  
In fact, self-defense has always been lawful because it is one of the primary rules of 
nature.315  However, an individual gives up some of these rights once he enters 
society.316  Although individuals can never relinquish their right to repel force by 
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force, they do relinquish the society-allowed means by which to accomplish that 
end.317  This was true even with the hue and cry, for in 1285, Edward I stipulated 
what were lawful arms through hierarchal and socio-economic conditions.318   
The 1619 edition of Dalton’s Country Justice supports this.  In it, Dalton shows 
that hierarchal and socio-economic gun restrictions were enforceable by law.   
Immediately after his analysis of the hue and cry laws, he wrote, “Every man 
knowing of any that keepeth, or useth any gun, . . . contrary to the stat[ute] may 
arrest them, [and] bring them to the next [justice of the peace].”319  Restrictions on 
gun ownership and use remained in subsequent editions of Dalton’s work, including 
the 1746 edition.320  Malcolm believes that the 1697 edition of Dalton’s Country 
Justice—which was released after the Glorious Revolution—inaccurately interpreted 
the gun laws.  She writes that the 1697 edition “ought to have clarified changes in the 
law resulting from the Glorious Revolution, [and] bears all the marks of a rushed and 
patchy update.”321  Dalton’s work is deemed inaccurate because the “chapter on guns 
listed the acts of Henry VIII and Edward VI even though the latter had been repealed 
two years before.”322   
Although Malcolm’s note on the statute of Edward VI is correct, her overall 
analysis of Dalton’s legal treatise is unsupported.  Her theory does not explain why 
every edition after 1697 retained the hierarchal and socio-economic conditions on 
gun use and ownership—including using arms for self-defense in the home.  The fact 
of the matter is that the statute of Henry VIII remained in force.  It had express 
limitations on who could own, use, and operate guns.  As the 1746 edition of 
Dalton’s Country Justice affirms, although the statute made it lawful to “shoot in any 
Gun” in “Defence of his Person, or House,” it did not remove the qualifications to 
own a gun.323  Moreover, this self-defense allowance was an exception to the legal 
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requirement that guns were to be shot only at a “butt or banke of Earth or in tyme of 
Warre.”324  At no time had any law allowed every person to own and operate 
firearms for self-defense.  One had to qualify for a gun in order to lawfully use it. 
It may seem odd to contemporary Americans that only qualified persons were 
allowed to own and use guns for self-defense or for any purpose, but this was not the 
case to persons living in seventeenth-century England.  They were familiar with 
these types of gun laws.  For instance, in 1690 the inhabitants of Westminster and St. 
James requested the King to enforce the militia laws as written.325  The inhabitants 
were mustered with each being levied “2s. 6d.”326  The money, however, was not 
going towards providing arms for the militia as the inhabitants were told.  Instead, 
the money was pocketed for “private use, to the great oppression of your Majesty’s 
poor subjects.”327  The inhabitants knew that the militia laws stated that no person 
“was to ‘find a foot arms,’ who has not a yearly revenue of 50l. of real or 600l. in 
personal estate.”328  More importantly, and for our purposes, they knew they were 
“not qualified by law to bear arms.”329  The inhabitants merely wanted to comply 
with the law by finding “men and arms proportionable of their estates.”330 
This example shows that the people were well aware of the gun laws and the 
ramifications of non-compliance, as well as the fact that only qualified persons may 
possess guns—even after the adoption of the Declaration of Rights.  The people’s 
knowledge of the laws did not mean that everyone agreed with the laws or how they 
were enforced.  Nevertheless, what is certain is that the people knew that the laws 
were in place.  For example, in 1682 Henry Booth hoped the search and seizure 
provision would not be used against “Protestant Dissenters but only against 
Papists.”331  He was of the “opinion . . . that no man should be denied to keep a gun 
in his house, provided he did not destroy the game, for a man’s house is his castle 
and for the defence.”  He further stated that he “thought it reasonable he should keep 
a gun” even “though the laws enjoin that none under a certain qualification should 
have that privilege.”332   
Booth recognized the fact that only people of a “certain qualification” had the 
“privilege” of having arms.  There is no doubt Booth disagreed with these laws, but 
it does not override the fact they were in existence.  Moreover, the Declaration of 
Rights’ “have arms” provision did not take precedence over these laws, for if the 
“have arms” provision had overrode the gun laws, the 1690 inhabitants’ petition 
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would not have referenced that they were “not qualified by law to bear arms.”333  
Therefore, even after the Declaration of Rights, the historical evidence makes it clear 
that it was within parliamentary power to limit who could use what arms and for 
what purposes—including in situations of self-defense.334   
To support their arguments, Individual Right Scholars often point to Parliament’s 
March 1689 decision to allow qualified papists to maintain “weapons” for self-
defense.335  In December 1688, Parliament issued the following order: 
In the mean time we will endeavor to preserve, as much as in us lies, 
the peace and security of these great and populace cities of London and 
Westminster, and the parts adjacent, by taking care to disarm all Papists, 
and secure all Jesuits and Romish priests, who are in or about the same.336 
To maintain this disarmament and secure the peace and security of the kingdom 
Parliament passed the Disarming Act, An Act for the better securing the Government 
by disarming Papists and reputed Papists.337  This Act included a provision allowing 
qualified papists to maintain “such necessary Weapons as shall be allowed to him by 
Order of the Justices of the Peace at their Generall Quarter Sessions for the Defence 
of his House or person.”338  The Act’s use of “weapons” in lieu of “arms” or “guns” 
has two legal interpretations.  
The first interpretation is that the use of the word “weapons” was not meant to 
include “guns.”  For the Disarming Act made it expressly illegal to “have or keepe in 
his House or elsewhere . . . any Arms Weapons Gunpowder or Ammunition.”339  The 
self-defense exception to this rule, however, mentions only “weapons.”  This was 
probably intentional because in subsequent sentences and paragraphs of the Act 
“Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, and Ammunition” always are mentioned together.340  
Thus, there is a valid argument that the Act never intended to allow papists to have 
“guns” because it would have fallen under the term “arms.” 
The second interpretation includes “guns” as “weapons.”  When the bill was 
proposed, John Maynard moved that all papists “bring all their fire-arms in, unless 
for the necessary defence of their Houses, to officers appointed.”341  Maynard’s 
proposal was for allowing qualified papists to maintain “fire-arms” if they could 
prove that the firearms were “necessary.”342  Despite differences in the interpretation 
of “weapons,” the Disarming Act raised the dilemma of how to convict persons of 
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being a papist.  Parliament was concerned that “not one man will go out of Town, 
nor deliver their Arms[] Unless actually convicted” of being a papist.343  Parliament 
settled this matter by requiring suspected persons to take Oaths of Allegiance.344  
Those who did not take the oath were to be “subject to all and every the Penalties 
Forfeitures and Disabilities hereafter in this Act mentioned.”345 
Malcolm believes the Act shows there was “general agreement that for the time 
being Catholics should be deprived of all arms except those needed for personal 
defence.”346  She supports this with Mr. Wogan’s concern during the debates of the 
bill when he stated, “If you find not a way to convict them, you cannot disarm 
them.”347  She claims Wogan’s statement “clearly meant the new right to have arms 
[was] to include all Protestants, whatever their condition.”348  The truth is that Wogan 
was concerned only with finding an enforcement mechanism, for immediately 
following the words cited by Malcolm, Wogan stated, “I would have a Clause for 
[identifying papists] in the Bill.”349  Malcolm goes on to conclude from the language 
of the Disarming Act that Parliament “assumed that everyone had a right to own 
firearms unless he could be conclusively convicted of Catholicism” and that 
“Catholics were considered to have a right to own arms for their personal defence 
and the defence of their households.”350 
These are several historical assumptions that do not comport with the English 
laws governing arms or self-defense.  Mr. Maynard delivered a motion to allow 
Catholics to maintain arms “unless for the necessary defence of their Houses.”351  
These allowances not only required an order of the justice of the peace, but also 
required the individual to meet the hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications to 
possess these “weapons.”352  Furthermore, the use of the word “weapons” does not 
necessarily speak to “guns.”  What Parliament meant to constitute as “weapons” is 
unknown.  All that is certain is that “weapons” were intended to be different from 
“arms.” 
If anything, the Disarming Act and its debates prove that the having of “arms” or 
“weapons” for self-defense was an allowance—not a right.  Parliament could never 
abolish individual self-defense, but it could regulate how individuals were equipped 
for self-defense.  Customary practice by the laws of England proves this to be true.353  
Even the holdings of Rex v. Gardiner and Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman support 
this understanding.  The defense counsel argued in Rex v. Gardiner that a “gun is an 
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engine, not for killing the game, but for the defence of a man’s house.”354  Nothing 
was said about the “right” to have a gun.  The defense was merely making an 
argument that the use of a gun by qualified persons was a lawful purpose by the 
statutes of the realm.  Meanwhile, Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman affirmed this, 
stating, “[A] gun may be kept for the defence of a man’s house.”355  Legal emphasis 
must be placed on the use of the word “may.” 
Furthermore, the Individual Right Scholars’ understanding of the “have arms” 
provision and an alleged right to armed self-defense is ludicrous given that in 1693 a 
parliamentary motion was made that allowed “every Protestant to keep a musket in 
his House for his defence.”356  The motion was made during the debates of a bill for 
the preservation of game.357  After the bill was read three times, Mr. Norris made the 
motion, and members Bowyer, Howe, Clarke, and Wharton expressed their support 
for it.358  They “thought it a good clause and for the security of the government that 
all Protestants should be armed sufficiently to defend themselves.”359  It is this 
support for the bill that proves a general right to “have arms” for personal defense 
did not exist.  Not one member of the House even mentioned the “have arms” 
provision in the Declaration of Rights or that “having arms” was a pre-existing right.   
John Lowther’s response sums up the overwhelming majority of the Parliament’s 
stance on the subject.  He stated that the motion was “not proper for this bill” and 
was appalled that Norris “would add a clause to it that savours of the politics to arm 
the mob, which,” he thought, was “not very safe for any government.”360  Lowther’s 
opinion also articulated the concerns that the House of Lords must have had when it 
revised the House of Commons’ version of the “have arms” provision.  To state that 
every Protestant “should” have arms would have created an armed mob.  It was 
better that the power to regulate “arms” stayed true to customary practice and 
remained with the government.  This explains why the final version of the 
Declaration of Rights guaranteed that only Protestants “may have arms for their 
defence suitable to their condition and as allowed by law.” 
VI.  THE MILITIA ACT OF 1757 
In 1757, with pressure from the George II and the people, Parliament passed a 
new militia bill.361  The legislative and statutory construction of the bill provides 
great insight in understanding the socio-economic and hierarchal structure of using 
and possessing arms.  The bill first came to fruition because of the government’s 
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frequent employment of Hessian soldiers.  Although the use of Hessian auxiliaries 
was meant to provide only temporary security, the length of the Seven Years War 
caused their employment to be continual, causing great dissent throughout England.  
The people and many members of Parliament hoped to resolve this problem with a 
new militia bill—a bill that would put the militia on an equal footing with the best 
armies of Europe.  
The 1758 bill was first proposed in 1756 and reached the House of Lords on May 
24th.362  Needless to say, it was not well received.  The overwhelming majority 
agreed that a “well regulated and well disciplined militia” was “the only proper 
military force of a free country.”363  However, the majority disagreed as to whether 
this could actually be achieved, and it disagreed even further over providing the 
people with arms.  For instance, the Earl of Stanhope knew the Swiss had achieved 
much success in providing its people with arms and hoped that England would do the 
same.364  Stanhope feared that if the men in England’s army were the only class that 
“knew any thing of arms, or military discipline” the country would be forever forced 
to defend itself by “keeping up a standing army of at least 100,000 men.”365   
The Earl of Granville opened the debate by arguing that the bill was too 
conservative in arming the militia.  He felt that what is “properly called the militia of 
any country” consists of “every freeman in that country who is able to carry arms.”366  
Additionally, he viewed the 1662 Militia Act’s requirement that individuals have at 
least “50l. a year land estate” as ridiculous.367  Despite his belief that every man 
should be armed, Granville thought the bill would ultimately fail.  For the bill to 
work, Granville knew the government would have to compel every man to make it 
their “immediate and apparent interest to breed himself to arms.”368  Parliament 
would have to require “men to employ a considerable part of their time . . . and even 
some expence, to learn an art which they think they may never once in their whole 
life have occasion to make use of.”369  
The Duke of Bedford concurred saying, “[I]f it were possible, [that] every 
freeman in the kingdom ought to be bred to arms, and taught military discipline,” 
then he was for it.370  Bedford saw the “natural spirit and courage of . . . men” 
deteriorate because they had been discouraged from the “use of arms, and every sort 
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of military exercise.”371  Bedford argued that things had deteriorated to such an 
extreme that “many of the inferior rank of people amongst us, are now afraid of 
handling a gun or a sword, and are terrified at the very name of a soldier.”372  
Therefore, Bedford viewed the establishment of a new militia as being paramount.  
To him, the militia was “the best guard we can have for our liberties, and the best 
military force we can provide for our defence.”373 
The bill, however, failed.  It was defeated by a vote of fifty-nine to twenty-
three.374  This defeat can be attributed primarily to Lord Harwicke who distributed a 
pamphlet containing his sentiments against the bill to the House of Lords.375  The 
pamphlet provided seven objections, the fifth and seventh of which objected to 
placing arms in the hands of the common people.376  Specifically, the pamphlet’s 
fifth objection regarded the Parliament’s failure to include a search and seizure of 
arms provision in the bill.377  Harwicke wrote: 
In the Militia Act of king Charles 2, sect. 14, a power is given to the 
lord lieutenant and deputy lieutenants to “search for and seize the arms of 
persons, whom they shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom.” 
This power is totally repealed by this Bill, and no such new power [is] 
given.378 
This fifth objection is significant for two reasons.  First, it shows that the 
government had continued to search and seize arms well into the eighteenth century.  
Search and seizure of arms had always been an important tool used to keep arms out 
of hands of persons not qualified by law to possess them.379  Second, no one even 
mentioned or argued that the maintaining of such a provision was in violation of the 
Declaration of Rights’ allowance to “have arms.”  In fact, Harwicke’s seventh 
objection to the militia bill shows that there was great concern in providing arms to 
the common people.380  It stated: 
The last thing, which I shall mention, by way of particular objection, is 
the loose and unsafe custody, wherein the arms of this militia are directed 
to be deposited.  Can any thing be more dangerous to the peace of the 
kingdom, than for so great a quantity of arms to be distributed about the 
country, in the houses of churchwardens, seldom stronger or more 
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defensible than cottages?  In cases of rebellions and insurrections, nay of 
riots, instead of being arms for your defence, they will be arms in the 
hands of the disturbers of the public peace.381 
This seventh objection is significant for multiple reasons.  First, and most 
importantly, Hardwicke described the militia arms as “being arms for your defence.”  
By “your” he meant Parliament, men of the aristocracy, landed gentry, and the 
government, not the general people.  This terminology echoes the limited right that 
the “have arms” provision was drafted to protect.  Second, Hardwicke was objecting 
to making arms easily available to the common people.  Arms in the hands of men 
who were “educated and trained” to use them, stated Hardwicke, “gives a habit, and 
a love of that kind of life.”382  Meanwhile, arms in the hands of the “common people” 
produce “a love of idleness, of sports, and at last of plunder.”383 
Harwicke had nothing against putting arms into men of property.  Rather, he 
“heartily wish[ed] that all the men of property in the nation were bred to arms and 
taught military discipline.”384 He was afraid, however, to provide arms “to the very 
lowermost rank of our people,”385 which included “journeymen, day-labourers, and 
servants.”386  Meanwhile, “men of property are our only freemen,” stated 
Harwicke.387   
Lord Talbot partially agreed.  He felt that the “rich and great” needed to be part 
of the militia,388 but he also thought that there could be a compromise.389  As long as 
“men of property were bred to arms and taught military discipline” how could there 
be “any danger from a seditious insurrection among those of no property, even 
supposing they should possess themselves of the arms provided for the militia”?390  
The dilemma was how to get the upper classes to participate.  The bill did not have 
any mechanism that forced “men of property” to serve.391  Well-to-do individuals 
could pay a fine to meet their militia obligation, which, therefore, made lower-class 
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men serve as substitutes—a legal loophole that scared Lord Sandys.392  Sandys 
reminded his fellow Lords that “no free state ever at first trusted the arms of the 
commonwealth in the hands of the poor and indigent; and every one of those we read 
of in history, lost their liberties soon after they began to do so.”393 
Sandys also made sure to address the concerns of the Earl of Granville, and many 
other Lords, regarding making this new militia an efficient fighting force.  He knew 
that military discipline and training took years to develop, and, therefore, he 
questioned how the militia could depend on individuals who were not familiar with 
the use of arms unless they were compelled to train every day.394  Not to mention, the 
proposed militia law did not oblige individuals to have their own arms.  Instead, all 
militia arms were to be provided at the expense of the public with general taxation.395   
This was a drastic change from the old militia laws that required individuals, 
depending on their socio-economic and hierarchal status, to pay for their own arms.  
These laws required men of property of 50l. and upward to provide their own 
arms.396  Many of these men were required to provide more arms depending on the 
number of militiamen they were charged.397  Because this new militia bill placed all 
arms in the hands of the Lieutenants, Sandys referred to it as “a Bill for establishing 
a popular militia by disarming the people,” and he questioned: 
How a man is to learn the exercise of the fire-lock, who is never to 
handle a fire-lock but for four or five hours of a Sunday, or how a man is 
to learn to form in battalion, that is never to see a battalion, or so much as 
a whole company formed, but once a year.398 
Therefore, Sandys not only viewed the bill as placing the nation’s security into 
the “hands of the poor and indigent,” but he also felt that it disarmed “men of 
property” who traditionally were qualified to possess arms.399  In other words, 
Sandys feared that this kind of disarming hindered the effectiveness and integrity of 
the militia, for how were the men to have a “warlike spirit” if they were not 
“possessed of arms, and often handling and making use of them”?400  Sandys stated, 
“The art of war is now carried to such a height, that even that part of it which 
belongs to the common soldier, is not to be learned without frequent and long 
practice.”401   
Ultimately, the bill did not pass for a multitude of reasons: it did not have a 
search and seizure of arms provision; it lacked an effective regiment to train men in 
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military maneuvers and discipline; and—what scared the House of Lords the most—
it put the nation’s security in the hands of the poor.402  The Earl of Temple summed 
up this last concern best when he stated, “A man [of property] that will not fight for 
his liberty, I am sure, does not deserve it, and a man who is no way qualified, cannot 
fight for it if he would.”403  Simply stated, the poor could not fight for liberties that 
they did not possess.  It was commonly believed that only men of property knew 
what true liberty was, and it was through property that all liberty was derived.404   
However, in less than a year, all of these objections and concerns would not 
matter.  On December 2, 1756, the King personally requested that Parliament push 
through the militia bill.405  Consequently, the failed militia bill of 1756 would 
virtually become the basis of 1757 Militia Act.  This, however, did not occur without 
some changes.  For instance, the militia force of sixty-thousand persons in the 1756 
bill was reduced to thirty-thousand.406  This change further required that the militia 
force come from only the larger towns in an effort to concentrate large bodies of men 
quickly.407  Moreover, these acts made it easier to drill the militia, and it positioned 
armories in places where they could be watched.  Therefore, the nation’s arms no 
longer would be scattered among the parishes,408 nor would there be a danger of arms 
falling into the wrong hands.  Moreover, to further protect against this last point, the 
1757 Act included a provision allowing Lieutenants to remove the arms to a safe 
place at any time.409  Not surprisingly, the original proposition of how arms were to 
be supplied, provided, and secured in the 1756 bill remained unaltered.410   
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As previously addressed, the “Arms, Clothes and Accoutrements” of the militia 
were provided by general taxation.  They were required by law to be kept “under 
Lock and Key” in a place where they would be secure.411  Not to mention, they were 
to be distributed only during musters and times of training.412  Upon the completion 
of such “exercises,” the law required “every Militia Man [to] clean[] and return[] his 
Arms, Clothes and Accoutrements, to his Captain, or to such Person as shall be 
appointed as aforesaid to receive the same.”413  These provisions led Lord Sandys to 
be so critical of the 1756 bill,414 for the bill essentially disarmed the old militia.  
Since 1662, “men of property” were required to provide their own arms “suitable to 
their condition.”415  This 1662 provision allowed qualified men to possess and 
exercise the use of arms at any time.  No longer was this the case.  
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords were in consensus on this 
matter.  In fact, it was the House of Commons that submitted the new arming 
restrictions in the bill.  Apart from Lord Sandys’ reservations, no one was even 
concerned with placing sole control of the arms in the hands of government.  It was 
Parliament’s right to pass laws that determined who was allowed to “have arms” and 
for what purposes.416  Furthermore, the 1757 Militia Act did not infringe upon the 
Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision.  Like the previous militia laws, it 
established property qualifications based upon military rank.417  Where it differed, 
however, was that individuals were no longer taxed with providing arms.  They were 
now taxed monetarily, and the government procured and provided the arms.418  
Additionally, the 1757 Militia Act allowed individuals to serve in the militia.  
Although the 1757 Act did not allow all persons to individually “have arms” per se, 
it more closely resembled James Harrington’s militia ideology.419  It gave a larger 
contingent of the population an active participation in the defense of its liberties and 
government.   
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Even Lord Sandys’ reservations do not conflict with this limited understanding of 
the allowance to “have arms.”  If anything, Sandys supports it.  When he referenced 
the 1756 bill as “establishing a popular militia by disarming the people,”420 Sandys 
meant only qualified men of property—a point he clarified when he expressed 
concern over placing arms in the “hands of the poor and indigent.”421  Moreover, 
Sandys’ use of “disarming” comports with our understanding of the “disarming” 
described in the “have arms” provision.  Notice that his use of the term does not 
describe an individual physical disarming, but a larger concept.  Just as James II 
placed Catholics in a position to control the militia arms, thereby “disarming” 
Protestants, a similar “disarming” was also occurring: the “disarming” of the old 
militia system in which qualified individuals possessed the arms.  These two 
disarmings, however, differ from each other in their legality.  Leading up to the 
Glorious Revolution, it was against the law for Catholics to be employed in military 
commissions or possess arms in service of the militia.422  Thus, this “disarming” by 
Catholic Lieutenants was against the law, as written.  Meanwhile, the “disarming” in 
the 1757 Militia Act was legal.  Parliament authorized this disarming when it 
approved changing the qualifications and conditions that Protestants “may have arms 
for their defence.”423  In other words, “disarming” was not always a reference to the 
individual act itself, but to a larger principle.424   
Most importantly, the legislative history of the 1757 Militia Act debunks the 
“individual right” theory on the use and ownerships of arms by the middle of the 
eighteenth century.  It can be seen from the debates that not only did both Houses of 
Parliament want to place limitations on the access to firearms, but that there was also 
a general consensus that the people were not familiar with the use of firearms, 
period.425  The Earl of Stanhope expressed his fear when he stated that only the army 
“knew any thing of arms, or military discipline.”426  Meanwhile, the Duke of Bedford 
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reiterated the fact that the people had been discouraged from the “use of arms, and 
every sort of military exercise.”427  To the extent that “many of the inferior rank of 
people amongst us, are now afraid of handling a gun or a sword, and are terrified at 
the very name of a soldier.”428   
Not one member in the House of Lords disagreed with either of these points.  No 
one stated that the people were generally allowed to have “arms for their defence,” 
thus making them somewhat proficient in arms use.  It was quite the contrary.  The 
general populous was not in possession of firearms as Individual Right Scholars 
contend.   The truth of the matter is that there was a general fear of placing arms—of 
any kind—in the hands of the poor and indigent. 
VII.  GRANVILLE SHARP IN UNDERSTANDING THE ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS” 
Even Granville Sharp—whom “individual right” supporters429 and the Supreme 
Court majority430 cite as providing evidence of a fundamental right to own guns—
supports the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.”  Sharp expressly defined 
the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision as follows: 
By the constitution of this kingdom, as well as by many express laws 
still in force, apprentices, wards, and indeed laymen of all ranks and 
conditions, from fifteen to sixty years of age, are required to have arms, 
and be duly exercised in the use of them, for the national defence.431 
Sharp’s interpretation undoubtedly limits “having arms” to defense of the realm 
as a means to prevent unlawful standing armies, and as a philosophical justification 
to usurp tyrannical government.  Neither Individual Right Scholars nor the Supreme 
Court cite this portion of Sharp’s tract.  Instead, both focus on an earlier portion 
which reads: 
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This latter expression, “as allowed by law,” respects the limitations in 
the above-mentioned act of 33 Hen. VIII c. 6, which restrain the use of 
some particular sorts of arms, meaning only such arms as were liable to 
be concealed, or otherwise favour the designs of murderers, as “cross-
bows, little short hand-guns, and little hagbuts,” and all guns UNDER 
CERTAIN LENGTHS, specified in the act; but proper arms for defence 
(provided they are not shorter than the act directs) are so far from being 
forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorised, and “the 
exercise thereof” expressly recommended by it, as I have already shewn.  
And indeed the laws of England always required the people to be armed, 
and not only to be armed, but to be expert in arms; which last was 
particularly recommended by the learned chancellor Fortescue.432 
From this quotation, Individual Right Scholars strongly infer that an “individual 
right” to “have arms” for self-defense existed.433  The first error in this interpretation 
is their misquotation of Sharp.  These scholars contend that “suitable to their 
conditions as allowed by law” was in reference to only Henry VIII’s gun statute.  As 
the quote shows, Sharp stated “as allowed by law” only in reference to the statute.  
The differentiation between the two interpretations is significant for interpretative 
purposes, for the Individual Right Scholars’ misquotation of Sharp implies that only 
Henry VIII’s Act was a proper legal limitation on the “have arms” provision.  This is 
not true.  As Sharp correctly states, the “as allowed by law” condition respected the 
government’s ability to restrict the types of weapons that a person may use and who 
may have them. 
Individual Right Scholars are quick to forget that Henry VIII’s statute required 
individuals to have lands of 100₤ to possess lawful weapons.434  Furthermore, the 
statute stipulated: 
[N]oe psn or psns, other then suche as have lands tents rents fees 
annuityes or Offices, to the yearley value of one hundred Pounds . . . shall 
carrie, or have in his or their Journey, goinge or ridinge in the Kings highe 
waye, or elsewhere, any Crosbowe bent or Gun charged or furnished 
withe Powder, fir or touche for the same, Except it bee in the tyme and 
Service of warre.435 
At no time did Sharp write that Henry VIII’s statute was the only allowable 
restriction on firearm ownership; he was merely clarifying that it “respects the 
limitations.”436 
The second error that Individual Right Scholars make is that their implication of 
the phrase “proper arms for defence . . . are so far from being forbidden by this 
statute, that they are clearly authorised, and ‘the exercise thereof’ expressly 
recommended by it.”437  This quote is used as a contextual jumping point to another 
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section of Sharp’s political tract.438  To jump from one section of a political work to 
another—without informing the reader of this improper context—is misleading and 
perilous in interpreting the law, for Sharp’s mentioning of “proper arms” not “being 
forbidden” is again referencing Henry VIII’s gun statute.  First, it required 
individuals to have annual revenue of 100₤.439  Second, the Act specified that guns 
shall be “the lenghe of one whole Yarde, or any Haquebut, or Demie hake of the 
length of three quarters a yard”440—a standard that the 1662 Militia Act conformed to 
when it required musket barrels “not to be under three Foot in length.”441  Third, 
these lawful guns were to “better ayde and assist to the defence of this Realme.”442  
Lastly, qualified persons were allowed to shoot lawful guns only “at anye butt of 
banke of Earth onlye in place convenient” or in defense of their person or house.443 
It is this last allowance—that a qualified person may use lawful guns for personal 
self-defense—that gives minor credibility to the “individual right” argument, but not 
much.  This is because even though the statute made armed self-defense lawful, it 
still extended to only qualified persons based on hierarchal and socio-economic 
status.444  Individual Right Theorists and the Supreme Court majority in Heller 
ignored these facts.  Both rely too heavily on the following Sharp quote: “No 
Englishman, therefore, can be truly LOYAL, who opposes these essential principles 
of the English LAW, whereby the people are required to have ‘arms of defence and 
peace,’ for mutual as well as private defence.”445 
The quote is often cited to support the “individual right” model and brings us to 
the third error in the individual right interpretation of Sharp.  Notice the quotation’s 
use of “therefore.”  It denotes that the sentence is concluding the preceding 
paragraph.  Individual Right Scholars intentionally omit this paragraph because it 
undermines their entire argument.  That paragraph reads: 
If it be alleged that there can be no occasion, in these modern times, to 
arm and train the inhabitants of England, because there is an ample 
military force, or standing army, to preserve the peace; yet let it be 
remembered, that, the greater and more powerful the standing army is, so 
much more necessary is it that there should be a proper balance to that 
power, to prevent any ill effects from it: though there is one bad effect, 
which the balance (howsoever perfect and excellent) cannot prevent; and 
that is the enormous and ruinous expence of maintaining a large number 
of men, without any civil employment for their support; an expence, which 
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neither the land nor trade of this realm can possibly bear longer, without 
public failure!446 
Therefore, Sharp states that the people were required to have arms as a means to 
check a standing army.  This is reiterated immediately following the phrase “for 
mutual as well as private defence.”  Sharp wrote that the people were required to 
“have arms” because “a standing army of regular soldiers is entirely repugnant to 
the constitution of England, and the genius of its inhabitants.”447  Individual Right 
Scholars assume too much from Sharp’s statement that “the people are required to 
have ‘arms of defence and peace’, for mutual as well as private defence.”448  Because 
Sharp states that this was “required” proves that he was referring to the laws 
respecting the militia, hue and cry, and assize of arms.  A right is never a 
requirement.  It is a guarantee. 
The last error of Individual Right Scholars’ interpretation is their failure to 
reference, cite, or even examine Sharp’s interpretation of the “have arms” provision.  
It explicitly conditions having arms on militia service “for the national defence.”449  
Most importantly, it refutes Malcolm’s interpretation of the statement: “proper arms 
for defence (provided they are not shorter than the act directs) are so far from being 
forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorized, and ‘the exercise thereof 
expressly recommended by it.’”450  For it is here—when Sharp defines the “have 
arms” provision—that he immediately cites pages nine through twenty-four of his 
tract.451  It is within these same pages to which the Court’s majority cites in Heller to 
assert that Sharp promoted an “individual right” to armed self-defense.452  This 
interpretation, however, is inaccurate. 
VIII.  BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES AND THE ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS” 
Individual Right Scholars often cite William Blackstone’s Commentaries to 
support their stance that the “have arms” provision and the Second Amendment 
support an “individual right” to armed self-defense.  In these instances, Blackstone is 
always taken out of context.  Blackstone perfectly articulates the limited right that 
the “have arms” provision was drafted to protect when he wrote: 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present 
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their 
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.  Which is also 
declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2. and is indeed a public 
allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and 
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self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found 
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.453 
Never has a commentator so eloquently stated the protective scope of the “have 
arms” provision.  Malcolm and Individual Right Theorists draw support for their 
argument from Blackstone’s phrase “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation.”454  From this phrase, Individual Right Scholars believe that Blackstone 
is talking about armed individual self-defense.  Unfortunately, this interpretation 
does not comport with the definition of what is an “auxiliary right.”  The “have 
arms” provision was the “fifth and last auxiliary right”—meaning there were four 
other preceding rights.455  Just what was an “auxiliary right”?  Blackstone states that 
it was a means to ensure that rights “ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of 
the laws, [would remain in force] if the constitution had provided no other method to 
secure their actual enjoyment.”456  In other words, auxiliary rights “serve principally 
as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great primary rights, of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”457   
What Blackstone made clear was that when government intruded on people’s 
natural and civil rights that the people had recourse by turning to the “auxiliary 
rights” to retain them.458  The first three auxiliary rights stemmed from the political 
structure of England.  The first was Parliament; the second was the King; and the 
third was the courts of justice.459  All three entities possessed a duty to maintain 
natural and civil individual rights.460  It was when all three government entities failed 
and there was an “uncommon injury” to the people or when an “infringement of the 
rights” of personal security, personal liberty, and private property occurred—“which 
the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach”—that there “still remain[ed] a 
fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual.”461 
This fourth auxiliary right allowed every person to petition Parliament or the 
King for the “redress of grievances”—a right that Blackstone cites as being protected 
by the Declaration of Rights.462  It was only once these four auxiliary rights were 
exhausted that the people may resort to the “have arms” provision—it too being an 
auxiliary right that was “declared by the same statute.” 463  Thus, what Blackstone 
was stating is that the Declaration’s guarantees—the right to petition and the 
allowance to “have arms”—were intended to be legal devices that ensured the 
protection of individuals’ natural and civil rights.   
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Individual Right Theorists extend this interpretation to armed individual self-
defense because they misinterpret the phrase “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation.”  They seem to ignore that Blackstone even states that the “have arms” 
provision is a “public allowance”—not a right.  Furthermore, he confirms that this 
“allowance” is “under due restrictions,” which supports the fact that Parliament can 
regulate it “suitable to their condition and degree.”464  In no way does Blackstone 
state that the “have arms” provision was drafted to give individuals an armed right to 
self-defense.465  He merely articulates the principle that the “have arms” provision 
comes from the “natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”466  In other words, 
“when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the 
violence of oppression” the people have a right to take up “arms for their defence” to 
overthrow tyrannical government.467   The allowance to “have arms” justified lawful 
rebellion.468   
If there was an eighteenth-century right—either through the English Constitution 
or common law—to possess arms for self-defense, then it certainly would have been 
included in Blackstone’s section on the absolute rights of individuals.  The first 
absolute right that the “fifth auxiliary right” could be exercised to protect was 
“personal security.”  This first absolute right echoes the principle of self-defense by 
protecting “[a] man’s limbs,” and enabling “man to protect himself from external 
injuries in a state of nature.”469  It is a right that “cannot be wantonly destroyed or 
disabled without a manifest breach of civil liberty.”470  However, there is no mention 
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of arms or the use of any kind of instruments to defend this absolute right.  Nowhere 
in his Commentaries does Blackstone state that society is bound to allow individuals 
to “have arms” to defend their person.  It had always been a “public allowance” by 
statute. 471 
There is not even one reference to the Declaration of Rights throughout 
Blackstone’s examination of “personal security.” Although it may seem valid to 
argue that Blackstone may have just forgotten to cite the Declaration of Rights, this 
argument becomes perilous upon reaching his analysis of the second absolute right—
“personal liberty.”  Writing on wrongful detention, Blackstone states that “31 Car. II 
c.2 commonly called the habeas corpus act . . . be evaded by demanding 
unreasonable bail, or sureities for the prisoner’s appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & 
M. st. 2 c. 2[, the Declaration of Rights,] that excessive bail ought not to be 
required.”472  Thus, Blackstone was clearly cognizant of the Declaration of Rights 
and its direct application to the three absolute rights of personal security, personal 
liberty, and private property.  He knew, however, that the “have arms” provision did 
not apply directly to any of the three, including “personal security” or self-defense.  
As Blackstone correctly cites, the have arms provision becomes applicable only upon 
the exhaustion of the preceding four auxiliary rights.473 
Moreover, not even Blackstone’s section on self-defense mentions anything 
resembling a right to “have arms” or instruments to defend one’s person.  It is true 
that Blackstone states that “it is lawful for [man] to repel force by force” in “defence 
of one’s self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of 
husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant.”474  However, he does not 
cite the Declaration of Rights here, nor does he even imply that people have a right 
to a modern means to defend themselves.  He merely states that it is lawful to “repel 
force by force.”  What “force” an individual possesses is not a right.  A man can use 
only whatever “force” society makes available to him.   
Most importantly, Blackstone makes it clear that self-defense is not something 
for which one should prepare.  Only in “sudden and violent cases[,] when certain and 
immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the 
law” could an individual “legally exercise this right of preventative defence.”475  In 
all other circumstances, the “right of natural defence does not imply a right of 
attacking.”476  Instead, the right only required that men have “recourse to the proper 
tribunals of justice.”477  Therefore, Blackstone provides a legal analysis that is a far 
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cry from an alleged right for individuals to prepare in the defense of their homes by 
having arms.478   
IX.  ST. GEORGE TUCKER ON BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES AND THE 
ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS” 
St. George Tucker’s edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries is of special 
significance in understanding the “have arms” provision.  This is because the Heller 
majority determined that Tucker’s analysis “made [it] clear in the notes to the 
description of the arms right, [that] Americans understood the ‘right of self-
preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention 
of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent injury.’”479 This note that the 
Heller majority paraphrases is not a description of the “have arms” provision, 
though, and, instead, is actually a note to Blackstone’s Commentaries stating the 
following: 
So that this review of our situation may fully justify the observation of 
a learned French author [Montesquieu], who indeed generally both 
thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom; and who hath not 
scrupled to profess, even in the very bosom of his native country, that the 
English is the only nation in the world, where political and civil liberty is 
the direct end of it’s constitution.480    
Not to mention, the majority even takes the language in the footnote out of 
context.  The pertinent part of that footnote reads: 
Rights, then, I apprehend, admit of a fourfold division: 1st, natural 
rights; 2dly, social rights; 3dly, civil rights; 4thly, political rights.  1. 
Natural rights, are such as appertain to every man, as a moral agent, 
independent of any social institutions, or laws, whatsoever: to which all 
men, without distinction, so long as they remain in the state of nature, are 
absolutely entitled.  The whole of which are comprehended under the right 
of self-preservation, and of doing whatsoever may be necessary to that 
end. 
It is this right of self-preservation which gives to any person in the 
state of nature the right to punish any other for any evil he has done; and 
to be himself both the judge and executioner of the law of nature. 
But this natural right doth not amount, even in the state of nature, to a 
state of license, or uncontrolled liberty; for the state of nature hath the law 
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that 
law, teaches all mankind that will consult it, that being all equal, and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions.  And, therefore, when his own preservation comes not in 
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competition, he ought, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, 
and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or 
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of liberty, health, limbs, 
or goods of another. 
When a man quits the state of nature, and enters into a state of society, 
he resigns into the hands of society the right of punishing an offender, for 
an injury already done him, the society by the terms of the social compact, 
having engaged to punish every such offender for him.  But he retains the 
right of repelling force by force; because that may be absolutely necessary 
for self-preservation, and the intervention of the society in his behalf, may 
be too late to prevent an injury.  Upon the same principle, he may be 
supposed to retain every other natural right, which the society cannot aid 
him in preserving or enforcing.481  
What Tucker’s footnote stated is what Blackstone articulated on the legality of 
self-defense: the philosophical principle that when an individual leaves a state of 
nature and enters society, that person gives up certain rights.  What no individual 
gives up, though, is the right to repel force by force, for no matter how many 
safeguards society may offer, there will always be instances when an individual 
cannot wait for society’s protection and must use force—lethal if necessary—to repel 
an attacker.  Of course, there is no mention of a right to arms or other instruments to 
accomplish this end.  There exists no such right.   
Even Tucker, writing in 1803 after the adoption of the Second Amendment, 
viewed the “have arms” provision as an allowance.  This is evidenced by the 
footnote he places next to Blackstone’s writing of the “fifth auxiliary right.”  The 
footnote comes after Blackstone wrote, “The fifth and last auxiliary right of the 
subject, that I shall present mention, is that of having arms for their defence.”482  The 
footnote reads: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.  
Amendments to C.U.S. Art. 4, and this is without any qualification as to their 
condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.”483  
Notice that Tucker cites the Second Amendment as being similar to the English 
allowance to “have arms.”  The major difference between the two being that the 
Second Amendment did not place restrictions on the condition or degree of the arms.  
This is evidenced by the statutory requirements in the militia laws throughout the 
United States—both preceding and after the adoption of the Constitution—that 
persons of all classes were required to keep and bear arms.484  This included even 
poor persons and indentured servants.  Of course, poor persons and indentured 
servants usually were exempt from the requirement to provide arms.  They were just 
never exempt from keeping arms that were personally assigned by the government 
nor relieved from serving during times of emergency.485  In other words, the English 
hierarchal structure was not as prevalent in the American militia laws as it was in 
England.   
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This understanding of Tucker’s analysis of the relation to the “have arms” 
provision and the Second Amendment is supported in his View of the Constitution of 
the United States, for Tucker first brings up the Second Amendment in describing 
Congressional power to provide for “organizing, arming and disciplining the 
militia.”486  In it, Tucker reiterates the fact that the Virginia Constitutional 
Convention was deeply concerned about giving Congress power over the State’s 
militias.  The Convention firmly believed “that a well regulated militia, composed of 
the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a 
free state.”487  Therefore, the Convention proposed “‘that each state respectively 
should have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own 
militia, whenever congress should neglect to provide for the same.’”488  Tucker 
believed that “all room for doubt, or uneasiness upon the subject, seems to be 
completely removed” with the inclusion of the Second Amendment.489  Its 
incorporation added “that the power of arming the militia, not being prohibited to the 
states, respectively, by the constitution, is, consequently, reserved to them, 
concurrently with the federal government.”490  
This section of Tucker’s View of the Constitution of the United States clearly 
denotes that the Second Amendment was a synonymous limited right with the 
Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision.  This is a fact that does not support 
Malcolm or the “individual right” model that the Supreme Court majority adopted in 
Heller.491  Furthermore, Tucker goes on to discuss the importance of a well-
organized and disciplined militia.  The Framers thought it was essential that there be 
uniformity in this regard because of the problems that the country faced during the 
American Revolution.  Tucker described the militia during that war as one of 
“uncertainty and variety.”492  By giving the federal government the power to organize 
and discipline, the exact opposite would present itself.  Now the country would 
present a militia that is “most safe, as well as [a] most natural defense of a free 
state.”493 
These facts put both the English “have arms” provision and the Second 
Amendment in their true contexts.  Given that Tucker cites the Second Amendment 
as being similar to the “have arms” provision in his edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, coupled with his analysis on the connection between the militia 
powers and the Second Amendment, it is clear that neither the English “have arms” 
provision nor the Second Amendment had anything to do with armed self-defense.494  
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The Heller majority ignored Tucker’s comments and, instead, preferred to focus on 
his description of the Second Amendment as the “true palladium of liberty.”495  
Granted, the purpose of the Second Amendment and the “have arms” provision is 
just this, because the ability of the people to stand up against oppressive standing 
armies, foreign and domestic, ensured that everybody had a hand in defending their 
liberty.  This point is stressed when Tucker writes, “Wherever standing armies are 
kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color or 
pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, on the brink of 
destruction.”496  Tucker stresses the philosophical underpinnings of the English “have 
arms” provision—that the people must have the ability to partake in defending their 
liberties.  If the people were left out of this process, it was feared that they would 
have no redress.  People had to fight to ensure the protection of their own liberties.  
Counting on others to protect them, or in the case of the Second Amendment, if they 
were ever restricted from the process, the people could essentially lose these 
liberties. 
This is why Tucker refers to hunting laws that confiscated English citizens’ arms 
for non-compliance.497  It was suspected that the English government had used the 
gaming laws as a means to prevent the people from attempting to overthrow 
tyrannical government.498  While English gaming laws prior to the Glorious 
Revolution might have stated that their purpose was to preserve game and property 
rights, they also supported the English government’s objective to prevent popular 
uprisings form the lower classes.499   
Game laws, however, did not conflict with the English Bill of Rights, for the 
“have arms” provision protected only an allowance and did so under limited 
circumstances.500  At no time did the game laws outright prevent an individual from 
bearing “arms for their Defence.”  These laws merely limited who could use and own 
certain arms outside of countering an illegal standing army and defending the realm 
from invasion.501  Tucker believes that this is what the Framers were trying to 
prevent by drafting the Second Amendment.502  The strong language “shall not be 
infringed” was included to obstruct the passing of laws that prevented classes of 
people from being able to bear arms—including the authority to overthrow tyrannical 
government. 
X.  THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON “HAVE ARMS” 
Not only have Individual Right Scholars misinterpreted St. George Tucker’s 
analysis of the English allowance to “have arms,” but they also misunderstand the 
                                                          
495
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2805. 
496
 TUCKER, supra note 486, at 239. 
497
 TUCKER, supra note 480, at 144 n.41. 
498
 Id. at 143; TUCKER, supra note 486, at 239. 
499
 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 412 (Oxford, 
Clarendon 1768). 
500
 CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 50-51. 
501
 Id. at 51. 
502
 Id. 
71Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
422 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:351 
Founding Fathers’ interpretation.  Individual Right Scholars reach conclusions 
without substantiating historical evidence and—in most cases—take quotes out of 
context. The strength of the “individual right” argument rests in a slew of 1769 
newspaper editorials found by Stephen P. Halbrook.  These editorials give some 
insight into the colonists’ opinions regarding Massachusetts Governor Francis 
Bernard’s decision to veto the acts and resolves of an illegally assembled Boston 
Town Council.  On April 13th, the New York Journal published the following:  
Instances of the Licentious and outrageous Behavior of the Military 
Conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are of 
such a Nature, and have been carried to so great Lengths, as must serve 
fully to evince that a late Vote of this Town, calling upon the Inhabitants 
to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence, was a Measure as 
prudent as it was legal: such Violences are always to be apprehended 
from Military Troops, when quartered in the Body of a populous City; but 
more especially so, when they are led to believe that they are become 
necessary to awe a Spirit of Rebellion, injuriously said to be existing 
therein.  It is a natural Right which the People have reserved to 
themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep Arms for their own 
Defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the 
Sanctions of Society and Law are found insufficient to restrain the 
Violence of Oppression.—We are however, pleased to find that the 
Inhabitants of this Town, under every Insult and outrage, received from 
the Soldiery, are looking up to the Laws of the Land for Redress; and if 
any Influence should be powerful enough to deprive the Meanest Subject 
of this Security; the People will not be answerable for the unhappy 
Consequences that may flow therefrom.503 
It was this editorial that the Ninth Circuit used in Nordyke as supporting evidence 
to incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.504  The Nordyke court did not elaborate on how this editorial 
supports its stance, but it can be assumed that the court interpreted the “calling upon 
the inhabitants to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence”—as prudent and 
legal—to equate to armed individual self-defense.  The problem with such an 
interpretation is that it is not placed in historical context.  What was the substance of 
the law that called for the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms?  What was 
the context and reason for passing the law?  Why was the law vetoed by Governor 
Bernard?  Why is “Spirit of Rebellion” mentioned?  Does not the editorial’s 
interpretation of Blackstone equate with the limited “auxiliary right” that the “have 
arms” provision protects?   
The Nordyke court failed to ask or analyze any of these important contextual 
questions, for if it had, it would have come to understand that the law in question 
was a militia law.  More importantly, it was a law that was enacted by Boston’s 
radical leaders—not the Convention of Towns—because they believed that British 
troops were coming to strip them of their rights; thus, they felt compelled to enforce 
Blackstone’s “fifth and last auxiliary right.” 
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In order to place the editorial in its proper context, one must go back to the 
Spring of 1768.  In March, mobs of Bostonians called for the end of the Townshend 
Duties and were celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act.505  Lieutenant Governor 
Thomas Hutchinson described these mobs as gangs of thugs “armed with 
bludgeons.”506  The mobs were defying the American Board of Customs 
Commissioners by continuing to illegally smuggle goods openly through the 
streets.507  By June, things had gotten worse.  John Hancock’s sloop, Liberty, had 
been seized, which caused “riots in the streets, physical assaults on the customs 
officers, the burning of patrol boats, Town Meeting resolutions of the wildest kind, 
and the harassment of the customs commissioners.”508  This all escalated to a point 
where many of the crown’s officials were forced to seek shelter at the Castle 
William.509 
These events forced Governor Bernard to request several regiments to aid him in 
keeping the peace.510  The request invoked unpopular reaction, which caused British 
officials to be secretive in requesting more.511  By July, Bernard had “some Concern 
for the Safety of the Castle [William] since the Commissioners retired” there.512  
Bernard did not have intelligence that it would be attacked, but he knew of the 
garrison’s weakness and “the Ease with which it might be surprised.”513  There was, 
however, a larger concern.  On July 9th, he wrote to Lord Hillsborough: 
This very Morning the Select Men of the Town ordered the Magazine 
of Arms belonging to the Town to be brought out to be cleaned, when 
they were exposed for some Hours at the Town-House.  They were 
expostulated with for this imprudent act; they excused themselves by 
saying, that those Arms were ordered to be cleaned two Months ago.514 
It was this rebellious behavior that led Bernard to ask for Thomas Gage’s help.  
By July 20th, Bernard finally received some encouraging news.  He learned that 
Gage received orders to “collect [and keep] in readiness” his army.515  The troops, 
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however, did not have orders to deploy.  There were constitutional concerns at play.  
Bernard wrote that neither the “popular [Massachusetts] Constitution nor the present 
intimidation” would allow troops to be sent to “quell Riots [and] Tumults but at the 
desire of the Civil Power”—a constitutional limitation with which Bernard generally 
agreed.516  He personally felt that “no Troops can be of any Service in quelling a Riot 
or a Tumult, that are not previously quartered near that Place.”517 
Bernard saw his current situation a bit differently.  “Troops are not wanted here 
to quell a Riot or a Tumult, but to rescue the Government out of the hands of a 
trained mob, [and] to restore the Activity of the Civil Power, which is now entirely 
obstructed,” wrote Bernard.518  In August, Lord Barrington agreed by offering 
whatever support he could.  Barrington felt it was “now evident to all the world that 
the Civil Magistrate in the Massachusetts should be assisted by troops, in 
maintaining Peace [and] supporting [the] Law.”519 
The Boston Sons of Liberty were acutely aware of what was afoot.  Especially 
when, on July 27th and 29th, Bernard requested the Boston Town Council’s approval 
for troops.  Both requests were unanimously rejected.520  The Council even issued a 
reply to Bernard, warning that he would be held “‘in the highest degree unfriendly to 
the Peace and good Order of this Government.’”521  This response led Bernard to 
believe that he could “‘no longer . . . depend upon the Council for the Support of the 
small Remains of royal [and] parliamentary Power now left.’”522 
In August, Samuel Adams’ correspondence shows that the radical element 
believed that military intervention was all but certain.  He even wrote an editorial 
under the name “Determinatus,” with the following contents: 
I am no friend to “Riots, Tumults and unlawful Assemblies,” I take 
upon me to say, any more than his Excellency is: But when the People are 
oppress’d, when their Rights are infring’d, when their property is invaded, 
when taskmasters are set over [to] them, when unconstitutional acts are 
executed by a naval force before their eyes, and they are daily threatened 
with military troops, when their legislative is dissolve’d! . . . In such 
Circumstances, while they have the spirit of freedom, they will boldly 
assert their freedom; and they are to be justify’d in so doing.523 
This editorial shows that Adams believed that rebellion not only was evident, but 
that the people would be “justify’d” in “assert[ing] their freedom” to do so.  James 
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Otis wrote similar sentiments, proclaiming that if the colonists’ grievances were not 
redressed and they “were called on to defend [their] liberties and Privileges, he 
hoped and believed [they] should one and all resist even unto Blood.”524   By 
September 8th, the Bostonians received affirmation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-
ninth Regiments coming from Halifax.525  A week later they were informed that two 
more regiments would be arriving from Ireland.526  The news caused Samuel Adams 
and James Otis to curse the governor.  They even pledged to defend themselves “‘at 
the utmost peril of their lives and fortunes.’”527 
It was under this tumultuous atmosphere that the Boston Town Council requested 
the Convention of Towns.528  This is where Individual Right Scholars first fail in 
their contextual understanding of the events that took place.  A Boston Town 
Meeting consisting of Thomas Cushing, Samuel Adams, Richard Dana, John Rowe, 
John Hancock, Benjamin Kent, and Joseph Warren proposed a law that required 
inhabitants to provide themselves with arms.529  It was not a resolution by the 
Convention of Towns.  Drafted on September 12th, the proposed law read: 
Whereas, By an Act of Parliament, of this first of King William and 
Queen Mary, it is declared, That the subjects being Protestants, may have 
arms for their Defence: It is the Opinion of this Town, That the said 
Declaration is founded in Nature, Reason and sound Policy, and is well 
adapted for the necessary Defence of the Community: 
And Forasmuch, As by a good and wholesome Law of this Province, 
every listed Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers, who by Law 
are otherwise to be provided) shall be always provided with a well fix’d 
Firelock, Musket, Accoutrements and Ammunition, as is in said Law 
particularly mentioned, to the Satisfaction of the Commission Officers of 
the Company: And as there is at time a prevailing Apprehension, in the 
minds of many, of an approaching War with France: In order that the 
inhabitants of this town be prepared in Case of sudden Danger: VOTED, 
That those of the said Inhabitants, who may at present be unprovided, be 
and hereby are Required duely to observe the said Law at this Time.530 
The language of the proposal definitively speaks to the limited nature of the 
allowance to “have arms.”  This is first evidenced by the requirement that individuals 
equip themselves with a “Firelock, Musket, Accoutrements and Ammunition.”  Only 
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Militia laws frequently required these items,531 a fact that is made clear with the 
language “by a good and wholesome Law of this Province.”  This phrase was a 
direct reference to the 1693 Militia Act and the subsequent militia laws that were still 
in force.532  In fact, the language of the 1693 Act corresponds with the Boston Town 
Meeting’s proposal.  Section 5 of the Act states: 
That every listed Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers) 
shall be always provided with a well fix’d Firelock, Musket, of Musket or 
Bastard Musket bore, the Barrel not less than three Foot and a half long; 
or other good Fire Arms to the Satisfaction of the Commission Officers of 
the Company; a Snapsack, a Collar with twelve Bandaliers, or Cartouch-
Box; one Pound of good Powder, twenty Bullets fit for his Gun; and 
twelve Flints.533 
The only major difference between the Boston proposal and the 1693 Act is that 
instead of listing each of the required accoutrements, the Boston proposal broadly 
defined them as “accoutrements.”534  Other than this, the first sentence of the 
proposal and the 1693 Act read almost verbatim.  This proves that it was the Town 
Meeting’s clear intention to revive the militia laws as a means to repel an alleged 
threat from France, for it was through the militia that the inhabitants “may have 
Arms for their Defence.”535 
It is not surprising that Governor Bernard did not allow such a proposal to go 
forward.  He was recently informed that there was a plot to “raise the Country and 
oppose the Troops.”536  Moreover, at the September town meeting, the same militia 
arms that the Boston Council had claimed were “brought out to be cleaned” in 
July,537 were rumored to be “laid upon the floor of the Town Hall to remind the 
people of the use of them.”538  Bernard was not ignorant.  He knew that the Town 
Meeting’s debates on “Arming the Town and Country against their Enemies” was a 
cover for the radicals’ true intentions—armed rebellion and preventing the Ireland 
regiments from landing.539  Bernard wrote, “The probability of a French War . . . was 
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[merely a] pretence for arming the Town” and “a cover for the frequent use of the 
word Enemy.”540  
 He had even heard the Town Meeting claim that it “had a right to oppose 
with Arms military Force which was sent to oblige them to submit to 
unconstitutional Laws.”541  Bernard then heard another man argue that “when a 
people’s Liberties [are] threatened they [are] in a state of War, and [have] a right to 
defend themselves.”542  Both of these quotes adequately articulate the Founding 
generation’s understanding of the limited right that the “have arms” provision 
protected.  What should be stressed is that the grievance that compelled the Town 
Meeting to attempt to invoke the militia laws was the sending of a standing army.543  
This is significant because it was generally feared that illegal standing armies 
usurped individuals’ liberties.544 
Therefore, the Town Meeting’s proposal to reinstate the militia laws was an 
attempt to prepare to exercise the “fifth and last auxiliary right.”  Unfortunately for 
the select radical Boston men involved, they were the only representatives in 
Massachusetts that felt that such a measure was necessary.  When calling the 
Convention of Towns, the Boston Town Meeting enclosed its resolves to its 
surrounding brethren.545  It was hoped that the surrounding towns would agree with 
its measures and, thereby, collectively petition Bernard and Parliament for a redress 
of grievances.546  This did not occur, however, especially in regards to reinstating the 
1693 Militia Act. 
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The Convention of Towns met on September 22nd.547  It is unclear exactly what 
transpired at this meeting, but, according to Bernard, extremists like Adams were 
“presently silenced.”548  The Convention took more of a moderate stance compared 
to the Bostonians.  The Convention presented a “humble and dutiful petition . . . for 
the redress of their grievances.”549  Thus, unlike the Town Meeting, they sought “the 
legal, regular, and prudential methods of obtaining the redress.”550  It is almost as if 
the Convention was apologizing for the Town Meeting’s resolves, for the 
Convention stated that “no irregular steps should be taken by the people, but that all 
constitutional and prudential methods should closely be attended.”551 
In speaking on the illegality of standing armies, the Convention viewed these 
armies as “dangerous to [the people’s] civil liberty” and stressed that standing armies 
were entities that could “ruin the liberties of America.”552  The constitutional means 
to protect against riots and tumults should be handled by “the civil magistrate” and 
aided by the “Posse Comitatus, when legally called in aid of the civil power.”553  The 
Convention made no mention of arms, providing arms, or the reinstatement of the 
militia laws. 
While the Convention did not outright proclaim that the Town Meeting’s militia 
proposal was constitutionally unsupported, the Town of Hatfield did.554  The town 
knew the real reason why the Boston Town Council requested a convention—“an 
apprehension of their being [a standing army] quartered.”555  The Town of Hatfield 
did not see the maintenance of a standing army as unconstitutional in this instance.  
Had not the entire colony been told that the purpose of arming Boston’s inhabitants 
was to defend against a French War?  Thus, Hatfield’s leaders thought it was 
plausible that an army be sent there “for your defence in case of a French war.”556  
These statements were merely witty retorts to the faulty logic of Boston’s radicals.  
The Town of Hatfield knew the real reason why the troops were being sent to 
Boston—to check on the latter’s unruly behavior.  Therefore, Hatfield told Boston’s 
radicals to use their “loyalty and quiet behaviour” to “convince his majesty and the 
world, [a standing army is no] longer necessary for that purpose, that thereupon they 
will be withdrawn, and your town and the province saved any further trouble and 
expence from that quarter.”557 
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It is interesting that no mention of the revival of the 1693 Militia Act was made 
until nearly six months after the troops were sent to Boston.  After his failure to gain 
the support of Massachusetts’ leaders at the Convention in January 1769, Samuel 
Adams and other radical leaders remained silent on the failed measure.  Things had 
even calmed to the point that Commodore Samuel Hood did not see the “least 
Probability of the People’s taking Arms.”558  “Indeed some few of the Convention 
took Pains to bring the Ignorant and lower Class into that Mind, and possibly might 
have succeed[ed] had not the Troops arrived as they did,” wrote Hood, “but those 
few are now alarmed.”559  This changed when Governor Bernard created a “cabinet 
council” to take depositions that, later, would be used as evidence in court trials for 
treason.560  
Bernard had become aware of all the “hidden purposes” behind the radical 
leaders of Boston.  It began on January 23, 1769 when Richard Silvester made a 
formal deposition before Thomas Hutchinson.  In it, Silvester swore that he had 
heard Adams howl, “‘Let us take up arms immediately and be free, and seize all the 
King’s officers’” and “we will destroy every soldier that dare put his foot on 
shore.”561  The most inflammatory statement came from Dr. Benjamin Church.  
Silvester heard Church openly state that not only would Boston resist the King’s 
troops, but that there were plans to seize Hutchinson, Bernard, and their papers and 
“‘send them home in irons.’”562   
In addition to the ongoing investigation by the “cabinet council,” Boston’s 
radical leaders were also unhappy with the content of King George III’s speech to 
Parliament on November 8, 1768.  What particularly upset them was the King’s 
description of Boston’s inhabitants as being “in a state of disobedience to all law and 
government: and [having] proceeded to measures subversive of the constitution, and 
attended with circumstances that might manifest a disposition to throw off their 
dependence on Great Britain.”563 
It was in this context that Samuel Adams defended the Town Meeting’s proposal 
to reinstate the provisions 1693 Militia Act.  In an anonymous editorial signed 
“Shippen,” Adams responded to Bernard’s investigation on treason and to the 
contents of the King’s speech.  He was appalled that the Ministry believed that “the 
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proceedings of [Boston], were not only to the highest degree seditious, but nothing 
short of treason itself.”564  Adams felt “the charge[s] appeared to be laid too high,” 
because neither Bernard, the King, nor Parliament “justly stated or proved, one 
single act of that town, as a public body, to be, I will not say treasonable or seditious, 
but even at all illegal.”565  Regarding the legality of reviving the 1693 Militia Act, 
Adams argued: 
For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry to prove that British 
subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly 
recognized by the Bill of Rights, and, who live in a province where the 
law requires them to be equip’d with arms, . . . are guilty of an illegal act, 
in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law directs.566 
Individual Right Scholars have relied on this quote to infer that the “have arms” 
provision protected a right to possess firearms outside of a militia or military 
context.567  This is a large assumption given that Adams expressly refers to the “have 
arms” provision as a “privilege”—not a “right.”  Moreover, such an interpretation is 
unsupported because Individual Right Scholars forget to take notice of Adams’ 
statement that “the law requires them to be equip’d with arms”—an explicit 
reference to Section 5 of the 1693 Militia Act.568  The fact of the matter is that the 
two are linked.  It was a privilege for an individual to possess arms to defend the 
state and their liberties.  Most importantly, it was a privilege that was regulated 
through the militia laws, as the Town Meeting’s resolve makes clear.569  This is why 
Adams adamantly defended the resolve as follows: 
But if some are bold and base enough, where the interest of a whole 
country is at stake, to penetrate into the secrets of the human breast, to 
search for crimes, and to impute the worst of motives to actions strictly 
legal, whatever may be thought of their expediency, it is easy to 
recriminate in the same way; and one man has as good reason to affirm, 
that a few, in calling for a military force under pretence of supporting civil 
authority, secretly intended to introduce a general massacre, as another 
has to assert, that a number of loyal subjects, by calling upon one another 
to be provided with arms, according to law, intended to bring on an 
insurrection.570 
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Adams’ mention of the “interest of the whole country” was a direct reference to 
the Town Meeting’s fabricated purpose behind the militia resolve—a perpetual fear 
of a war with France.571  With the Seven Years War ending just six years prior, 
Adams balked at the resolve as being treasonous or rebellious.  If the reinstatement 
of the militia laws had a “secret” intent, Adams felt that it was just as fair to argue 
that the same could be said on the stationing of troops in Boston.  To him, it was just 
as plausible that the British troops “secretly intended to introduce general massacre” 
if Bernard persisted on investigating the Town Meeting’s militia resolve as 
treasonous.  This was not Adams’ first query into the insidious designs of the British 
troops.  He had written a combination of editorials claiming that the army’s presence 
was in violation of the English Bill of Rights.572 
In these editorials, Adams makes multiple references to the people’s duty to be 
aware of their constitutional rights.  “It behoves the publick then to be aware of the 
danger, and like sober men to avail themselves of the remedy of the law, while it is in 
their power.”573  This included restraining military power, especially when it was 
being used as a substitute for the civil authority.574    Adams used the power of the 
press to push for the peaceful removal of the British troops by arguing that their 
presence was unconstitutional on multiple levels. 
By February 1769, he changed his approach in light of the forfeiture of the 
Massachusetts charter and the reorganization of government that was being 
discussed in England.575  In another anonymous Boston Gazette editorial, Adams 
responded to the numerous heated exchanges between the selectmen of Boston and 
Governor Bernard.576  The governor’s position was that he was forced to solicit the 
                                                          
571
 See id. 
572
 For instance, in an article entitled Principiis Obsta, Adams argued that the maintaining 
of a standing army generally led to the adoption of “military maxims” that would “soon 
eradicate every idea of civil government.”  SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE, UNSIGNED (BOSTON 
GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 
251, 252.  It was universally believed that soldiers “look upon themselves as a body of men 
different from the rest of the people” and would “make laws for themselves, and enforce them 
by the power of the sword!”  Id. at 252-53.  To Adams, it was better that the power be in the 
hands of the people.  He had no quarrels with the “prerogative [being] a power vested in the 
crown by the constitution, for the safety of the people.”  SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE SIGNED 
“VINDEX” (BOSTON GAZETTE, Dec. 26, 1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL 
ADAMS, supra note 523, at 272, 275.  This, however, was a power “which is never to be 
exerted, but when the safety of the people requires it.”  Id.  Otherwise, standing armies are 
“not to defend the nation, but to destroy its liberties.”  Id.  
573
 SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE, UNSIGNED (BOSTON GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1768), reprinted in 1 
THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 251, 253.    
574
 Id. at 252. 
575
 RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, LIFE AND TIMES OF JOSEPH WARREN 95 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, & Co. 1865). 
576
 SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE SIGNED “E.A.” (BOSTON GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1769), reprinted 
in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 316, 318; see also ANDREW 
STEPHEN WALMSLEY, THOMAS HUTCHINSON AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
98 (1999). 
81Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
432 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:351 
troops to preserve law and order.577  Meanwhile, Adams and the selectmen viewed 
the troops as a means to strip the colonists of their liberties.  They preferred to have 
the civil authorities handle the security of the town, with the civil magistrate having 
power to adjudicate.  Any riots or tumults were to be suppressed by the militia.  
“Every one knows that the exercise of the military power is forever dangerous to 
civil rights,” wrote Adams.578  It is here that Adams defended the Town’s militia 
resolve and reiterated the limited legal understanding of the “have arms” provision as 
stated by Blackstone.579 
While Individual Right Scholars use Adams’ paraphrase of Blackstone to support 
their stance, it provides nothing that refutes the limited interpretation of the “have 
arms” provision.  What is unique about this editorial is that it was the first time that 
Adams admits the true purpose behind reviving the 1693 Militia Act—legal rebellion 
or the invocation of the “fifth auxiliary right.”580  The members of the Town Meeting 
were not even remotely concerned with a French war.  Primarily, they voted to 
reinstate the militia laws as a means to prepare against a tyrannical government.581  
Of particular interest is the fact that Adams never stated that individuals have a right 
to own arms.  The constitutional issue at hand was whether the representatives of the 
town may invoke the “have arms” provision.582  In other words, the debate was 
whether it was legal to pass a law providing arms for the colonists’ defense without 
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the support of the governor.583  Adams certainly thought so, especially because a 
standing army was being maintained in Boston.584 
The issue did not end there.  Adams—being the great disseminator of political 
propaganda that he was—forwarded a similar defense of the Town Meeting’s resolve 
to the New York Journal.585  He argued that the “late Vote of this Town, calling upon 
the Inhabitants to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence, was a Measure as 
prudent as it was legal.”586  It was because “Violences are always to be apprehended 
from Military Troops” that it is the “natural Right which the People have reserved to 
themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep Arms for their own Defence.”587  
It was a right “to be made use of when the Sanctions of Society and Law are found 
insufficient to restrain the Violence of Oppression.”588 
All and all, the brilliance of Samuel Adams as a political propagandist can be 
seen on the subject of the Town Meeting’s attempt to reinstate the 1693 Militia Act.  
Adams’ argument evolved from a reasonable fear of foreign invasion to the 
invocation of the “have arms” provision in situations when government has 
oppressed life, liberty, and property, and all other attempts of redress are exhausted.  
Several months later, however, Adams changed his argument again.  This time he 
took the innocent approach and omitted ever proposing a Militia Act.589  It began 
when Boston’s radicals seized Bernard’s and Hutchinson’s letters, publishing them 
for all the colonies to see.590  Adams no longer needed to be on the defensive and 
forced to explain Boston’s decision to reinstate the Militia Act.  Instead, he claimed 
that ordering the cleaning of arms was incidental to the riots and tumults occurring at 
that time.591  Adams wrote that “revolting” was in “no other Thought in the Minds of 
any, except in the Governor and a few more.”592   He explained the incident: 
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Whereas the simple Truth of the Matter is, these Arms had for many 
Years been deposited in Chests and laid on the Floor of the Town Hall; 
but the Hall itself being burnt a few Years ago, the Arms were sav’d from 
the Ruins and carried to the Town House: After the Hall was Re-built the 
Town ordered their Removal there; and tho’ it happen’d to be done at a 
Juncture when the Governor and his Confederates talked much of the 
Town’s revolting.593 
No mention was made of the Town Meeting’s militia resolve, and for good 
reason.  Adams wanted to attack Bernard’s perception of the Convention of Towns, 
thereby, making Boston the innocent party.  Adams no longer defended the legality 
of armed rebellion.  At this point, the Town Meeting’s resolves were “nothing more 
than a friendly circular Letter to the Selectmen of several Towns in the Province.”594  
The Convention was not called to arm the people, but to consult “Measures to 
promote Peace and good Order.”595  It was a “very innocent Measure,” which “was 
most certainly attended with all the happy Effects for which it was propos’d.”596 
In sum, the Convention of Towns’ resolve to provide the inhabitants with arms 
was an attempt to invoke the 1693 Militia Act.597  While Adams’ original argument 
was that it was a means to prevent another French War, the “secret” intent was to 
invoke the “have arms” provision’s protection of lawful armed rebellion “when the 
Sanctions of Society and Law are found insufficient to restrain the Violence of 
Oppression.”598  The resolve had nothing to do with an armed individual’s self-
defense.599 This is evidenced not only by the frequent paraphrasing of Blackstone’s 
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“fifth auxiliary right,” but also by Adams’ change in political stance—including his 
retraction of the militia law being put forth at all.600  
 Another “individual right” argument is that the Second Amendment was drafted 
to protect against the incessant disarming that occurred during the American 
Revolution.601  If this is the case, then why did not one colonial petition, list of 
grievances, declaration, or pamphlet mention the disarming as a violation of their 
constitutional or natural right to “have arms”?  If the Founders were cognizant of the 
“have arms” provision and the “individual right” interpretation of it, why did no 
one—including Samuel Adams and other members of the Town Meeting—reference 
it during this disarming?  One need not look further than Lord Dunmore’s actions in 
Virginia, Judge William Henry Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury, and the 
Declaration of Independence to understand that the Founders did not view individual 
firearm ownership as a right—at any level.   
Under cover of night on April 20, 1775, Lord Dunmore ordered a contingent of 
Marines to seize and move Williamsburg’s gunpowder stores.602  The seizure drew 
an immediate response.  The people wanted to know “what motives and for what 
particular purpose the powder [was] carried off.”603  The people demanded the 
gunpowder “to be immediately returned to the magazine.”604  Dunmore replied that 
he acted because “he did not think it secure” and moved the gunpowder only “to 
prevent any alarm.”605  He promised to deliver the gunpowder “in half an hour” upon 
the threat of any insurrection.606  The truth of the matter was that Dunmore wanted to 
disarm and disable the rebel contingent.  Lord Dartmouth had given him specific 
orders to secure as many military stores as possible.607  Dunmore had no plans of 
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returning the gunpowder, especially to an armed mob of men.  He did “not think it 
prudent to put powder into [the people’s] hands in such a situation.”608 
Without powder, the inhabitants could not sufficiently arm themselves—not even 
against the potential slave revolt that the colonists feared.  The belief that “wicked 
and designing persons have instilled the most diabolical notions into the minds of our 
slaves” caused the people to request the immediate return of the powder.609  This 
purpose behind the colonists’ need for the powder is significant in debunking the 
“individual right” myth, for not one locality claimed that the taking of the powder 
infringed on its right to armed individual self-defense.  Surely, just the threat of a 
slave revolt would have validated an individual in preparing arms under the 
“individual right” model.  Therefore, the hindering of the colonists in effectuating 
this—with the taking of the gunpowder stores—would have brought forth a 
grievance that the people were denied the right to “have arms for their defence.”  
However, no complaint was ever made.610 
One may argue that Dunmore did not seize arms per se, and, thus, the colonists 
could not claim that they had been disarmed.  This is a textually valid argument, but 
it fails for two reasons.  First, Individual Right Scholars have heralded Dunmore’s 
seizure of gunpowder as one of the events that infringed on the colonists’ right to 
“have arms for their defence.”611  Second, it does not explain why not one colonist, 
newspaper, or complaint corrected Dunmore’s claim that he had the authority to 
seize whatever arms or ammunition he deemed necessary.  
Dunmore even expressly informed his council of this power when he stated that it 
was “under the constitutional right of the crown” that “the custody and disposal of all 
public stores of arms and ammunition alone belong.”612  Moreover, he would 
reiterate this argument to the Virginian people in a proclamation dated May 3, 
1775.613   There, Dunmore stated that he was “the only constitutional judge, in what 
manner the munition, provided for the protection of the people of this government, 
[are] to be disposed of for that end.”614  He informed the populace that it was under 
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Governour’s removal of the powder lodged in the magazine, and set apart for the defence of 
the country, was fraudulent, unnecessary, and extremely provoking to the people of this 
colony.”  Id.   
611
 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF 
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 16 (1989) [hereinafter HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS]. 
612
 Governor Dunmore to His Council (May 2, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: 
THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 77. 
613
 See His Council to Governor Dunmore and his Excellency’s Resultant Proclamation 
(May 3, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, 
at 80, 81.  
614
 Id.  
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his authority that the militia and people were armed.  “[W]henever the present 
ferment shall subside, and it shall become necessary to put arms in the hands of the 
militia, for the defence of the people against a foreign enemy or intestine insurgents,” 
Dunmore stated, he would exert his best abilities to arm the people “in the service of 
the country.”615 
No one challenged Dunmore—even after word arrived in late April of Gage’s 
attempt to seize the arms, ammunition, and gunpowder at Lexington and Concord.616  
The similarities between Dunmore and Gage’s actions were all too clear.  A fact the 
Virginia House of Burgesses even took notice of when it issued the following 
address: 
The inhabitants of this country, my Lord, could not be strangers to the 
many attempts in the northern colonies to disarm the people, and thereby 
deprive them of the only means of defending their lives and property.  We 
know, from good authority, that the like measures were generally 
recommended by the Ministry, and that the export of pow[d]er from Great 
Britain had been prohibited.  Judge then how very alarming a removal of 
the small stock which remained in the public magazine, for the defence of 
the country, and the stripping of the guns of their locks, must have been to 
any people, who had the smallest regard for their security.617 
At no time in its address did the House of Burgesses claim that the widespread 
disarming was a violation of the Declaration of Rights.  No mention was made of a 
constitutional or a natural right to “have arms,” yet Halbrook and Individual Right 
Scholars claim that the Founders viewed such seizures as violating the “have arms” 
provision.618  Without any direct and circumstantial documentary evidence, it is 
erroneous for Individual Right Scholars to assert that such seizures violated an 
alleged right to “have arms.”  How can such a theory be correct if not one petition—
by any locality—connected either event as infringing on the allowance to “have arms 
for their defence”?  
Judge Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury is also of particular importance in 
debunking the “individual right” assumption of a right to “have arms” because it 
compares the events—particularly the grievances—of the Glorious Revolution to the 
American Revolution.619  Judge Drayton delivered the Charge on April 2, 1776 in 
                                                          
615
 Id. 
616
 Although one may argue that such silence is inconclusive, it is well known that 
Dunmore’s actions were under continuous scrutiny.  Newspapers, assembly proceedings, 
correspondence, and journal entries followed Dunmore’s every move.  See generally 3 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603 (Virginia Assembly 
proceedings on Dunmore’s actions and responses to his letters).  In fact, even third-party 
hearsay was prevalent in newspapers and assembly proceedings.  See CHARLES, 
IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 95-96; CHRISTOPHER WARD, 2 THE WAR OF 
THE REVOLUTION 845 (John Richard Alden ed., 1952). 
617
 HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, supra note 611, at 16 (alteration in original). 
618
 Id.; see also HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’ supra note 567, at 29-124. 
619
 WILLIAM HENRY DRAYTON, THE CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY (Apr. 23, 1776), 
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE 
MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA 50, 50 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1859). 
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order to “expound to [the jury] the constitution of [their] country.”620  Drayton 
reminded the jury that the forefathers of the Glorious Revolution vested the 
protections of the 1689 Declaration of Rights and that the Revolution established an 
affirmative right of the people to usurp the government when their unalienable rights 
were ruined.621  He catalogued the “attempts to enslave America” by “king and 
parliament” prior to hostilities.622   
Drayton then went on to describe many events in which the colonists had been 
disarmed.  This list of events included the attempt to seize munitions at Lexington 
and Concord,623 Dunmore’s actions,624 and the disarming of Boston’s inhabitants.625  
Although Drayton did not mention anything about the seizure of arms at Lexington 
and Concord or the seizure by Lord Dunmore, it was well known what had occurred.  
Moreover, Drayton expressly mentioned the taking of arms in his description of what 
happened to Boston’s inhabitants626—showing that he was aware that the disarming 
of colonists had taken place. 
                                                          
620
 Id. (internal formatting omitted). 
621
 Id.  
622
 Id. at 51.  The charges included:  
By claiming a right to bind the colonies “in all cases whatsoever;”  
By laying duties, at their mere will and pleasure, upon all the colonies;  
By suspending the legislature of New York;  
By rendering the American charters of no validity, having annulled the most 
material parts of the charter of Massachusetts Bay;  
By divesting multitudes of the colonist of their property, without legal accusation 
or trial;  
By depriving whole colonies of the bounty of Providence on their own proper 
coasts, in order to coerce them by famine;  
By restricting the trade and commerce of America;  
By sending to, and continuing in America, in time of peace, an armed force, 
without and against the consent of the people;  
By granting impunity to a soldiery instigated to murder the Americans;  
By declaring, that the people of Massachusetts Bay are liable for offences, or 
pretended offences, done in that colony, to be sent to, and tried for the same in 
England, or in any colony where they cannot have the benefit of a jury of the vicinage;  
By establishing in Quebec the Roman Catholic religion, and an arbitrary 
government, instead of the Protestant religion and a free government. 
Id.  
623
 See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 81; JAMES H. STARK, THE 
LOYALISTS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE OTHER SIDE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51 
(Augustus M. Kelley 1972) (1910). 
624
 See An Introductory Note (Mar. 28, 1775-June 24, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY 
VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 1, 5. 
625
 See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 81; SELBY, supra note 607, at 
19. 
626
 1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE MOST 
EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619, at 50, 52 (“For the little purpose of disarming 
the imprisoned inhabitants of Boston, the king’s general, Gage, in the face of the day, violated 
the public faith, by himself plighted.”).   
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Drayton felt that the abuses by the British government were so destructive that 
“[n]ature cried aloud, self-preservation is the great law,”627 which “forced [the 
colonies] to take up arms in [their] own defence.”628  This use of terminology—“self-
preservation” and “arms in their own defence”—comports with the proper and 
limited understanding of the English allowance to “have arms.”  As a judge, Drayton 
was familiar with the proper use of this language, and his comparison of the 
provisions—of the Declaration of Rights to the events of the American Revolution—
comports with the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.”  
Drayton listed the first eight grievances in the Declaration of Rights verbatim 
including the accusation that James II caused “several good subjects, being 
Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when Papists were both armed and 
employed contrary to law.”629  In comparing the grievances to the events of the 
American colonists, Drayton correlated four grievances to the actions of King 
George III: the suspending of the laws,630 levying money without consent of 
parliament,631 freedom of elections,632 and the raising and keeping of a standing army 
without consent.633  He failed to make any connection between the disarming of the 
colonists and the English “have arms” provision.  Drayton even stated that the 
colonies needed “no better authority than that illustrious precedent” of the Glorious 
Revolution and would “therefore compare the causes of, and the law upon the two 
                                                          
627
 Id. 
628
 Id. at 51. 
629
 Id. at 53. 
630
 Id.  In particular: 
James the Second suspended the operations of laws—George the Third caused the 
charter of the Massachusetts Bay to be in effect annihilated; he suspended the 
operation of the law which formed a legislature in New York, vesting it with adequate 
powers; and thereby he caused the very ability of making laws in that colony to be 
suspended. 
Id. 
631
 Id. (“King James levied money without the consent of the representatives of the people 
called upon to pay it—king George has levied money upon America, not only without, but 
expressly against the consent of the representatives of the people in America.”).   
632
 Id.  The grievance stated that: 
King James violated the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament—King 
George, by his representative, Lord William Campbell, acting for him and on his 
behalf, broke through a fundamental law of this country, for the certain holding of 
General Assemblies; and thereby, as far as in him lay, not only violated but 
annihilated the very ability of holding a General Assembly. 
Id. 
633
 Id.  As to keeping a standing army without consent: 
King James in time of peace kept a standing army in England, without consent of the 
representatives of the people among whom that army was kept—king George hath in 
time of peace invaded this continent with a large standing army without the consent, 
and he hath kept it within this continent, expressly against the consent of the 
representatives of the people among whom that army is posted. 
Id. 
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events.”634  Moreover, he expressly mentioned the disarming of Boston’s 
inhabitants.635  Therefore, if Halbrook, Malcolm, and the Individual Right Scholars 
are correct in their interpretation of the “have arms” provision, why did Drayton not 
connect the disarming of colonists with the 1689 Declaration?  Under their 
interpretation, any eighteenth-century laymen should have connected the disarming 
of colonists and a right to “have arms for their defence.” 
The truth of the matter is that the “individual right” interpretation is inaccurate 
and incomplete.  The “have arms” provision was a limited right and no substantiating 
historical correlation exists between it and an alleged right to armed individual self-
defense.  Drayton was an eighteenth-century judge, no less, and he would have 
understood the legality of the “have arms” provision more than most of the Founding 
generation.  Not to mention, Drayton’s list of grievances goes side by side with the 
Declaration of Independence, which is the most comprehensive list of grievances 
against the crown.  If the disarming of individuals was against the “have arms” 
provision, the drafting committee certainly would have included or at least 
mentioned it; the committee, however, did not.   
The Declaration of Independence lists twenty-seven grievances against the 
British government—twenty-nine were in the original list, but two were deleted by 
Congress.636  They include allegations from “the imposing of taxes . . . without 
consent” to the employing of the “merciless Indian savages.”637  What makes the 
grievances specifically important to understanding the “have arms” provision is their 
similarity to the grievances in the 1689 Declaration.638  At least eight of the 
grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence mirror a grievance or right 
within the Declarations of Rights, including: the dissolving of representative houses 
repeatedly,639 obstructing the administration of justice,640 keeping of standing 
armies,641 quartering of troops,642 depriving trial by jury,643 abolishing the free system 
of English laws, the abolishing of charters, and the suspending of the legislatures.644  
                                                          
634
 Id. at 52. 
635
 See supra note 626. 
636
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
637
 Id.  For history on employment of Indians in the American Revolution by both sides 
see CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 213-70. 
638
 The modern consensus is that the English Declaration of Rights heavily influenced the 
Declaration of Independence.  See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 104-07 (1997). 
639
 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.) (listing “[a]nd that for Redresse of all Grievances, and 
for the amending strengthening and preserving of the Lawes Parlyament sought to be held 
frequently”).  
640
 Id. (listing “[b]y Prosecutions in the Court of Kings Bench for Matters and Causes 
cognizable onely in Parlyament and by diverse other Arbitrary and Illegall Courses”).  
641
 Id. (listing “[b]y raising and keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdome in time of 
Peace without Consent of Parlyament” it was proclaimed “[t]hat the raising or keeping a 
standing Army within the Kingdome in time of Peace unlesse it be with Consent of 
Parlyament is against law”).  
642
 Id. (listing “[q]uartering Soldiers contrary to Law”).  
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Although none of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence expressly 
referenced the grievances or rights in the Declaration of Rights, Thomas Jefferson, 
the drafting committee, and the Continental Congress were clearly cognizant of the 
rights of their forefathers.  James Otis described the British constitution as coming 
“nearest [to] the idea of perfection of any that has been reduced to practice.”645  He 
viewed the “colonists, black and white” as being “freeborn British subjects, and 
entitled to all the essential civil rights . . . not only . . . from the provincial charters, 
from the principles of the common law, and acts of Parliament, but from the British 
constitution, which was reestablished at the [Glorious] Revolution with a professed 
design to secure the liberties of all the subjects to all generations.”646   
What is of particular interest regarding Otis is that he briefly wrote upon the 
“have arms” provision in his pamphlet entitled A Vindication of the British 
Colonies.647  The tract was a response to Martin Howard’s Halifax Letter.648  It 
outlined the rights of the American colonist, which included the “absolute liberties of 
Englishmen” the right of personal security, personal liberty, and personal property.649  
“Besides these three primary rights,” writes Otis, “there are others which are 
secondary and subordinate (to preserve the former from unlawful attacks).”650  It is 
here where Otis lists the “right of having and using arms for self-defense.”651  His 
description of the “have arms” provision—standing alone—would seem to support 
                                                                                                                                         
643
 Id. (listing “[a]nd whereas of late yeares Partiall Corrupt and Unqualifyed Persons have 
beene returned and served on Juryes in Tryalls and particularly diverse Jurors in Tryalls for 
High Treason which were not Freeholders” it was proclaimed “[t]hat Jurors ought to be duely 
impannelled and returned and Jurors which passe upon Men in Trialls for High Treason ought 
to be Freeholders”).  
644
 Id.  These last three can all be classified under the Suspending and Dispensing with the 
law.  It was “By Assumeing and Exerciseing a Power of Dispensing with and Suspending of 
Lawes and the Execution of Lawes without Consent of Parlyament” that it was proclaimed 
“[t]hat the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall 
Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegall” and “[t]hat the pretended Power of 
Dispensing with Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authoritie as it hath beene assumed 
and exercised of late is illegall.”  Id.  
645
 JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston, 
Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 
408, 428 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).  James Otis published the Declaration of Rights in his 
famous pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved.  He and the other 
Founders were well aware of what the “have arms” provision entailed.  See id. at 430-34. 
646
 Id.  
647
 JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (Boston, Edes & Gill 1765), 
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545, 
545. 
648
 MARTIN HOWARD, A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN AT HALIFAX, TO HIS FRIEND IN 
RHODE-ISLAND (Newport, S. Hall 1765).  
649
 JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (1765), reprinted in 1 
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545, 558. 
650
 Id. at 558-59.  
651
 Id. at 559.  
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the “individual right” theory.  However, it does not.  It is merely a portion of a larger 
context, for Otis, like Samuel Adams did in defense of his invocation of the 1693 
Militia Act, is paraphrasing Blackstone’s Commentaries.652  Just like Blackstone, he 
lists the right to arms as the “fifth auxiliary right.”  It is a right that may be used only 
when the “three primary rights” are unlawfully restricted.653  When this happens the 
people are provided with the following constitutional checks: 
(1) The constitution or power of Parliament; (2) The limitation of the 
King’s prerogative (and to vindicate them when actually violated); (3) The 
regular administration of justice; (4) The right of petitioning for redress of 
grievances; (5) The right of having and using arms for self-defense.  See 
Mr. Blackstone’s accurate and elegant analysis of the laws of England.654 
The Individual Right Theorists will argue that, despite Otis’ reference to the 
allowance to “have arms” as an auxiliary right, he expressly refers to it as a right to 
have and use arms for self-defense.  They would claim this proves that the colonists 
and the Founding Fathers understood the allowance to “have arms” as one of armed 
individual self-defense, especially in the home.  This argument would fail for two 
reasons.  The first reason is that it is an auxiliary right.  Otis limits the “right of 
having and using arms” to only when the government unlawfully attacks the “three 
primary rights.”655  He is simply restating Blackstone’s legal analysis of that limited 
right—nothing more, nothing less.   
The second reason the “individual right” argument fails is the grievances listed in 
the Declaration of Independence.  Otis’ pamphlet was well known by the signers of 
the Declaration.  If they interpreted Otis’ statement as a right to armed individual 
self-defense, the disarming of the colonists certainly would have been added to the 
Declaration’s list of grievances.  This did not occur.  There is no doubt that Otis 
perfectly understood the “have arms” provision.  He even cited Blackstone, thus, 
making clear the limitations on the right he was articulating656—that individuals have 
a right take up arms as a means to check tyrannical government when all other 
constitutional safeguards have failed. 
Otis’ use of “self-defense” in this broader and different context may be confusing 
to Individual Right Scholars.  Pamphleteers, however, were not immune from using 
“self-defense” in a broader context.  For example, in describing Thomas Gage’s 
seizure of arms, James Macpherson wrote, “The great law of self-defence must 
therefore have justified [him] for having deprived the former of arms, which they 
almost avowedly intended to raise against all legal authority.”657  John Lind also 
described Gage’s seizure as an act in “self-defence” of government.  Lind felt that 
                                                          
652
 Id.; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 188, at 139. 
653
 JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (1765), reprinted in 1 
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545, 558-59. 
654
 Id. at 559 (citation omitted). 
655
 See id.  
656
 Id.  
657
 JAMES MACPHERSON, THE RIGHTS OF GREAT BRITAIN ASSERTED AGAINST THE CLAIMS 
OF AMERICA: BEING AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE GENERAL CONGRESS 74 
(London, T. Cadell 6th ed. 1776). 
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England was justified in its “acts of self-defence”658 because it was acting only “in 
consequence of resistance already shewn.”659 
Besides, in understanding the American perception of the English allowance to 
“have arms,” one cannot forget that the Founding Fathers and the American 
pamphleteers frequently referred to the 1689 Declaration of Rights to support their 
arguments.660  The British Constitution was always on their minds.  This is 
significant because the Founders would have been particularly familiar with the 
protective scope of the “have arms” provision.  If the Individual Right Scholars are 
correct in their interpretation, it does not make sense that the Founders did not list 
the seizure of arms by Thomas Gage, Josiah Martin, Lord Dunmore, and the 
restrictions on the importation of arms by Lord Dartmouth in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Any of these seizures would have unequivocally infringed on the 
“individual right” theory of armed self-defense.   
However, such an argument was never made in the Declaration of Independence.  
One may argue that the mention of Gage’s seizure of arms in the 1775 Declaration 
of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms661 already addressed this point, and 
the Founders did not need to mention it again.  This argument is diminished when 
comparing the two Declarations, for the Declaration of Independence included the 
majority of grievances listed in its 1775 predecessor.662  Not to mention, the taking of 
arms was never stated as an infringement of their natural or constitutional right in the 
                                                          
658
 JOHN LIND, AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 129 
(London, T. Cadell 1776). 
659
 Id. at 128. 
660
 The Declaration of Rights and Grievances, passed in October 1774, catalogues “the 
principles of the English constitution.”  THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES (U.S. 
1774), http://usconstitution.net/intol.  Many of the rights listed are in direct reference to the 
1689 Declaration of Rights.  See John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym (Jan. 
13-27, 1866), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 158, 159-62 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977).  There are 
countless examples in the pamphlets of the American Revolution.  See, e.g., A LETTER TO THE 
PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, n. pub. 1760), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 257, 262, 269; JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS 
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in 1 
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 419, 428-29, 474; 
STEPHEN HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONIES EXAMINED (Providence, William Goddard 
1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776,  supra note 645, 
at 507, 511, 518; REASONS WHY THE BRITISH COLONIES, IN AMERICA, SHOULD NOT BE 
CHARGED WITH INTERNAL TAXES, BY AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT (New Haven, B. Mecom 
1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776,  supra note 645, 
at 386, 387, 389, 406.  Paul H. Smith compiled six pamphlets that incessantly refer to the 
English Constitution to support the American grievances.  See ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF 
AMERICAN FREEDOMS 1774-1778, supra note 243.  For the unconstitutionality of standing 
armies see JAMES BOWDOIN ET AL., A SHORT NARRATIVE OF THE HORRID MASSACRE IN BOSTON 
in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1776, at 211 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967). 
661
 THOMAS JEFFERSON & JOHN DICKINSON, DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY 
FOR TAKING UP ARMS (Philadelphia, Continental Congress 1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 213, 213-18 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
662
 Compare id. with THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
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former.663  The English government’s deprivation of trial by jury—“in cases 
affecting both life and property”—was described as an “accustomed and inestimable 
privilege.”664  Meanwhile, the taking of arms was described as an “open violation of 
Honour, in defiance of the obligation of Treaties, which even savage Nations 
esteemed sacred.”665   
The two descriptions are drastically different in their implications.  The 
Declaration’s description of trial by jury makes it clear that it was an affirmed 
right.666  It was a right that the 1774 Bill of Rights described as “constitutional.”667  
The same cannot be said about the possession of arms.  In fact, Individual Right 
Scholars have taken the true nature of the grievance completely out of context.  The 
“violation of honour” had nothing to do with the colonists’ forfeiture of personal 
arms but, rather, dealt with the fact that Gage violated the terms of their 
agreement.668   
                                                          
663
 THOMAS JEFFERSON & JOHN DICKINSON, supra note 661, at 216. 
664
 This grievance was also mentioned in the 1774 Bill of Rights.  That document stated: 
An act for the better securing his Majesty’s dock-yards, magazines, ships, 
ammunition and stores, which declares a new offence in America, and deprives the 
American subject the constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage, by authorizing the 
trial of any person, charged with the committing any offence described in the said act, 
out of the realm, to be indicted and tried for the same in any shire or county within the 
realm. 
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES (U.S. 1774), http://usconstitution.net/intol. 
665
 Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration as Adopted by Congress  (1776), in 1 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON supra note 661, at 213, 216 (emphasis omitted). 
666
 See THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES (U.S. 1774), http://uscon 
stitution.net/intol. 
667
 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 660, at 158, 162. 
668
 The original agreement permitted citizens to leave Boston on the condition that they 
took no firearms or ammunition among their possessions.  In response, the Provincial 
Congress resolved to permit those wishing to live in Boston to do so on the same condition 
and even to send out for their effects later.  Letter From James Warren (May 7, 1775), in 3 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 6 n.8 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979). 
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Both Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson’s drafts attest to this fact.669  The 
inhabitants that wished to depart Boston entered into a treaty with Thomas Gage.  
The terms agreed upon required those persons who were departing to deposit their 
arms with the local magistrate.670  Gage violated this agreement by seizing these 
arms and other personal effects from the magistrate.671  This is what the Declaration 
of Independence referred to as being “in defiance of the obligation of treaties, which 
even savage nations esteem sacred.” 
Not even John or Samuel Adams—who were always critical of Gage’s actions—
made any mention of the seizure of arms as a violation of a right to “have arms.”  
This is significant because it is John Adams’ legal and political works that Individual 
Right Scholars quote as support for their stance.672  For example, Adams represented 
the British soldiers that participated in the Boston Massacre.673  It is claimed that his 
                                                          
669
 Dickinson wrote: 
The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that Town by the General their 
Governor & having in order to procure their Dismission entered into a Treaty with 
him, it was stipulated (between the) that the said Inhabitants having deposited their 
Arms with their own Magistrates, should have (free) Liberty to depart, (out of said 
town) taking with them their other Effects.  They accordingly delivered up their Arms, 
but in open violation of Honor, in Defiance of the Obligations of (a) Treat(y)es, which 
even savage Nations esteem sacred, the Governor ordered the Arms deposited 
aforesaid that they might be preserved for their owners, to be seized by a Body of 
(armed men) soldiers. 
John Dickinson, John Dickinson’s Composition Draft (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON supra note 661, at 204, 210.  Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
The inhabitants of the town of Boston in order to procure their enlargement having 
entered into treaty with (a certain Thomas Gage, principal instigator of these 
enormities) General Gage their Governor (to procure their Enlargement), it was 
stipulated that the said inhabitants, having first deposited their arms with their own 
magistrates (their own arms [and] military stoers) should have free liberty to depart 
out of the said town, taking with them their other (goods [and]) effects.  Their arms 
(and military stores) they accordingly delivered in, and claimed the stipulated license 
of departing with their effects, But in open violation of plighted faith & honor, in 
defiance of the sacred obligation of treaty which even savage nations observe, their 
arms (and warlike stores), deposited with their own magistrates to be preserved as 
their property, were immediately seized by a body of armed men under orders from 
the said (Thomas) General [Gage].   
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Fair Copy for the Committee (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 199, 201-02 (third alteration in original). 
670
 See supra note 669. 
671
 The main grievance was that “provisions and merchandise were added to the list” on 
top of arms.  Not to mention, “arbitrary searches were made of all containers, and sometimes 
passports were so drawn as to separate families.”  Letter From Joseph Palmer (June 19, 1775), 
in 3 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 668, at 27, 29 n.2. 
672
 HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’,  supra note 567, at 25-26; HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE 
ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 58 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
HALBROOK, ARMED]. 
673
 JOHN ADAMS, ADAMS’ ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENSE (Dec. 3-4, 1770), in 3 LEGAL 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242, 248 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
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closing argument affirms that individuals had a right to own arms.674  In his closing 
argument Adams states, “Here every private person is authorized to arm himself, and 
on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm 
themselves at that time, for their defence.”675   
Many assumptions are made from this quotation without putting it into the 
context of Adams’ closing argument.  First, Individual Right Scholars omit the 
remainder of the quote,676 which stated, “[T]he inhabitants had a right to arm 
themselves at that time, for their defence, not for offence, that distinction is material 
and must be attended to.”677  Second, Adams was talking about the legality of self-
defense in the English Riot Act.678  He gives a lengthy and detailed account of how it 
was lawful to “repel force with force,” especially when an armed mob is 
approaching.679 
Citing William Hawkins’ Pleas to the Crown, Adams stated: “[T]he killing of 
dangerous rioters, may be justified by any private persons, who cannot otherwise 
suppress them, or defend themselves from them; in as much as every private person 
seems to be authorized by the law, to arm himself for the purposes aforesaid.”680  
Adams was not saying that individuals have a right to own arms.  Rather, he was 
stating that when individuals are compelled to defend themselves, they “may be 
justified” in using the “arms” that are available.681  This is made clear by Adams’ use 
of “at that time.”  Most importantly, though, Adams cited the Riot Act.  He made no 
reference to the 1689 Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision.  He is merely 
paraphrasing Hawkins’ statement that “justifiable homicide in the due advancement 
of public justice.”682 
                                                          
674
 HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 25-26; HALBROOK, ARMED, supra note 672, 
at 58. 
675
 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 673, at 248. 
676
 HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 25. 
677
 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 673, at 248. 
678
 See id. at 247-48. 
679
 Id. at 247. 
680
 Id. at 247-48 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, 1 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 74 
(London, E. Nutt 1716)). 
681
 Id. 
682
 This portion of Hawkins reads: 
If those who are engaged in a Riot, or a Forcible Entry, or Detainer, stand in their 
Defence, and continue the Force in Opposition to the Command of a Justice of Peace, 
& c. or resist such Justice endeavoring to arrest them, the killing of them may be 
justified (a): and so perhaps may the killing of dangerous Rioters by any private 
Persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or defend themselves from them, 
inasmuch as every private Persons seems to be authorized by the Law to arm himself 
for the Purposes aforesaid. 
HAWKINS, supra note 680, at 71. 
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Adams did not view arms ownership as right.683  He viewed it as a societal 
allowance.  While Adams’ legal knowledge made him an advocate for self-defense, 
nothing proves that he viewed arms ownership as a right to accomplish that end.  In 
fact, if the Individual Right Theorists are correct, why did Adams not describe 
Gage’s taking of arms in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up 
Arms as infringing on their right to “have arms”?  Not even the radical James Warren 
mentioned Gage’s seizure of arms in such a fashion.684  
Even if the main focus of the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking 
Up Arms grievance was the seizure of arms, James Macpherson’s response did not 
describe it as a constitutional grievance.  In his pamphlet entitled The Rights of Great 
Britain Asserted Against the Claims of America, Macpherson places the Declaration 
of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms grievance in its proper historical 
context.685  While the seizure of arms was certainly listed as part of a larger 
grievance, it did not violate the guarantee that “Protestants Subjects may have arms 
for their defence.”  That limited right was being exercised by the colonists.    
The 1775 pamphlet Resistance No Rebellion addressed this and the “fifth 
auxiliary right” that the “have arms” provision affirmed.  It was a right that was 
exercised twice against the Stuart monarchy.  The first time was against Charles I’s 
“despotic measures, totally contrary to the laws of the land, and wholly inconsistent 
                                                          
683
 See JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1787-1788).  “Individual right” 
proponents also argue that Adams’ Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United 
States of America supports their stance.  They believe Adams viewed arms ownership as a 
right because he recognized the propriety of “arms in the hands of citizens, to be used . . . in 
private self-defence.”  Id.  This is another quotation that Individual Right Scholars take out of 
context.  Adams was actually articulating a principle that undercuts the “individual right” 
theory.  He believed “arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion” would 
be “to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by 
no man—it is a dissolution of government.”  Id.  There were two exceptions to this rule that 
society may allow.   These were (1) “private self-defence” and (2) through the militia “by 
partial orders of towns, counties, or districts of a state.”  Id.  While the former allowance—
self-defence—was not articulated as a right—fundamental, natural, or constitutional—the 
latter was described as “the fundamental law.”  As many proponents of the militia believed, 
Adams felt that “[t]he arms of the commonwealth should be lodged in the hands of that part of 
the people which are firm to its establishment.”  Id. 
684
 See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 660, at 3, 4. 
685
 Macpherson wrote:  
The assertions of the Congress concerning transactions within the town of Boston, are 
as utterly devoid of truth, as their account of what happened in the country.  The 
hostile intentions of those WITHIN, were as apparent as the rebellion of their brethren 
WITHOUT was certain.  The great law of self-defence must therefore have justified 
General Gage for having deprived the former of arms, which they almost avowedly 
intended to raise against all legal authority.  After the skirmish at Lexington and 
Concord, all supplies from the country were cut off from the town of Boston.  Many of 
the inhabitants desired to remove, with their effects.  Their request was granted; but it 
was at the same time demanded, that they should deliver up their arms. 
MACPHERSON, supra note 657, at 74. 
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with the rights and freedom of the subject.”686  This forced “the people to have 
recourse to that resistance, which they had an unquestionable right to make use of, 
whenever it became absolutely necessary for the defence and preservation of their 
constitution.”687 
The second time occurred during the Glorious Revolution.  James II’s despotic 
acts “roused up the resentment of the nation, and obliged the people to make use of 
their right to resistance, in defence of their laws, liberties and religion; when they 
called over the Prince of Orange.”688  The American Colonies were justly entitled to 
this right: 
That all English subjects have a right to resist any attempt, to subvert 
and set aside their laws, rights and the constitution; and that is their 
undoubted duty to do so—That the people of England did, at the happy 
Revolution, resist the tyrannical attempt of King James to subvert and 
destroy their laws, rights, and liberties.689 
This is why the colonists had taken up arms.  As the Declaration of the Causes 
and Necessity for Taking Up Arms stated, it was “in defence of the Freedom that is 
our Birthright . . . for the protection of our Property” that they had “taken up 
Arms.”690  The Olive Branch Petition similarly justified the colonists’ actions, stating 
that the government’s “measures and proceeding to open hostilities for enforcing 
them, have compelled us to arm in our own defence.”691  This is a description that 
mirrors the language of the “have arms” provision—“arms for their defence.”692    
                                                          
686
 RESISTANCE NO REBELLION: IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT TO TAX 
THE AMERICAN COLONIES IS FULLY CONSIDERED, AND FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 21-22 
(1775). 
687
 Id. 
688
 Id. at 22. 
689
 Id. at 48.  When the Boston Assembly gave instructions regarding the vote for 
independence, its representatives were reminded that they were on “the verge of a glorious 
Revolution.”  Instructions of the Town of Boston to Their Representatives (1776), in 6 
AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 556, 556 (Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter 
Force 1846).  In much the same light, Brunswick, Massachusetts legitimized its support for 
autonomy due to “their attachment to the system of legal Government established by the 
glorious Revolution.”  John Ker, Address of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
to the King (1776), in 6 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra, at 604, 604.   
Buckingham County, Virginia reminded its delegates regarding the vote for autonomy, that it 
was by the Glorious Revolution, “and the choice of the people, that the present royal family 
was seated on the throne of Great Britain.”  Id.  So it was that the Glorious Revolution came to 
be revered as the most important political ideal of American independence; when government 
becomes defective “or deviates from the end of its institution, and cannot be corrected, [be] 
that the people may form themselves into another avoiding defects of the former.”  Id. 
690
 John Dickinson, John Dickinson’s Composition Draft (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 204, 218. 
691
 Second Petition From Congress to the King (July 8, 1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 219, 220. 
692
 A better example can be found in Robinson Morris’s pamphlet Considerations.  He 
states, “We possess a great and fine country; we have the most noble and beneficial 
dependencies; we have a fleet; we have an army; we have several hundred thousands, and 
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Even with this history readily available to them, Individual Right Theorists will 
argue that the Founding Fathers wanted to prevent the future seizure of arms that 
occurred in the American Revolution.  To them, the Second Amendment was drafted 
to protect against such an event.  It fixed any disparity between the “having of arms” 
and the right of resistance by stating that people’s right to “keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed.” On its face, this argument would seem to make sense, but the 
Amendment makes a distinct reference to a “well organized militia.”  The Supreme 
Court majority in Heller rationalized that such language helps explain the right and 
does not determine it.693  In other words, the majority determined that the right was 
separate and distinct from a “well organized militia.”  It felt that the Founders’ 
terminology “keep and bear Arms” was a more precise and affirmative way to state 
“Protestant subjects may have arm for their Defence.”694   
There is little denying that the two constitutional guarantees are similar.  What 
separates the two is that the Second Amendment was not restricted by England’s 
socio-economic and hierarchal structure.695  In addition, it was a right that “shall not 
be infringed.”  This is strong language that indicates just how limited the right is and 
its undoubted connection to a “well regulated militia.”696  Nevertheless, the Heller 
majority felt that “bearing arms” was synonymous with the carrying of arms, and 
“keeping arms” was another way of affirming gun ownership.697  The thirteen 
colonies’ use of these terms in their respective statutes undercuts this 
interpretation.698   
                                                                                                                                         
perhaps a million of men capable of bearing arms in their own defence.”  ROBINSON MORRIS, 
CONSIDERATIONS (1774), reprinted in ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF AMERICAN FREEDOMS 1774-
1778, supra note 243, at 49, 89. 
693
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (“The prefatory clause 
does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient 
right; most undoubtedly they thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”).   
694
 Id. at 2798.  
695
 The Founders agreed with the writings of such seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
political philosophers as Algernon Sidney, James Harrington, David Hume, John Toland, John 
Trenchard, Walter Moyle, Andrew Fletcher, and Robert Viscount Molesworth—all of who 
agreed that the militia should consist of the free body of a nation’s people.  See CHARLES, 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 107-12; IDEAL COMMONWEALTHS, supra note 419, at 
183, 183; DAVID HUME, IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH, reprinted in ESSAYS: MORAL, 
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 512, 525 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985); Lawrence Delbert Cress, 
Radical Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological Roots of the American 
Revolutionary Militia, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 43, 47 (1979). 
696
 See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 8. 
697
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-99. 
698
 The use of the phrase “bear arms” was only distinctly used in militia laws.  There is 
not one instance of “bear arms” appearing in any self-defense, gun, hunting, or slave law.   It 
is true that the Pennsylvania minority had proposed a “bear arms” provision that includes 
hunting, but this amendment never reached the floor of Congress or the Constitution’s drafting 
committee.  There is also no proof that it even reached the floor of the Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention.  Moreover, the Supreme Court and Individual Right Theorists only selectively 
incorporate the language of that proposal.  See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, 
at 17-27, 39-40.  The Supreme Court did not report one instance of the use of “keep arms” in a 
colonial law.  The phrase can be found in many different forms in militia laws.  The keeping 
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This includes the examples of Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury and the 
Declaration of Independence.  Both use “bear arms” in its proper military context.699  
The Heller majority believes that the use of “bear arms” in examples such as these 
were technical in meaning, but are they?700  It is more sensible to argue that the 
phrase “keep and bear arms” was incorporated to remove any confusion that the 
“have arms” provision conveyed.  To further clarify the right—so it would not be 
abused—it is just as rational to argue that the same is true with the phrase “well 
regulated militia,” for these words and phrases were common only in the colonies’ 
militia laws or in State constitutions.701  It was England’s 1757 Militia Act which 
                                                                                                                                         
of arms did not necessarily mean that one owned or possessed the arms.  It was verbage to 
describe the maintaining or servicing of military arms.  See id. at 27-34. 
699
 Drayton accused Parliament and the king of passing a law “to make slaves of the crews 
of such vessels, and to compel them to bear arms against their conscience, their fathers, their 
bleeding country.”  1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, BY 
THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619, at 50, 52.  The charge even made 
the grievances in the Declaration of Independence.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
(U.S. 1776).  It dually accused the king of constraining “our fellow Citizens taken Captive on 
the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends 
and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.”  1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION 
OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619, 
at 50, 52.  Both grievances do not make sense other than to interpret the use of “bear arms” in 
its military context.  Even Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation used “bear arms” in the proper 
military context.  On November 7, 1775, he ordered “every Person capable of bearing Arms, 
to resort to his Majesty’s STANDARD.” John Earl, A Most Disagreeable but Absolutely 
Necessary Step, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 334, 334 
(Robert L. Scribner & Brent Tarter ed., 1978).  He further declared that “all inden[tured] 
Servants, Negroes, or others, free that are able and willing to bear Arms.”  Id.  The promise of 
freedom was meant to extend to only those who could perform military service—a fact that 
American opponents made sure to address.  Spotsylvania County Committee, Assembled 
Freeholders Choose a Committee, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO 
INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 417, 419 n.18.  Many viewed Dunmore’s Proclamation as a trick to 
lure slaves.  John Johnson thought it would be used to “subject many of these poor Wretches 
to the Loss of Life, [and] most severe punishment.”  John Johnson, Portsmouth Virginia, to 
Unidentified Addressee: An Intercepted Letter, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO 
INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 414, 415 (citation omitted).  An address to the people of 
Williamsburg stated, “To none . . . is freedom promised, but such as are able to do Dunmore 
service.”  A Few Anonymous Remarks on Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation, in 4 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, at 459, 461; see also PATRICK 
CHARLES, WASHINGTON’S DECISION: THE STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S DECISION TO 
REACCEPT BLACK ENLISTMENTS IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 52 (C. Thomas Long ed., 2005).  
It was argued that slaves be “flattered with their freedom, if they be able to bear arms.”  A 
Few Anonymous Remarks on Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: 
THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 459, 461. 
700
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2802 (2008). 
701
 The terminology was likely borrowed form the English militia laws.  In the House of 
Lords during the debates of the 1756 Militia Bill, the Earl of Stanhope stated, “[T]he only 
proper military force of a free country is a well regulated and well disciplined militia.”  15 
COBBETT, supra note 150, at 152.  The language would become part of the 1757 Militia Act 
that was passed by the English government.  It stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and well-
disciplined Militia is essentially necessary to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this 
Kingdom.”  30 Geo. 2, c. 3 (1757) (Eng.).  In an Amelia County Committee address in 
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stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and well-disciplined Militia is essentially necessary 
                                                                                                                                         
response to Dunmore’s seizure of gunpowder and neglect of the militia law, it was stated that 
the militia should “be properly and regularly disciplined, and that the patrollers in every 
neighborhood be constantly kept on duty.”  Amelia County Committee, Preparations for 
Armed Conflict (May 3, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 
supra note 603, at 82, 83.  Similar language was used in the colonies’ militia laws and 
constitutions: “Whereas a well-regulated Militia, is the proper and natural Defence of a free 
State.”  Act of 1778, ch. 20 Del. Laws (for better regulating a militia within this state), 
microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN);  “Whereas a well regulated Militia is the 
proper and natural Defence of a free State, and as the Laws heretofore made for the Regulation 
thereof, are found to be inadequate for the good Purposes thereby intended.”  Act of Feb. 5, 
1782, Del. Laws (establishing a militia within the state), microformed on William S. Hein & 
Co. (HEIN); “Whereas a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of every free 
State: And as the several laws enacted by the Legislature of this state for the regulation of the 
militia thereof have been found to require material alterations; in order to which it has been 
thought more advisable to revise the whole system.”  Act of June 18, 1793, ch. 36, 1793 Del. 
Laws (establishing a militia in this state), microformed on William S. Hein & Co., (HEIN);  
“That a well regulated Militia is the proper, natural and safe Defense of a free government.”  
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776), available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/organic/1776-ddr.htm;  “Whereas a well ordered and well 
disciplined militia is essentially necessary to the safety, peace, and prosperity of this 
province.”  Act of Mar. 25, 1765, Ga. Laws 33, 33 (providing for better ordering the militia of 
this province), microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN);  “It is evident from the 
experience of ages, that to be prepared for war, is the greatest security of peace of a nation; 
and that a well organized Militia ought to be considered among the first objects of a free 
people.”  Act of Feb. 2, 1798, Ga. Laws 21 (providing more effectual training to the Militia of 
this state), microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN);  “Whereas the defence and safety 
of republican states must greatly depend on their militia which cannot be well organized and 
disciplined without arms and experienced officers.”  Act of Feb. 18, 1799, Ga. Laws 76 
(altering and amending the militia law of this state, and to provide arming the militia thereof), 
microformed on William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (HEIN);  “That a well-regulated militia is the 
proper and natural defence of a free government.”  MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XXV, available at 
http://www.nhumanities.org/ccs/docs/md-1776.htm;  “Whereas it is a Duty and Interest of 
every State, to have the Militia thereof properly armed, trained and in compleat Readiness to 
defend against every Violence or Invasion whatever.”  Act of March 2, 1781, Mass. Laws (for 
forming and regulating the Militia within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts), microformed 
on Redgrave Information Resourced Corp. (RIR);  “A well regulated militia is the proper, 
natural, and sure defence of a state.”  N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXIV, available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/organic/1784-nhr.htm; “Whereas it is necessary, in this time 
of danger, that the militia be well regulated and disciplined.”  Act of Apr. 14, 1757, ch. 1, 
1757 Va. Laws (for better regulating and disciplining the militia), microformed on William S. 
Hein & Co. (HEIN);  “[D]ue regulation of the Militia is absolutely necessary for the defence 
of this country.”  Act of May 9, 1723, ch. 2, 1723 Va. Laws (providing for the settling and 
better regulation of the militia), microformed on William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (HEIN); 
“Whereas the defence and safety of the Commonwealth depend upon having its citizens 
properly armed and taught the knowledge of military duty, and the differently laws heretofore 
enacted being found inadequate for such purposes, and in order that the same may be formed 
into one plain and regular system.”  Act of Jan. 1, 1786, ch. 1, 1786 Va. Laws 1 (amending 
and reducing into one act, the several laws for regulating and disciplining the militia, and 
guarding against invasions and insurrections), microformed on Redgrave Information 
Resourced Corp. (RIR); “That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of people trained 
to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State.”  DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 
XIII (Va. 1776), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th _century/virginia.asp.   
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to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this Kingdom.”702  Virginia followed this 
language in its 1757 Militia Act when it proclaimed, “Whereas it is necessary, in this 
time of danger, that the militia of this colony should be well regulated and 
disciplined.”703  It should be stressed that the Constitution was written by the best 
legal minds America had to offer.  They undoubtedly understood how the phrases 
“well regulated militia” and “keep and bear arms” were incorporated in their legal 
system.  This was in the militia laws. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Convention debated the inclusion of the “well 
regulated” language, which shows that the language was not just explanatory 
rhetoric.  Eldridge Gerry was not pleased with the Amendment reading that a well 
regulated militia was the “best security of a free state.”704  He feared that although 
this insinuated that a militia was the “best security,” it also admitted that a standing 
army was a secondary choice.705  He moved that it should read, a “well regulated 
militia, trained to arms,” because this would make it the federal government’s duty to 
ensure that the militia was maintained.706  Although the motion was not seconded, the 
language, reading “being the best security of a free state,” eventually would be 
removed.  The words “necessary to the” were put in place of “the best,” making the 
Amendment imply what Gerry wanted it to—that a well regulated militia was the 
only security of a free State.707 
This limited interpretation of the Second Amendment is supported by the events 
that occurred during the infamous Shays’ Rebellion—the same rebellion that has 
been credited in aiding the formation of the United States Constitution.708  What has 
been lost in the history of the event is the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution.  It 
explicitly protected the “right of the people to keep and bear arms for the common 
                                                          
702
 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 1 (1757) (Eng.). 
703
 Ch. III, 7 LAWS OF VA. 93, 93 (Hening 1820) (enacted 1757). 
704
 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 188-89 
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).  The Earl of Stanhope stated a similar phrasing in the House of 
Lords during the debates of the 1756 Militia Bill.  Stanhope stated, “[T]he only proper military 
force of a free country is a well regulated and well disciplined militia.” 15 COBBETT, supra 
note 150, at 706.  The language would became part of the 1757 Militia Act that was passed by 
the English government.  It stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and well-disciplined Militia is 
essentially necessary to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this Kingdom.”  30 Geo. 2, c. 3 
(1757) (Eng.). 
705
 The debates of the Second Amendment support the idea that they were trying to 
suppress the idea of standing armies.  The colonists’ disdain for standing armies was reiterated 
many times in eighteenth-century documents, including a letter by John Cartwright.  He wrote, 
“As for troops, a country containing millions of inhabitants, never can want any: let them rely 
upon the natural, the best resource—a national militia; but, for heaven’s sake!  [N]ever more 
let the face of a British soldier be seen in North America.”  John Cartwright, Letter X (Apr. 14, 
1774), in ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF AMERICAN FREEDOMS 1774-1778, supra note 243, at 182, 
186. 
706
 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 704, at 188. 
707
 Id. at 175. 
708
 Matthew Spalding, The Formation of the Constitution, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 7 (2005); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89, at 135-36 
(3d ed. 1994). 
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defence.”709  Despite this protection, the insurgents were forced to turn over their 
arms for a period of three years710—a seizure that neither Benjamin Lincoln, James 
Madison, George Washington, nor any of the Founding Fathers, viewed as an 
infringement on a right to “have” or “keep and bear arms.”711  In fact, the right to 
“keep and bear arms” was defined by the Massachusetts legislature during the 
rebellion.  In An Act for the more speedy and effectual suppression of tumults and 
insurrections in the commonwealth, the Massachusetts legislature resolved: 
Whereas in free government, where the people have a right to keep 
and bear arms for the common defence, and the military power is held in 
subordination to the civil authority, it is necessary for the safety of the 
state that the virtuous citizens thereof should hold themselves in readiness, 
and when called upon, should exert their efforts to support the civil 
government and oppose attempts of factitious and wicked men who may 
wish to subvert the laws and constitution of their country.712 
The Act’s use of “keep and bear arms” clearly limits the right to service in the 
militia and in defense of the State.  Although the Massachusetts constitutional 
protection did not expressly mention the militia, it was inherently understood, for the 
“bearing of arms” was eighteenth-century language in reference to the military use of 
arms.713  The use of this language in all the colonies’ militia laws supports this.  
                                                          
709
 MA. CONST. of 1780 art. XVII.  
710
 On February 16, 1787, the Massachusetts government passed the following into law: 
That they shall keep the peace for the term of three years . . . and that during that term 
of time, they shall not serve as Jurors, be eligible to any town office, or any other 
office under the Government of this Commonwealth, and shall be disqualified from . . 
. giving their votes for the same term of time, for any officer, civil or military, within 
this Commonwealth, unless such persons, or any of them, shall after the first day of 
May, seventeen hundred and eighty-eight, exhibit plenary evidence of their having 
returned to their allegiance . . .  
. . . . 
That it shall be the duty of the Justice before whom any offender or offenders 
aforesaid may deliver up their arms, and take and subscribe the oath aforesaid…and it 
shall be the duty of the Justice to require such as shall take and subscribe the oath of 
allegiance, to subjoin their names, their places of abode, and their additions, and if 
required, to give to each offender who shall deliver up his arms . . . a certificate of the 
same under his seal . . . . and it shall be the duty of such Major-General or 
commanding officer, to give such directions as he may think necessary, for the safe 
keeping of such arms, in order that they may be returned to the person or persons who 
delivered the same, at the expiration of said term of three years, in case such person or 
persons shall have complied with the conditions above-mentioned, and shall obtain an 
order for the re-delivery of such arms, from the Governour.  
Disqualifying Act, ch. 6, 1787 Mass. Laws, microformed on Redgrave Information Resources 
Corp. (RIR). 
711
 See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 84-87. 
712
 Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Laws 564 (providing for the more speedy and 
effectual suppression of Tumults and Insurrections in the Commonwealth), microformed on 
Redgrave Information Resources Corp. (RIR). 
713
 See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 23-27, 85-86. 
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Meanwhile, the Second Amendment expressly mentions a “well-regulated militia,” 
yet, the Supreme Court did not interpret that right as being limited to the militia.  
This is understandable given the Court’s reliance on Joyce Lee Malcolm’s research 
on the English “have arms” provision.  Generally, any court that starts its legal 
interpretation with inaccurate information will end up with a conclusion much 
different than the original intent.  One would think Article VI, Section 4 of the 
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution’s, removes any doubt on this issue.  It 
read: 
[N]or shall any body of forces be kept up, by any State in time of 
peace, except such number only as, in the judgement of the United States, 
in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts 
necessary for the defence of such State; but every State shall always keep 
up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and 
accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public 
stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of 
arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.714 
The Articles’ use of the language “well regulated and disciplined” mirrors the 
prefatory language of the Second Amendment and may have been the latter’s 
inspiration.  The Supreme Court, however, failed to take notice of this connection. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
The idea that individuals have an Anglo-American constitutional right to “have 
arms” for personal self-defense is one of the greatest historical myths of all time.  
While Individual Right Scholars, supporters, and lobbyists have convinced the 
majority of Americans that such a right existed during the Founding and pre-
Founding eras, much of the credit should be given to the contemporary 
understanding of the phrase “keep and bear arms.”  Modern state constitutions have 
used the language to protect an individual’s right to possess arms for self-defense. 
There is no denying that some state constitutions undoubtedly protect such a right.  It 
is within each state’s constitutional structure to do so.  This fact, however, should not 
influence our interpretation of the Founders’ understanding of the right.   
There exists no substantiating historical or legal evidence that Englishmen—of 
all classes—had an affirmative right to “have arms” for personal defense.  The legal 
allowance to “have arms”—for all purposes—was based upon hierarchal and socio-
economic status.715  It cannot be stressed enough that the 1689 Declaration of Rights 
“have arms” provision did not apply to all laws respecting firearms.716  It was not 
intended to be a blanket provision covering game and gun laws.717  It was meant to 
serve only two purposes.  The first purpose was to speak to the philosophical 
principle and the limited right of the people to rebel when all forms of redress against 
a tyrannical government had been exhausted718—what Blackstone understood as the 
                                                          
714
 ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added). 
715
 See supra pp. 363-65. 
716
 See supra pp. 356-83. 
717
 See supra pp. 386-403. 
718
 See supra pp. 382-83, 387-88. 
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“fifth auxiliary right.”719  However, as history shows, individuals did not necessarily 
need to possess the arms to exercise this right.720  The second purpose of the “have 
arms” provision was an allowance through the militia to possess certain armaments 
to defend the realm against invasion and to check unlawful standing armies721—an 
interpretation supported by the works of Granville Sharp, St. George Tucker, and 
Samuel Adams.722  In any case, it was an allowance that was intended to be regulated 
by Parliament “suitable to [an indivdual’s] condition and as allowed by law.”723   
Furthermore, “arms for their defence” did not speak to individual self-defense.724  
It was terminology that referred to defending the realm.  Although “individual right” 
supporters can repetitively claim it spoke of an unfettered right to “have arms” for 
personal defense, repetition of the same opinion without substantiated historical 
evidence does not make it a fact.  Their analysis of the history of the “have arms” 
provision is full of assumptions and opinion—maybe more so than facts.  They even 
go so far to state that a parliamentary debate on the Gordon Riots of 1780 proves that 
all individual’s had a right to own guns.725  Not only was this debate non-
contemporaneous with the adoption of the English “have arms” provision, but 
Individual Right Scholars understand neither the political climate of that debate nor 
the history because they take it out of context.726  
In closing, the historical evidence shows that the Supreme Court majority in 
Heller and the Nordyke court were misled by Individual Right Scholars’ 
interpretation of the English “have arms” provision.  Whether it will be reexamined 
by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago is another issue.  Both the 
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals certainly felt the history was 
still subject to litigation, and Supreme Court precedent supports this practice.  It is 
well-established that the Supreme Court may reexamine constitutional history when 
recent scholarship shows historical disparities with the Court’s past decisions.  Not to 
mention, this constitutional issue should be reexamined because the first step in 
deciding whether a right is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is whether it is “fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice.”727  In determining this test, the Supreme Court has traditionally examined 
                                                          
719
 See supra pp. 416-20. 
720
 See supra pp. 408-11; 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 32 (1757) (Eng.). The Founding generation 
also practiced this principle.  Some states controlled and distributed the militia arms.  
CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 73-79.  Moreover, the federal government 
considered taking similar steps in enforcing its constitutional power to organize the militia, 
including collecting and storing all the militias’ arms.  Id. at 76-79. 
721
 See supra pp. 384-86.  For American militia right, see supra pp. 433-34. 
722
 For Granville Sharp see supra pp. 410-18.  For St. George Tucker, see supra 417-21.  
For Samuel Adams see supra pp. 424-34.  
723
 See supra pp. 353-54, 403-04. 
724
 See supra pp. 371, 387-92, 414-16. 
725
 For the debates, see 21 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 726, 726-54 (London, T.C. Hausard 1813). 
726
 SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 207, 222-24. 
727 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  See also Smith v. Alright, 321 U.S. 
649, 665-66 (1944); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575 
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the Anglo-American tradition of the right being asserted.  Given that the Court only 
briefly touched upon this in Heller, it is highly probable it will be addressed again.  
If this happens, the weight of the historical evidence shows what the Court should 
do—not incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause and possibly overturn Heller. 
This history is also significant in understanding the Second Amendment as a 
“privilege and immunity” of the citizens of the United States, for the privilege of all 
citizens to defend the country predates even the 1689 Declaration of Rights and 
continued up to the Reconstruction.728  Although the Second Amendment may not 
have bound the states,729 the Founders were in agreement that the people must 
participate in defending the nation to understand liberty.730—a privilege that the 
Supreme Court has twice identified the Second Amendment as protecting.  This 
prevented a standing army and the creation of a soldier class of citizens who felt they 
were superior to the citizens and liberties they protected.731   
It must be noted that, by the Reconstruction Era, there were some in Congress 
who viewed the Second Amendment as protecting the right to defend the home and 
property.732  However, the Second Amendment was most frequently brought up in 
                                                                                                                                         
(1985); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 604, 611 (1971); Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1985). 
728
 See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2420-21 (1809); 23 ANNALS OF CONG. 1023 (1812); 28 
ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (1814); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 523 (1854) (“By 
enrolling the slaves in the militia, and yielding to their Constitutional right ‘to keep and bear 
arms’ . . . Congress would convert those foes into friends.”); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st 
Sess. app. at 482, 1070, 1078, 1090-91, 1122 (1856); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 73 
(1857); Letter of Joseph Tallmadge (Dec. 29, 1809), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 263, 266-67 (Walter Lowerie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & 
Seaton 1832); On the Subject of the Organization and Discipline of the Militia of the United 
States (Feb. 27, 1827), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 597, 600 (Asbury 
Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860); Report of the board of 
officers relative to the militia (Nov. 28, 1826), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY 
AFFAIRS, supra at 388, 389; Application of New York for Amendments to the Militia System 
of the United States (Dec. 24, 1833), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 240, 
241 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860). 
729
 In 1863, Mr. Bayard described the Second Amendment “as a to guard the States.”  
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 729 (1863).   
730
 CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 111-14; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252, 265 (1886) (The Amendment prevents the states  from “prohibit[ing] the people from 
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for 
maintaining the public security[.]”); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929) 
(Citing the Second Amendment, the Court held “the common defense was one of the purposes 
for which the people ordained and established the Constitution.”). 
731
 Id. at 34-39, 111-14. 
732
 Mr. Nye stated, “As citizens of the United States [Freedmen] have equal right to 
protection, and to keep and bear arms for self-defense.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1073 (1866).  Mr. Pomeroy stated that Freedmen “should have the right to bear arms for the 
defense of himself and family and his homestead.”  Id. at 1182.  Meanwhile, Mr. Davis stated 
that the Founding Fathers “were for every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them 
in his house, his castle, for his own defense.”  Id. at 371; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 325-26, 390-91 (2005).   
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congressional debates on whether the Reconstruction states could maintain a 
militia,733 granting Freedmen the right to vote,734 the disarming of Freedmen veterans 
or soldiers,735 and the organization of the United States militia itself736—all of which 
                                                          
733
 In defending against disarming the unlawful militias in the South, Mr. Saulsbury voted 
against such a proposition because the Constitution “does not give power to Congress to 
disarm the militia of the State, or destroy the militia of a State, because [of the] . . . second 
amendment.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 914 (1866).  No one questioned Saulsbury’s 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.  Mr. Wilson, however, thought the disarming of 
southern militias in this instance lawful, despite the Second Amendment, because Congress 
has “the power to disarm ruffians or traitors, or men who are committing outrages against 
law.”  Id. at 915.  In other words, Congress had the power to disarm unlawful militias that 
were not in support of the Constitution or just government.   Such militias were engaged in 
rebellion, as occurred in Shays’ Rebellion.  CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 
83-87, 95.  When Congress readdressed the issue of unlawful militias in 1868, Mr. Buckalew 
and Mr. Warner turned to the Second Amendment as protecting the right of the states to 
organize their militias.  CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 83-85 (1868).  No one questioned 
either Buckalew or Warner’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.  Id. at 80-86.  Mr. 
Willey expressed similar sentiments in 1867.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1848-49 
(1867).  For the other 1867 debates on this issue, see id. at 1574-79. 
734
 In 1864, Mr. Holman defended the right of black soldiers to bear arms in service of the 
militia when he stated, “[T]he right to bear arms is the peculiar right of the free citizen in a 
free Republic.”  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1995 (1864).  Holman went on to state 
black soldiers have a “high appreciation of the right to bear arms for the defense of his 
country.”  Id.  In 1866, Mr. Salusbury stated, “Those races who bear arms to defend a 
Republic must be allowed to participate in its Government.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 145 (1866).  Mr. Farnsworth stated:  
[W]e compel them to bear arms in support and defense of the Government, and also to 
that other important fact, that we tax them for the support of Government . . . [yet] that 
man has no right to a voice in the choice of his rulers, and has no lot or part in the 
Government.   
Id. at 206.  Thomas Williams stated, “He counts in the representation.  He pays taxes, and 
must bear arms if necessary, and he has done it.  No sensible man now pretends to doubt that 
he is a citizen, or can doubt it in view of these considerations.”  Id. at 792.  Mr. Pomeroy 
stated, “The ‘right to bear arms’ is not plainer taught or more efficient than the right to carry 
ballots.”  Id. at 1183.  In a report to defend the rights of Freedmen, the Address of the Swiss 
Conventions read:  
But what would most disturb all our hopes would be to see those freedmen who had 
spilled their blood for the defense of the Union . . . [to be] deprived of those rights 
which are, in all republican Governments, the appanage of those brave men who are 
called to bear arms for their country.   
Id. at 2801.  In debating the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Barry stated, “The colored man 
having won the right to bear arms for the Republic, his claim to the elective franchise was but 
a logical sequence.”  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 266 (1871). 
735
 Congress was upset with the disarming of black Union soldiers and not allowing 
Freedmen to serve in militias.  Mr. Clarke stated, “[T]he brave black soldiers of the Union, 
disarmed and robbed by this wicked and despotic order . . . Many of these brave defenders of 
the nation paid for the arms with which they went to battle.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1839 (1866).  On May 23, 1866, it was reported to Congress:  
More than twenty-five thousand colored men of Kentucky have been soldiers in the 
Army of the Union. . . . [I]n many instances [they] are scourged, beaten, shot at, and 
driven from their homes and families.  Their arms are taken from them by the civil 
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discussed the limited nature of the Second Amendment in connection to the defense 
of the country.  Thus, few will deny the Reconstruction Congress viewed the right to 
defend the nation as a privilege and immunity of United States citizens.737  
Meanwhile, to argue that the Reconstruction Congress viewed “having arms” to 
defend the home as a “privilege and immunity” is less certain.  This is due to the fact 
that there is substantial evidence in the congressional record that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers were more concerned about the equal protection of arms 
laws738 rather than impeding on states’ and localities’ police power to regulate 
overall arms possession.739   
                                                                                                                                         
authorities and confiscated for the benefit of the Commonwealth.  The Union soldier is 
fined for bearing arms.  Thus the right of the people to keep and bear arms as provided 
in the Constitution is infringed.   
Id. at 2774 (alterations in original).  In 1866, the Committee of Reconstruction reported 
that in South Carolina:  
[P]ersons of color constitute no part of the militia of the State, and no one of them 
shall, without permission in writing from the district judge or magistrate, be allowed to 
keep a fire-arm . . . [and] not a pistol, musket or other fire-arm or weapon appropriate 
for purposes of war.   
Ex. Doc. No. 118, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (May 23, 1866).   
736
 In debating the appropriations of arms to the militias, Mr. Nye stated that the Second 
Amendment protects “the right of the citizen to bear arms and the duty of the Government to 
furnish them when organized regularly as militia of the States.”  CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4325 (1868).   
737
 In 1861, Mr. Breckinridge stated, “The President has not only guaranteed, by his 
action, the right to bear arms, but he has invited the patriotic citizens of the United States to 
bear arms for the only noble purpose for which men can take arms—in defense of the 
Constitution and liberties of the people.”  CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 1473 (1861). 
738
 Mr. Grinnell stated, “A white man in Kentucky may keep a gun; if a black man buys a 
gun he forfeits it and pays a fine of five dollars, if presuming to keep in his possession a 
musket which he has carried through the war.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 651 
(1866).  Mr. McKee stated, “We have one code for the white man, another for the black.  Is 
this Justice?”  Id. at 653.  Mr. Trumbull stated, “The moment that any State does justice and 
abolishes all discrimination between whites and blacks in civil rights, the judicial functions of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau cease.”  Id. at 941.  Mr. Raymond stated, “[W]e have colored aliens 
enjoying advantages that native colored persons cannot enjoy; the one class may be made 
citizens by act of Congress and the other is absolutely debarred from it.  Is it possible that the 
Constitution ever intended a distinction so invidious?”  Id. at 1266.  Mr. Harlan stated:  
If the fangs of slavery had not originally pierced the Constitution, then, in the first 
days of the Union, when citizens were sent out to claim dominion over the unpeopled 
Territories . . . those governments once admitted as States, it would have been to 
organize their militia and bear arms, irrespective of color.  
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078-79 (1868). 
739
 Henry Brannon listed the right “to keep and bear arms” as a privilege of the citizens of 
the United States, but stated that it “does not grant the right to carry a weapon” nor does it 
“impair the state power of regulation and police in this respect.”  HENRY BRANNON, A 
TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 65, 92 (Cincinnati, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1901) 
(1873). 
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Not to mention, by 1868, only seventeen740 of the thirty-seven state constitutions 
protected some form of an “individual right” to “keep and bear arms.”  This means 
that more than half the states did not view arms ownership in a light that supports the 
Individual Rights Scholars stance and did not view arms to defend the home as a 
right.  Needless to say, incorporating a right to “have arms” for personal self-defense 
through the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not as strong of a case as Individual 
Right Scholars proclaim it is.741  Even the constitutional commentators, after the 
                                                          
740
 ALA. CONST. of 1867 art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. of 
1868 art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32; KAN. 
CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25; MICH. CONST. of 1850 
art. XVIII, § 7; MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. 
of 1868 art. I, § 24; OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 21; PA. 
CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21; R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22; TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13; 
VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. IX.  This is looking at each state’s constitution in a light most 
favorable to the “individual right” stance.  However, out of these seventeen states, arguably 
eleven of these “bear arms” provisions could be interpreted as merely a militia right.  See FLA. 
CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and the lawful 
authority of the State.”); GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“[R]ight of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed.”); IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32 (“[R]ight to bear arms for 
the defence of themselves and the State.”); KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25 (“[R]ight of the 
citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); MO. 
CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and of the lawful 
authority of the State cannot be questioned.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“[R]ight of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4 
(“[P]eople have the right to bear arms for their defense and security.”); OR. CONST. of 1857 
art. I, § 21 (“[P]eople shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the 
State.”); PA. CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21 (“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms, in defence of 
themselves and the State, shall not be questioned.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. IX. 
(“[P]eople have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”).  For 
determining whether a state’s constitution possesses an “individual right” one should look at 
the state’s laws, constitutional conventions, and legislative history.  See CHARLES, SECOND 
AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 129-77. 
741
 There were certainly members of Congress that viewed the Second Amendment as 
protecting an “individual right,” however, this has been overemphasized by Individual Right 
Scholars.  Similar to their arguments on the English “have arms” provision, Individual Right 
Scholars ignore historical context in other areas of the legislative record to support their 
stance.  See HALBROOK, ARMED, supra note 672, at 107-53.  For instance, Individual Right 
Scholars argue the 1866 Freedman’s Bureau Act proves that the Reconstruction Congress 
wanted to secure a right to possess arms in the home.  Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 
269 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)).   However, the drafters 
may have been primarily concerned with protecting a militia right.  The pertinent Freedman’s 
Bureau Act section states that citizens shall “have full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, 
and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms.”  14 
STAT. 176-77 (1866).  Notice how the text “constitutional right to bear arms” is separated from 
the text “personal security.”  Id.  This is significant because Mr. Raymond also separated the 
Second Amendment from self-defense when he stated before Congress: “He has a defined 
status; he has a country and a home; a right to defend himself and his wife and children; a 
right to bear arms; a right to testify in the federal courts; he has all those rights that tend to 
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ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not view the Second Amendment as 
protecting a right to possess arms in defense of the home.742  
To its credit, the “individual right” argument of incorporation through the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause is substantially stronger than through the Due 
Process Clause, for while the history of the Anglo-American allowance to “have 
arms” shows that incorporation through the Due Process Clause is futile, depending 
on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction’s history and weighing 
the interests of federalism, the Court majority could go either way on the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.   
                                                                                                                                         
elevate him.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1266 (1866).  This separation of text 
implies that the drafters were protecting the limited militia right.  It must be remembered that 
Freedmen were often exempt from serving in the militia.  CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, 
supra note 14, at 58-60.  Not to mention, it was the unlawful rebel militias that were 
preventing Freedmen Union soldiers and militia from maintaining their arms.  See supra note 
735.  It is likely that it was this constitutional right to bear arms that Congress was protecting. 
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 BRANNON, supra note 739, at 65, 92; JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 558-677 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1873) (failing to 
mention the Second Amendment as privilege and immunity of United States citizens); 
THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 270-71 (Boston, Brown, 
Little & Co. 1880) (stating that the Second Amendment “implies the right to meet for 
voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order”); THEOPHILUS 
PARSONS, THE PERSONAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 188-89 
(Hartford, S.S. Scranton & Co. 1878) (classifying the Second Amendment as a military right 
and duty); ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP 166, 179 (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1881) (“The right to bear arms is a matter of state regulation.”); JOSEPH STORY, 
A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264-65 (Boston, 
Lawbook Exch. 1999) (1871) (classifying the Second Amendment as a militia right); ROGER 
FOSTER, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (Boston, Boston 
Book Co. 1895) (declaring disbanding of state militias as a violation of the Second 
Amendment); GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE END 
OF THE FIRST CENTURY 359 (Boston, D.C. Heath & Co. 1895) (discussing how the Second 
Amendment prevents the federal government from depriving States of public security). 
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